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ABSTRACT 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) is a contentious mechanism that has 
been introduced to redress the imbalances caused by the apartheid regime by empowering 
previously disadvantaged individuals. Several scholars have argued that, whilst it is important 
to empower black individuals, B-BBEE is not necessarily the best method available. Long after 
the democratisation of South Africa and the introduction of B-BBEE legislation, the imbalance 
between the income of black and white South Africans is still evident, providing support for 
those claiming that B-BBEE needs to be reformed. B-BBEE compliance is a requirement for 
companies conducting business with government institutions, but voluntary for other 
organisations. The introduction of the 2013 Codes of Good Practice brought about stricter 
requirements for B-BBEE than those initially drafted in 2004.  
Corporate leaders might question whether the benefits related to B-BBEE outweigh the 
associated costs. Previous research yielded inconclusive results on the relationship between the 
total B-BBEE scores of listed companies and financial performance. Most of these studies were 
based on small samples and employed a limited number of financial performance measures. 
These gaps have been addressed in the current study. Not only was a large sample investigated 
over a longer time period in comparison to previous studies, but a wide range of financial health 
measures were used. The individual elements of the B-BBEE scorecard were investigated in 
addition to the total B-BBEE scores provided by Empowerdex. Financial health, the dependent 
variable, was used as a collective term for accounting-based, market-based, value-based and 
risk-based measures. The author controlled for company size. The financial health and size data 
were sourced from the Bloomberg database. 
Four accounting-based measures, five market-based measures, one value-based measure and 
one risk-based measure were employed in this study. Descriptive statistical analyses were 
conducted to investigate trends in the data. Mixed-model analysis of variance and Fisher’s Least 
Significant Difference tests were used to assess the significance of the observed trends over 
time. Panel regression models were employed to investigate the relationships between B-BBEE 
scores (in total and per element) and each of the considered financial health measures. In total, 
1 767 observations from 379 unique companies were analysed over the 12-year study period 
(2004-2015). 
A statistically significant positive relationship was noted between total B-BBEE score and cost 
of equity. In contrast, a statistically significant negative association was observed between total 
B-BBEE score and the Price/ Earnings (P/E) ratio. Significant increases in B-BBEE scores (in
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
iii 
 
total and per element) were observed over the research period. The mean socio-economic 
development B-BBEE element scores reflected the largest increase over time. The panel 
regression analysis revealed a significant positive association between this element and the P/E 
ratio. A significant negative association was also reported between the management control 
element and cost of equity.  
Based on the empirical findings, recommendations are offered to a range of stakeholders. 
Directors should carefully consider their B-BBEE strategies by giving more attention to 
management control and socio-economic development, given the significant associations 
reported between these elements and financial health. The BEE commission should also 
critically evaluate the appropriateness of the individual B-BBEE elements and their weightings 
in the current economic climate. More focus could be placed on education and skills 
development to grow the talent pool in the country. Companies and government should 
thoughtfully consider the optimal manner to empower previously disadvantaged individuals. 
Keywords: Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment, accounting-based financial 
performance, market-based financial performance, value-based financial performance, default 
risk probability 
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OPSOMMING 
Breë-Basis Swart Ekonomiese Bemagtiging (B-BBEE) is ŉ omstrede meganisme wat in 
werking gestel is om die wanbalanse wat deur die apartheid regering veroorsaak is, reg te stel 
deur voorheen benadeelde persone te bemagtig. Menige outeurs is van mening dat, alhoewel 
dit belangrik is om swart individue te bemagtig, B-BBEE nie noodwendig die mees geskikte 
metode is nie. Lank na die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika en die bekendstelling van B-BBEE 
wetgewing, is die wanbalans tussen swart en wit inkomste steeds duidelik, wat steun verleen 
aan diegene wat redeneer dat B-BBEE hervorm moet word. Voldoening aan B-BBEE 
wetgewing word vereis van maatskappye wat handel met regeringsinstellings wil dryf, maar is 
nie verpligtend vir ander organisasies nie. Die bekendstelling van die 2013 Kodes van Goeie 
Praktyk bevat strenger vereistes vir B-BBEE as wat oorspronklik in 2004 daargestel is. 
Besigheidsleiers kan vra of die voordele van B-BBEE die meegaande koste oorskry. Vorige 
navorsing het onbesliste resultate oor die verhouding tussen die totale B-BBEE tellings van 
genoteerde maatskappye en finansiële prestasie opgelewer. Meeste van hierdie studies is op 
klein steekproewe en ŉ beperkte aantal finansiële prestasie maatstawwe gegrond. Hierdie 
gapings is in hierdie studie aangespreek. Nie net is ŉ groter steekproef oor ŉ langer tydperk as 
vorige studies ondersoek nie, maar ŉ wye reeks finansiële gesondheidsmaatstawwe is gebruik. 
Die individuele elemente van die B-BBEE telkaart is, addisioneel tot die totale B-BBEE tellings 
deur Empowerdex verskaf, ondersoek. Finansiële gesondheid, die afhanklike veranderlike, is 
as ŉ versamelnaam vir rekeningkundig-gebaseerde, mark-gebaseerde, waarde-gebaseerde en 
risiko-gebaseerde maatstawwe gebruik. Die outeur het vir maatskappy-grootte gekontroleer. 
Die finansiële gesondheid en grootte data is vanaf Bloomberg verkry. 
Vier rekeningkundig-gebaseerde maatstawwe, vyf mark-gebaseerde maatstawwe, een waarde-
gebaseerde maatstaf en een risiko-gebaseerde maatstaf is in hierdie studie gebruik. 
Beskrywende statistiese analise is gedoen om die tendense in die data te ondersoek. Gemengde-
model analise van variansie (ANOVA) en Fisher se minste beduidende verskille (LSD) toetse 
is gebruik om die beduidendheid van die tendense oor tyd vas te stel. Paneel regressie modelle 
is toegepas om die verhoudings tussen B-BBEE tellings (in totaal en per element) en elk van 
die oorweegde finansiële gesondheidsmaatstawwe te ondersoek. In totaal is 1767 waarnemings 
van 379 unieke maatskappye oor ŉ 12-jaar studieperiode (2004-2015) ondersoek. 
ŉ Statisties beduidende positiewe verwantskap is waargeneem tussen totale B-BBEE telling en 
koste van ekwiteit. In teenstelling, is ŉ beduidende negatiewe verwantskap waargeneem tussen 
totale B-BBEE telling en die Prys/Verdienste verhouding. Beduidende toenames in B-BBEE 
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tellings (in totaal en per element) is oor die navorsingsperiode waargeneem. Die gemiddelde 
sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling B-BBEE element tellings het die grootste toename oor tyd 
getoon. Die paneel regressie analise het ŉ beduidende positiewe verhouding tussen hierdie 
element en die Prys/Verdienste verhouding getoon. ŉ Beduidende negatiewe verband is ook 
tussen die bestuursbeheer element en koste van ekwiteit gerapporteer. 
Gebaseer op die empiriese bevindinge word voorstelle aan verskeie belanghebbendes gemaak. 
Direkteure moet hul B-BBEE strategieë noukeurig oorweeg deur meer aandag aan 
bestuursbeheer en sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling te gee, gegewe die beduidende 
verwantskappe tussen hierdie elemente en finansiële gesondheid. Die BEE kommissie moet 
ook die toepaslikheid en die gewigte van die individuele B-BBEE elemente in die huidige 
ekonomiese klimaat krities evalueer. Groter fokus kan op onderrig en vaardigheidsontwikkeling 
geplaas word om die talentpoel in die land te vergroot. Maatskappye en die regering moet die 
optimale metode, waardeur voorheen benadeelde individue bemagtig kan word, deurdink. 
Sleutelwoorde: Breë-Basis Swart Ekonomiese Bemagtiging, rekeningkundige-gebaseerde 
finansiële prestasie, mark-gebaseerde finansiële prestasie, waarde-gebaseerde finansiële 
prestasie, risiko van wanbetaling 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
A new era was dawning in 1994 as apartheid in South Africa was demolished and ‘freedom for 
all’ seemed possible. Amidst the changing political landscape in the early 1990s, a world icon 
of peace, Nelson Mandela (1918-2013) pleaded reconciliation among all South Africans after 
being released from prison. Late president Mandela and the ruling African National Congress 
(ANC) party envisaged that ‘physical’ freedom was not sufficient, and that ‘true’ economic 
freedom had to be cultivated for all citizens, especially the victims of apartheid (Tangri & 
Southall, 2008; Ponte, Roberts & Van Sittert, 2007). This sentiment was echoed by Jeffrey 
(2014) and Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson (2007) who claimed that Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) was essential to achieve economic freedom for South 
Africans post-1994. The new South African government introduced legislation to address 
economic inequality. Since B-BBEE legislation was promulgated in 2003, B-BBEE 
compliance targets have become stricter (De Wet, 2016; Empowerdex, 2016). The question is 
increasingly being raised whether there is a financial motivation for publicly listed companies 
to achieve a higher level of compliance with this legislation (De Wet, 2016; Kleynhans & 
Kruger, 2014).  
A background discussion on B-BBEE in South Africa will be presented next, followed by an 
overview of pertinent research on the financial motives to enhance B-BBEE compliance. The 
research design and methodology will then be outlined, followed by the contribution and layout 
of the study. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
In this section, attention will firstly be given to the need for B-BBEE in South Africa. Secondly, 
an overview of the B-BBEE codes will be presented. Thirdly, the motives of complying with 
the Broad-Based Economic Empowerment Act (No 53 of 2003) (henceforth referred to as the 
2003 Act) will be highlighted. 
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1.2.1 The need for B-BBEE in South Africa 
Following the transition from the pre-1994 apartheid government to a democratic government 
in 1994, the ruling ANC party believed that political equality would not be sufficient to rectify 
the social and economic inequalities permeating the South African society (Acemoglu et al., 
2007). In line with the ANC’s belief that policy was vital to affect economic transformation, 
the 2003 Act was promulgated, and revised by the B-BBEE Act (No 46 of 2013). This 2003 
Act compelled all companies with a turnover of more than R10 million per year to comply with 
a set of requirements to promote equality and increase broad-based and effective participation 
of black people in the local economy. Black people is referred to as Africans, Indians and 
Coloureds in the 2003 Act (Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2003). A subsequent 
court ruling also included Chinese individuals in the definition of black people for the purpose 
of B-BBEE (Mail & Guardian, 2008). In sub-section 9(1)(a) of the 2003 Act, it is stated that 
the DTI would issue Codes of Good Practice to “promote the purposes of the Act” (DTI, 
2003:2). A brief overview of these Codes will be presented in the following section. 
1.2.2 The Codes of Good Practice 
The first draft of the Codes of Good Practice (hereafter referred to as the Codes) was circulated 
in 2004 (DTI, 2004). The objectives of the 2004 Codes were to further interpret and define B-
BBEE and the different categories of black employment entities (DTI, 2003). The 2004 draft 
Codes focussed on seven elements of economic empowerment, namely ownership, 
management, employment equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise 
development and other elements (collated as the residual element) (DTI, 2004). These elements 
provide a common base for measuring compliance with the 2003 Act (ibid).  
Companies were measured against the seven elements to provide an entity with an overall 
compliance score based on the 2004 Codes (ibid). In contrast, the 2007 Codes (DTI, 2007) and 
2013 Codes (DTI, 2013) categorised a company’s overall compliance score into eight levels. 
The 2004 Codes, however, classified companies’ B-BBEE compliance as excellent, good, 
satisfactory and limited based on their B-BBEE score (>80, 65-79.9, 40-64.9 and <40 
respectively, out of 100 available points) (DTI, 2004). 
The 2004 Codes were adjusted twice in the year that followed to promote companies’ level of 
participation in B-BBEE activities (Patel & Graham, 2012). The latest Codes were issued in 
2013 (DTI, 2013) and came into effect on 1 May 2015 (Empowerdex, 2016). The 2013 
amendments changed the weightings and requirements of the compliance levels (DTI, 2013; 
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2007; 2004). According to Empowerdex (2016), one of South Africa’s leading empowerment 
rating agencies, the 2013 Codes are likely to have a negative impact on the B-BBEE ratings of 
businesses, as the requirements have become stricter (Empowerdex, 2016). The compilation of 
a company’s B-BBEE score based on the respective codes is illustrated in Table 1.1. The 
difference in elements and weighting are shown for the respective elements.  
Table 1.1: Elements and weightings under the respective B-BBEE Codes (2004, 2007 
and 2013) 
Element 
Weighting (points) 
2004 2007 2013 
Ownership 20 20 25 
Management control 10 10 15 
Employment equity 10 15 n/a 
Skills development 20 15 20 
Preferential procurement 20 20 n/a 
Enterprise development 10 15 n/a 
Residual element 10 n/a n/a 
Enterprise and supplier development n/a n/a 40 
Socio-economic development  n/a 5 5 
Total 100 100a) 105a) 
a) Bonus points are available, as shown in Table 2.4 
Sources: DTI (2013; 2007; 2004) 
Perusal of Table 1.1 reveals that there has been limited change in the weightings of the elements 
in the 2004 and 2007 Codes. There were only slight changes in employment equity and skills 
development weightings, with the former being regarded as more important in the 2007 Codes. 
The 2004 Codes also made provision for a residual element, which entailed a company’s 
corporate social investment activities. In the 2007 Codes, this residual element was renamed 
socio-economic development initiatives.  
A number of changes occurred in the 2013 Codes. The entire weighting for employment equity 
was distributed to ownership, management control and skills development in equal proportions. 
Emphasis is now (under the 2013 Codes) placed not only on a representative workforce, but 
also on empowering black owners and managers. Preferential procurement and enterprise 
development were consolidated into enterprise and supplier development in the 2013 Codes. 
The aim is to assist and accelerate the development of small to medium enterprises owned by 
black people (DTI, 2013).  
According to De Wet (2016), local companies needed to implement black equity ownership 
transactions to comply with the 2013 Codes. Equity ownership transactions refer to transfer of 
shares from white to black individuals. The alternative is that a company could receive a ‘non-
compliant contributor’ certificate. De Wet (2016) expressed the view that companies will have 
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to critically decide whether these stricter B-BBEE requirements are worthwhile to comply with. 
A comparison between the scores required to qualify for various compliance levels under the 
2007 and 2013 Codes is provided in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.2: B-BBEE compliance levels (2007 versus 2013) 
B-BBEE Status 2007 Codes 2013 Codes 
Level one contributor >= 100 points >= 100 points 
Level two contributor >= 85, but <100 points >= 95, but <100 points 
Level three contributor >= 75, but <85 points >= 90, but <95 points 
Level four contributor >= 65, but <75 points >= 80, but <90 points 
Level five contributor >= 55, but <65 points >= 75, but <80 points 
Level six contributor >= 45, but <55 points >= 70, but <75 points 
Level seven contributor >= 40, but <45 points >= 55, but <70 points 
Level eight contributor >= 30, but <40 points >= 40, but <55 points 
Non-compliant contributor <30 points <40 points 
Sources: DTI (2013; 2007) 
It is evident that companies that gave insufficient attention to their B-BBEE endeavours would 
have experienced a decrease in their compliance levels with the implementation of the 2013 
Codes. This observation is supported by De Wet (2016) and the rating agency Empowerdex 
(2016) who expressed the view that companies were likely to drop two compliance levels if 
they have not increased their compliance efforts since the release of the 2013 Codes. In the 
following section, the benefits of complying with the 2003 Act will be discussed. It is important 
to note that compliance is encouraged for all companies, but is currently only compulsory for 
government institutions (DTI, 2013). There are still no penalties payable for non-compliance, 
but, certain sectors may require B-BBEE compliance to renew trade licenses (such as mining 
or banking licenses). 
1.2.3 Reasons for and benefits of complying with the B-BBEE Act 
Research (Sartorius & Botha, 2008; BusinessMap, 2005) suggests that compliance with 
empowerment legislation is primarily driven by the view that B-BBEE is a necessary and 
important step in rebuilding the South African economy. Sartorius and Botha (2008) 
furthermore remarked that companies regard B-BBEE as a way of growing their business and 
market share. Krüger (2011), however, stated that the perceived influence of B-BBEE on 
company performance is mainly negative.  
At the time when the most recent (2013) Codes came into effect (in May 2015) (Empowerdex, 
2016), Statistics South Africa (2015) announced that the real gross domestic product (GDP) 
decreased by 1.3 per cent quarter-on-quarter (seasonally adjusted and annualised). As a result 
of the struggling economy, B-BBEE arguably had to make economic and business sense for 
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companies to embrace it. According to De Wet (2016:2), “the decision to proceed with B-
BBEE (post-2013) should primarily be a commercial one. There should be reasonable certainty 
that improved empowerment will lead to revenue growth”. 
The question hence arises whether or not it makes commercial sense for companies to engage 
in B-BBEE activities. Several authors have investigated this question. They specifically 
investigated the nature of the association between a company’s B-BBEE score and financial 
performance. An overview of the most prominent studies in this regard is presented next. 
 
1.3  PRIOR STUDIES ON THE FINANCIAL MOTIVES FOR 
ENGAGING IN B-BBEE ACTIVITIES  
A number of researchers have been quite critical of the 2003 Act, as they felt that it only 
benefits a few elite citizens in the country (Patel & Graham, 2012; Tangri & Southall, 2008; 
Hoffman, 2008). Some researchers cautioned that B-BBEE creates very little wealth for the 
disadvantaged majority in the country (Krüger, 2011; Andrews, 2008). Extensive literature 
reviews have been published on the topic. Tangri and Southall (2008) investigated the 
beneficiaries of B-BBEE share transfer transactions, and concurred that there are a few elite 
individuals who gain more benefit than other black people. Andrews (2008) and Patel and 
Graham (2012) paid attention to the real beneficiaries of B-BBEE transactions and found that, 
even though a few elite individuals gain from B-BBEE, there are more black people than just 
those that have benefitted from B-BBEE. Other researchers performed event studies to compute 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of companies before and after B-BBEE equity deal 
announcements. The results of these event studies are displayed in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: Summary of event studies 
Author 
Research 
period 
Sample 
size 
Impact on CAR 
Jackson, Allesandri & Black (2005) 1996-1998 20 Insignificant impact 
Wolmarans & Sartorius (2009) 2002-2006 125 Insignificant impact 
Strydom, Christison & Matias (2009) 1996-2006 254 Insignificant impact 
Ward & Muller (2010) 2000-2008 175 Insignificant impact 
Chipeta & Vokwana (2011) 1999-2009 57 Insignificant impact 
Mehta & Ward (2017) 2009-2015 410 
Significant positive short-term impact 
and significant negative long-term 
impact 
Source: Researcher’s compilation based on the cited references 
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As shown in Table 1.3, previous researchers who conducted event studies reported 
inconclusive and contradicting results. Despite the fact that the majority of researchers found 
insignificant impacts, the results were also contradicting, as certain researchers found an 
insignificant positive impact on CAR, and others an insignificant negative impact on the same 
variable. More details on these event studies will be discussed in Section 3.3. The South 
African market appears ‘indecisive’ towards the impact of B-BBEE deals and announcements. 
It is debatable whether a change in share price could be attributed to a single factor (such as a 
B-BBEE deal announcement) as there are many factors influencing a share’s price. 
In contrast to qualitative and event study methodologies, a number of local researchers have 
considered the relationship between total B-BBEE scores and several financial performance 
measures. Only two researchers, Morris (2018) and Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014), 
included all the individual elements of the B-BBEE score. Researchers mainly used 
accounting-based and/or market-based financial performance measures. Verbeke and 
Merchant (2012) explained that accounting-based measures reflect a company’s past 
performance and market-based financial performance measures indicate the market’s 
expectation of future value creation. No researcher has yet employed a combination of 
accounting-based, market-based and risk-based measures in their B-BBEE studies. This study 
thus contributes to the body of knowledge by utilising different based financial performance 
measures. As such, in this study the term financial health is used as a collective noun for 
accounting-based, market-based, value-based and risk-based measures. 
A summary of previous local and international studies on the relationship between B-BBEE 
(local context) or ethnic diversity (international context) and financial performance are 
presented in Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.4: Summary of previous studies 
Author 
Research 
period 
Sample 
size 
Independent variable(s) Dependent variable(s) Results 
South African studies on the relationship between B-BBEE scores and financial performance measures 
Acemoglu et al. 
(2007) 
2004-2007 159 
Total B-BBEE and ownership 
scores 
Return on sales (ROS); investment; 
productivity (sales value per employee) 
No significant relationships 
Mathura (2009) 2004-2009 209 
Total B-BBEE and ownership 
scores 
Compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR); Tobin’s Q; price/earnings 
ratio (P/E ratio) 
No significant relationships 
De Villiers & Ferreira 
(2011) 
2005-2008 200 Total B-BBEE score Short-term share returns Significant negative relationship 
Van der Merwe & 
Ferreira (2014) 
2005-2011 905 Total B-BBEE and element scores Short-term share returns 
Significant negative relationship with 
total B-BBEE score, ownership and 
preferential procurement. Positive 
relationship with management control 
Kleynhans & Kruger 
(2014) 
2009-2011 26 Total B-BBEE scores Operating profit; turnover No significant relationships 
Morris (2018) 2010-2015 47 Total B-BBEE and element scores Unlevered beta No significant relationships 
Global studies on the relationship between diversity measures and financial performance measures 
Richard (2000) 1995-1996 574 % minorities in workforce Productivity; return on equity (ROE) No significant relationships 
Erhardt, Werbel & 
Shrader (2003) 
1997-1998 112 
% females and % minorities on 
board 
Return on assets (ROA); return on 
investment (ROI) 
Significant positive relationship 
between ethnic diversity and ROI 
Richard, Barnett, 
Dwyer & Chadwick 
(2004) 
1998 153 
% females and % minorities in 
management 
ROE No significant relationships 
Marimuthu (2008) 2000-2005 100 % minorities on board ROA Significant positive relationship 
Marimuthu & 
Kolandaisamy (2009) 
2000-2006 100 
% minorities and % females in 
management 
ROA, ROE No significant relationships 
Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins & Simpson 
(2010) 
1998-2002 641 
% minorities and % females on 
board and board committees 
ROA, Tobin’s Q 
Significant positive relationship 
between ethnic diversity and ROA 
Shukeri, Shin & Shaari 
(2012) 
2011 300 
% minorities and % females on 
board 
ROE 
Significant positive relationship with 
ethnic diversity 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the cited references 
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Care should be taken when interpreting some of the results indicated in Table 1.4 given the 
small sample sizes. Kleynhans and Kruger (2014) rightfully suggested that a longer term study 
should be conducted to draw valid conclusions on the relationship between profitability and B-
BBEE. As indicated in Table 1.4, international studies typically measured ethnic diversity in 
terms of the percentage of minority directors serving on boards. These studies normally yielded 
positive results between board diversity and financial performance measures. Marimuthu 
(2008) explained that, if representatives of all spheres of society is present on the board, the 
board could channel their offering to suit the entire population. In the local context, Mans-Kemp 
and Viviers (2014) found a negative relationship between percentage black people on board 
and total share returns. The positive association observed in the international context may thus 
not be applicable to local companies. 
 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
B-BBEE legislation was formally introduced in 2003 as a way of empowering black 
individuals. The DTI requires local companies to assist the government to empower previously 
disadvantaged individuals and to redress the imbalances created by the apartheid regime. 
Companies are incentivised to comply with B-BBEE requirements as stipulated in the Codes 
of Good Practice. The draft 2004 Codes were formalised in the 2007 Codes. The latest Codes 
were released in 2013 and is effective since 2015. 
Directors will arguably be encouraged to implement B-BBEE strategies if increased compliance 
is associated with improved financial results. Contradictory results were, however, reported on 
the relationship between B-BBEE scores and financial performance. Prior authors utilised small 
samples, limited performance measures and mainly focused on the total B-BBEE score. 
There are thus a number of gaps in the literature. Inconclusive evidence has been reported on 
the relationship between B-BBEE and different financial performance measures. The exception 
being board diversity (the management control element) in the international context which 
appears to have a positive relationship with financial performance. Only one study established 
a significant relationship between management control and financial performance for a small 
sample of listed South African companies, over a short period (2005-2011) and only short-term 
share returns were used. 
In this study, a comprehensive analysis was conducted by including B-BBEE scores in total 
and for the respective elements. Financial health was investigated by incorporating a range of 
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accounting-based, market-based and value-based measures as well as default risk probability. 
A longer study period and larger sample were considered than those considered by previous 
authors. All companies that had Empowerdex compliance scores for the 12-year period under 
review were included in the sample. 
The aim of this study was hence to investigate the relationship between B-BBEE scores (in 
total and per element) and the financial health of a sample of JSE-listed companies over the 
period 2004 to 2015.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In this study, the question of whether it is financially beneficial for a JSE-listed company to 
engage in B-BBEE activities (as reflected by the B-BBEE scorecard) to increase their total B-
BBEE score is addressed. The researcher also set out to answer the following research 
questions:  
• What has been the trend in B-BBEE compliance amongst the most empowered JSE-listed 
companies since the 2003 Act came into effect? 
• Which element(s) did companies focus on to increase total B-BBEE score? 
• Which other elements showed increased B-BBEE element scores over the research period? 
• What is the nature of the relationship between the considered companies’ B-BBEE scores 
(in total and per element) and financial health measures? 
 
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
The primary objective was to investigate the nature and significance of the relationship between 
B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and a number of financial health measures. The 
secondary objective was to investigate trends in the respective variables over time. 
The following hypotheses were formulated based on the stated research objectives:  
𝐻01:  There was no relationship between total B-BBEE score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
𝐻a1: There was a relationship between total B-BBEE score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
𝐻02:  There was no relationship between ownership score and the financial health of selected 
JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
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𝐻a2: There was a relationship between ownership score and the financial health of selected 
JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
 𝐻03:  There was no relationship between management control score and the financial health 
of selected JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
𝐻a3: There was a relationship between management control score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
 𝐻04:  There was no relationship between employment equity score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
𝐻a4: There was a relationship between employment equity score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
 𝐻05:  There was no relationship between preferential procurement score and the financial 
health of selected JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
𝐻a5: There was a relationship between preferential procurement score and the financial 
health of selected JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
 𝐻06:  There was no relationship between enterprise development score and the financial 
health of selected JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
𝐻a6: There was a relationship between enterprise development score and the financial health 
of selected JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
 𝐻07:  There was no relationship between skills development score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
𝐻a7: There was a relationship between skills development score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
 𝐻08:  There was no relationship between socio-economic development score and the financial 
health of selected JSE-listed companies over the research period.  
𝐻a8: There was a relationship between socio-economic development score and the financial 
health of selected JSE-listed companies over the research period. 
 𝐻09:  There was no change in the B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) of selected JSE-
listed companies over the research period. 
𝐻a9: There was a change in the B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) of selected JSE-
listed companies over the research period. 
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1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Zikmund, Babin, Carr and Griffin (2010) defined business research as finding solutions to 
business problems by applying a scientific method. The paradigm in which the research will be 
performed should be established to select a suitable research approach. 
1.7.1 Research paradigm 
According to Babbie (2012), there are various research paradigms that researchers can consider. 
Positivistic and phenomenological paradigms are commonly used in social sciences. A 
positivistic paradigm entails that a researcher focuses on quantitative data, whereas 
phenomenological research centres on qualitative data (ibid). 
The study centred on gaining a deeper understanding of the relationship between JSE-listed 
companies’ B-BBEE scores and their financial health, using a range of financial health 
indicators. As the data collected for the study were quantitative in nature, a positivistic approach 
was used.  
1.7.2 Research design 
Mouton (2001) stated that a research design is the plan of how the researcher intends to conduct 
the research. Zikmund et al. (2010) explained that there are three main types of business 
research, namely exploratory, descriptive and causal. Should the researcher be the first to 
conduct research on a topic, the study would entail exploratory research. If a field has already 
been researched and the researcher aims to contribute further to the body of knowledge by 
describing new developments pertaining to a phenomenon, descriptive research would be 
applied. Alternatively, cause-and-effect relationships between variables can be examined by 
performing causal research (Zikmund et al., 2010). The relationship between B-BBEE scores 
and certain financial performance measures were investigated by previous researchers. The 
gaps in the literature that has been addressed by this study were set out in Section 1.4. This 
study was hence descriptive in nature. 
1.7.3 Collection of secondary data 
There are two main sources of data when conducting business research, namely primary and 
secondary (Babbie, 2012; Zikmund et al., 2010; Mouton, 2001). Primary data are generated by 
a researcher for the purpose of a specific study, typically by conducting interviews or 
distributing self-administered questionnaires. Secondary data are readily available (Mouton, 
2001), such as Empowerdex’s list of most compliant companies.  
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Two sets of secondary data were collected and analysed, namely financial health measures and 
B-BBEE scores. Financial health data were downloaded from the Bloomberg database, whereas 
B-BBEE scores were sourced from Empowerdex’s lists of most empowered companies from 
2004 to 2015, measured on the 2007 Codes. Details on the financial health measures that were 
used in this study are provided in Table 1.5, which expands on the measures employed by prior 
researchers. 
Table 1.5: Financial health measures used in this study  
Type of measure Measure 
Previous researchers that used this 
measure 
Accounting-based ROS (Net operating profit after tax 
(NOPAT) divided by sales); % 
Acemoglu et al. (2007); Kleynhans & 
Kruger (2014) 
Accounting-based ROE (Net profit divided by average equity); 
% 
Richard (2000); Richard et al. (2004); 
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy (2009); 
Shukeri et al. (2012) 
Accounting-based ROA (NOPAT divided by average total 
assets); % 
Erhardt et al. (2003); Marimuthu (2008); 
Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy (2009); 
Carter et al. (2010) 
Accounting-based Annual percentage change in turnover; % Kleynhans & Kruger (2014) 
Market-based Market-to-book value (MTBV) (Share price 
divided by book value per share); ratio 
Mathura (2009) 
Market-based P/E ratio (Share price divided by earnings 
per share); ratio 
Mathura (2009) 
Market-based Annual share price growth (Share price at 
financial year-end divided by share price at 
previous financial year-end); % 
Mathura (2009) 
Market-based Cost of equity (required return based on 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM)); % 
n/a 
Market-based Excess return (annual share price growth 
minus cost of equity); % 
n/a 
Value-based Economic value added (EVA) (NOPAT 
minus product of weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) and total assets); Rand 
n/a 
Risk-based Default risk probability (as calculated by 
Bloomberg); probability (0-1) 
n/a 
Quantitative data can be nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio in nature (Babbie, 2012). With the 
exception of default risk probability, all the considered financial health measures indicated in 
Table 1.5 were interval data. Default risk probability and the B-BBEE scores are ratio data as 
they have absolute zeros. Control variables were included to improve robustness of results, 
namely market capitalisation, total assets and total revenue to account for the effect of company 
size on financial health. 
1.7.4 Population and sample 
Since the study focussed on the financial health of companies listed on the JSE, the total number 
of companies listed on the JSE comprised the population (see Table 1.6). The sample included 
all companies that formed part of Empowerdex’s list of most empowered (or compliant) 
companies (i.e. the listed companies for which Empowerdex provided B-BBEE scores) from 
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2004 to 2015 for which financial data were available. It should be noted that the B-BBEE 
endeavours of a company in year t, are audited at the end of year t and the company’s B-BBEE 
score is then released in year t + 1. The possible benefits of increased B-BBEE compliance 
manifest when the company receives its B-BBEE score (or certificate). As such, the financial 
results of year t were used in conjunction with the B-BBEE score released in year t + 1 for each 
sample company.  
The study period ended in 2015, since the 2013 Codes were implemented in 2015. The B-BBEE 
scores of 2016 and onwards are based on the 2013 Codes, which is incomparable to the 2004 
and 2007 Codes. The Empowerdex lists are populated based on voluntary participation by 
companies. Empowerdex ranks these companies based on their total B-BBEE scores and 
releases the B-BBEE scores of the most empowered companies. These lists are publicly 
obtainable via the Mail & Guardian’s website. 
Table 1.6: Details of the population and sample 
Year Population(a) Empowerdex sample 
2004 389 198 
2005 373 184 
2006 389 200 
2007 411 199 
2008 411 188 
2009 398 200 
2010 397 100(b) 
2011 395 110(c) 
2012 387 99 
2013 375 82 
2014 380 99 
2015 382 108 
(a) Data sourced from the World Federation of Exchanges (2016) 
(b) Empowerdex changed the list from the Top 200 most empowered to the Top 100 
most empowered companies 
(c) In subsequent years, the number of companies did not always equal 100, due to 
the number of companies participating and the exclusion of private companies 
from this study. In some years, Empowerdex used their discretion to release the 
scores of all the participating companies, if the number of companies 
approximated 100. 
A considerable number of the total JSE-listed companies were hence included in this 
comprehensive study. A total of 1 767 company years were included for 379 companies.  
1.7.5 Data analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to summarise the collected data. Mixed-model analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) analyses were conducted to determine the significance of the change in B-
BBEE scores over the research period, whilst Fisher least significant difference (LSD) analyses 
were used to determine the significance of the changes over time. Fixed, random and pooled 
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ordinary least square (OLS) panel regression analyses were conducted to determine the nature 
of the relationship between the dependent, independent and control variables. In line with 
previous research, the financial health measures were the dependent variables and the B-BBEE 
score (in total and per element) were the independent variables.  
 
1.8 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Prior studies conducted on B-BBEE typically employed a short time frame and used small 
samples, as was shown in Table 1.4. In line with Mathura’s (2009) suggestion that a longer time 
frame should be used, this study was conducted over 12 years (1 January 2004 to 31 December 
2015). This time period was specifically chosen as the 2013 Codes were implemented in 2015. 
The B-BBEE scores released after 2015 were thus based on the 2013 Codes, which were 
considered to be materially different from the 2007 Codes. While several authors only focused 
on market-based or accounting-based financial performance measures, a broad range of 
financial health measures were used for the purpose of this study (refer to Table 1.5). With the 
exception of Morris (2018) and Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014) who included the elements, 
previous authors mainly considered the total B-BBEE scores. In this study, the elements of the 
B-BBEE scorecard were included in addition to the total scores.  
This study is especially relevant at a time when B-BBEE compliance is becoming stricter 
(Empowerdex, 2016; De Wet, 2016). Directors need to reflect on if and how the moral 
imperative for engaging in B-BBEE activities can be integrated in their strategies to create 
value. 
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. A brief outline of each chapter is presented.  
Chapter One:  Introduction to the study 
Chapter One encompasses an overview of the study, including a background discussion and 
summary of prior research on the topic. The problem statement, research objectives, research 
questions and hypotheses are then presented. The research design and methodology are 
followed by the contribution of the study. 
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Chapter Two:  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment: History, application 
and lessons learnt 
In Chapter Two, details on the origin of B-BBEE are provided, including an explanation of 
what it entails, its requirements and the verification of compliance scores. Empowerment 
initiatives in other countries are explored to highlight lessons that can be learned in the local 
context. 
Chapter Three:  Overview and application of financial health measures in the South 
African context 
In this chapter, several financial health measures are discussed. Details are provided on the 
calculation of selected accounting-based, market-based, value-based and risk-based measures 
(collectively called financial health in this study). The rationale for including these measures is 
explained. 
Chapter Four:  Research design and methodology  
In Chapter Four, the adopted research paradigm and design are discussed. Details on the 
population and sample are followed by explanations on the methods used to collect and analyse 
panel data. Reliability, validity and ethical considerations are also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Five:  Descriptive results 
The trends of the B-BBEE scores (in total and per element), financial health measures and 
control variables are presented and discussed.  
Chapter Six:   Inferential findings 
The result of the mixed-model ANOVA and Fisher LSD tests are presented to reflect on the 
significance of the observed trends. Thereafter, the panel regression results are presented and 
discussed. 
Chapter Seven:  Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
The final chapter comprises a summary of the study. Based on the conclusions, 
recommendations to directors, the media, shareholders, educators and accountants are provided. 
A reconciliation of the research objectives is presented. Suggestions for future research, based 
on the limitations of this study are included, followed by some concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT: HISTORY, 
APPLICATION AND LESSONS LEARNT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One gave a brief overview of the study, including a summarised background to B-
BBEE. A more comprehensive discussion on B-BBEE is provided in Chapter Two to offer 
context to the study. The emergence of and rationale for B-BBEE in South Africa will be 
explained. A more encompassing definition of B-BBEE will be provided. The Codes of Good 
Practice and the requirements for auditing the compliance with the Codes will then be 
discussed. An overview of the main sector charters is also presented. In the final section of this 
chapter, an overview of empowerment initiatives in other countries will be included, to 
determine lessons applicable to B-BBEE as applied in the local context. 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND 
As B-BBEE is aimed at rectifying the injustices of the past, Pike, Puchert and Chinyamurindi 
(2018) argued that B-BBEE should be studied through the lens of social justice theory. This 
theory is based on the principles of equality and fairness (Rawls, 1999). Governments should 
aim to provide economic systems that promote these principles.  
Compliance with B-BBEE can furthermore be motivated by organisational legitimacy theory. 
As explained by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), organisational legitimacy is the combination of 
the values and objectives of a company, and the values and objectives of the broader 
environment of which they form part. In the context of B-BBEE, attention should be given to 
economic upliftment and corrective action to amend past injustices. Masito (2007) indicated 
that during apartheid there were large corporate companies that have benefited from the 
injustices of the apartheid regime. If such companies engage in B-BBEE, they could possibly 
rectify the undue benefits they received and hence gain organisational legitimacy. Preston and 
O’Bannon (1997) argued that companies that have organisational legitimacy through the 
involvement in social upliftment (such as B-BBEE) will experience increased financial 
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performance. This increased financial performance is due to the social impact hypothesis which 
states that companies ultimately benefit financially from social impact activities. 
Preston and O’Bannon (1997) also highlighted that if there are additional costs involved in 
obtaining the social impact (as is the case in B-BBEE), the companies can forfeit some of its 
financial performance. This theory is called the trade-off hypothesis. The trade-off hypothesis 
states that if capital and other resources are required for the social impact activities, it may 
reduce the funds available for profitable investments, hindering the company’s financial 
performance (ibid). The available funds hypothesis or managerial opportunism hypothesis 
could be explored if the author believed that increased B-BBEE compliance is the dependent 
variable, and financial health the independent variable (i.e. if the author believed that an 
increase in total B-BBEE score follows an increase in financial health). In this study the 
objective was not to ascertain whether companies invested in B-BBEE when their resources 
allowed it, but rather to investigate the relationship an increased B-BBEE score (in total and 
per element) had with the sampled companies’ financial health. 
Jackson et al. (2005) and Wolmarans and Sartorius (2009) argued that B-BBEE could be seen 
as part of a company’s corporate social responsibility. These researchers investigated the 
business case of B-BBEE compliance through the lens of corporate social responsibility. 
Neither of these researchers found a clear business case for B-BBEE.  
In South Africa, economic exploitation is well known and well documented (Masito, 2007). It 
could be argued that economic exploitation contributed to the uprising against apartheid, the 
birth of the democracy and ultimately to B-BBEE to rectify the economic exploitation. In the 
following section, the researcher will highlight economic inequality and economic exploitation 
in South Africa. 
2.2.1 Economic exploitation in South Africa 
Habib and Padayachee (2000) argued that the economic objective of the apartheid government 
was promoting wealth of white individuals, whilst excluding black people from economic 
opportunities. Masito (2007:51) showed that 80 per cent of black business owners felt that their 
“foundation” was weak at the end of apartheid, and that they could not compete fairly with 
white individuals. The economic exploitation of black people should, however, not only be 
attributed to apartheid, as the latter only came into existence in 1948 (Masito, 2007). Before 
that, under the British colonialisation, a similar gap between the income of white and black 
members of society existed. 
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Jackson et al. (2005) stated that, although the majority of the South African population were 
black people, only three per cent of managerial positions were occupied by black individuals in 
1990. Furthermore, only one per cent of the shares of locally JSE-listed companies were owned 
by black people in 1995 (ibid). A black person’s income was 13 per cent of the average white 
person’s income in 1994 (Engdahl & Hauki, 2001). Details on the per capita income of African, 
Coloured and Indian people (as a percentage of white income) are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1:  Per capita income of African, Coloured and Indian people (as percentage 
of white income) from 1917 to 1993 
Year African (as % of 
white income) 
Coloured (as % of 
white income) 
Indian (as % of 
white income) 
1917 9.1 22.0 22.1 
1936 7.6 15.6 23.1 
1956 8.6 16.9 21.9 
1970 6.8 17.3 20.2 
1980 8.5 19.1 25.5 
1993 10.9 19.3 42.0 
Source: Institute of Race Relations (IRR, 2009) 
Based on the statistics shown in Table 2.1, it can be deduced that there was a large disparity 
between white and black income from 1917 to 1993. Between 1994 and 2000, the situation 
slightly improved (IRR, 2009). Black income was 15.9 per cent relative to white income in 
2000, which still represented a large discrepancy. Since the implementation of B-BBEE in 
2004, the situation has not changed considerably. Black income stabilised at around 13 per cent 
of white income post-2004 (IRR, 2017). When reflecting on the change in the income of Indian 
people shown in Table 2.1, which is also regarded as black individuals according to the 2003 
Act, an interesting observation is made. Indian income as a percentage of white income rose 
from 22.1 per cent in 1917 to 42 per cent in 1993, and ultimately to 52 per cent in 2015 (IRR, 
2017).  
A Gini-coefficient measures the equality of distribution of income in a country. In an equal 
world, with perfect income distribution, the Gini-coefficient would be 0. A Gini-coefficient of 
one would imply that one person has the entire population’s income, and zero that all people 
have an equal amount of income (Miller, 2015). Under these conditions, income per race would 
also be equally distributed, and black income would thus be 100 per cent of white income. The 
South African income distribution has, however, never been equal, neither during nor after 
apartheid. South Africa has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world (The World Bank, 
2019). The country’s Gini coefficient increased from 0.61 in 1996 to 0.63 in 2015 (ibid). The 
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disparity between these figures could also be interpreted as that there are still many people 
living in poverty.  
After President Mandela was released from prison in 1993, he remarked that economic power 
vested in a few white individuals. He expressed the view that the concentration of economic 
power had to change, and that this power should be deracialised, and power should be vested 
in all people (Acemoglu et al., 2007). The process of transforming the economy in South Africa 
will be discussed in the following section. 
2.2.2 Transforming the economy in South Africa  
Economic transformation started before the end of apartheid (Ponte et al., 2007). In the 1980s, 
some businesses rearranged their ownership structures to create a black middle class with 
interest in the local economy (ibid). The restructuring was driven by the political instability 
between black and white citizens. Businesses hoped that by creating a black middle class, it 
would bring economic and political stability (Engdahl & Hauki, 2001). President Thabo Mbeki 
also referred to economic transformation in his speech on 29 May 1998 (the so-called ‘Two 
Nations’ speech). In this speech, he highlighted that reconciliation and national unity were 
unachievable dreams if economic transformation did not occur (Ponte et al., 2007).  
The ANC promoted the empowerment of black people since the mid-1950s (Ponte et al., 2007). 
This economic policy manifested in the ANC’s so-called Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) and became part of their election manifesto in 1994 (Habib & Padayachee, 
2000). The RDP was a socio-economic policy framework which had five interrelated sections. 
The sections dealt with meeting social needs, developing nationwide human resources, building 
the economy, democratising the society and state, and implementing the RDP (Habib & 
Padayachee, 2000).  
The goals of the RDP were reconstruction and development, as is evident from the program’s 
name. The RDP was, however, criticised by South African academics as it did not boost 
business confidence or encourage foreign investments (Ponte et al., 2007; Habib & Padayachee, 
2000). In practice, the RDP was focused on the transfer of shares from white people to black 
people. Tshetu (2014) stated that the first transfer of ownership, in terms of black economic 
empowerment, occurred in 1993. According to Acemoglu et al. (2007), 231 share transfer deals 
to black people were effected by 1998. These share transfers took place at a significant discount 
of between 15 and 40 per cent in the period after apartheid ended in 1994, and before B-BBEE 
was legislated in 2003. 
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The ANC altered and formalised the RDP into an economic framework called GEAR – an 
acronym for Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Ponte et al., 2007). GEAR was formally 
implemented in 1996, along with the first draft of affirmative action legislation aimed at 
redressing the demographical representation of employees (Acemoglu et al., 2007). In effect, 
GEAR led to so-called ‘empowerment’ deals where large white-owned conglomerates sold 
shares to black people, even though the majority of the beneficiaries were politically connected 
individuals (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Tangri & Southall, 2008). 
The end of the millennium signalled the end of the first phase of economic transformation in 
the country. However, with growing calls for transformation to be more inclusive and to cover 
more aspects of socio-economic development than just the transfer of ownership, the second 
phase of economic transformation, called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was launched 
(Ponte et al., 2007). This phase led to the formation of the BEE Commission in September 1998 
under leadership of (now president) Cyril Ramaphosa (Acemoglu et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 
2005).  
With the release of the BEE Commission’s report in 2001, the government acknowledged the 
need to broaden the nature of BEE. The broadening of the nature of BEE had to incorporate the 
requirements of affirmative action, focus on human resource development, enterprise 
development, preferential procurement, corporate social investment activities, and ownership 
(Acemoglu et al., 2007; Ponte et al., 2007). It was at this stage that BEE was expanded to 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (or B-BBEE) (Acemoglu et al., 2007). These 
broadened aspects have a direct impact on businesses, as B-BBEE requirements apply to all 
commercial and government institutions (DTI, 2003). The question could be asked as to 
whether it is fair to burden commercial entities with economic transformation. The author is of 
the opinion that there are other avenues, such as education, that could be more effective in 
correcting the imbalances of the past, which do not require corporate involvement. 
The BEE Commission’s (2001) report stated that black people were still excluded from 
economic and financial resources. It was hence suggested that BEE should incorporate 
comprehensive strategies aimed at improving access to these resources without hindering the 
productivity thereof (ibid). The BEE commission thus set out to ensure that jobs were created, 
rural development took place, and citizens were appropriately trained and upskilled. 
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (No. 53 of 2003) was implemented in 
2004 as proposed by the BEE Commission (DTI, 2003). In the following section, an in-depth 
definition of B-BBEE will be provided. 
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2.3 DEFINING BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT 
Porter (1991) stated that one of a government’s purposes should be to enable and encourage 
companies to become more profitable and competitive. In the South African context, 
government should focus on black-owned businesses to redress the inequalities of the past. The 
BEE Commission (2001) stated that B-BBEE aims to create and promote ‘new’ opportunities 
for black people, and their participation in ownership, management and control of economic 
activities. The BEE Commission (2001:1) advocated that B-BBEE should be a “people-centred 
strategy” which affects all black people in every sphere of life. 
The BEE Commission (2001:12) therefore adopted the following definition of B-BBEE: 
“It is an integrated and coherent socio-economic process. It is located within the context of the 
country’s national transformation programme, namely the RDP. It is aimed at redressing the 
imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and equitably transfer and confer the 
ownership, management and control of South Africa’s financial and economic resources to the 
majority of its citizens. It seeks to ensure broader and meaningful participation in the economy 
by black people to achieve sustainable development and prosperity.” 
The 2003 Act (DTI, 2003:4) uses the following definition: 
“B-BBEE means the empowerment of all black people including women, workers, youth, 
people with disabilities, and people living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-
economic strategies that include, but are not limited to increasing the number of black people 
that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets; facilitating ownership and 
management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, workers, cooperatives and 
other collective enterprises; human resource and skills development; achieving equitable 
representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; preferential 
procurement and investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people.” 
Some academics developed their own definitions of B-BBEE. Kleynhans and Kruger (2014:2) 
stated that it is very difficult to put B-BBEE “in a box”, and define it, as it could either be 
defined too widely, or too narrowly, but concluded that the definition provided by the BEE 
Commission (2001) is probably the most accurate. Strydom et al. (2009) argued that B-BBEE 
is a broad concept which aims at improving economic activities for all black South Africans. 
Patel and Graham (2012) stated that B-BBEE intends to provide a solution for the social and 
developmental disadvantages brought about by the apartheid regime. Chimhandamba (2007) 
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defined B-BBEE as a process to redistribute the economic wealth, enhance economic equality, 
create a black middle-class consensus and to promote sustainable long-term economic growth. 
This definition is in line with the definition provided by the 2004 Codes (DTI, 2004). In light 
of the existing definitions, B-BBEE is defined as follows for purposes of this study: a formalised 
process, led by the South African government, to redress the economic imbalances of the past, 
to ensure that all South Africans are equally privileged and could compete on the same level in 
all spheres of life. 
An ‘expiry date’ for B-BBEE is arguably necessary as B-BBEE regulations are seen as a barrier 
for foreign investment (Gules, 2018). Continuation of B-BBEE after its aim (to redress the 
imbalances of the past) has been achieved, may thus hinder economic growth. Researchers such 
as Acemoglu et al. (2007) hence predicted that B-BBEE will reach a third phase. Recall that 
the first phase was unstructured BEE until the end of 1999. The second phase was formalised, 
structured B-BBEE with the release of the BEE Commission report and the implementation of 
the 2003 Act, and revised in 2013. The third phase of B-BBEE will arguably occur when the 
economic imbalances have been corrected and companies and individuals can compete on equal 
footing (Acemoglu et al., 2007).  
 
2.4 EVOLUTION OF THE CODES OF GOOD PRACTICE 
There are two legal documents driving B-BBEE, namely the 2003 Act (and the revised 2013 
version) and the Codes of Good Practice. The 2003/ 2013 Act sets out the principles of B-
BBEE, whereas specific empowerment practices are explained in the Codes. It is therefore 
important to consider the Codes in order to understand the practical implications of B-BBEE 
for companies.  
To fully understand the evolutionary process of the Codes, all the role players in controlling B-
BBEE should be introduced. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the BEE Commission initiated the 
idea of having a formalised plan and national policy related to B-BBEE in 2001. The BEE 
Commission (2001) recommended that there should be a co-ordinating council to oversee the 
implementation of B-BBEE. As a result, the B-BBEE Advisory Council was established to 
implement the 2003 Act and offer advice to the government on B-BBEE-related issues. The B-
BBEE Advisory Council is headed by the DTI. This Council is constituted as follows: The 
chairperson of the B-BBEE Advisory Council is the president of the country. In absence of the 
president, the minister of the DTI acts as chairperson. The B-BBEE Advisory Council further 
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comprises of 19 influential individuals (including the minister of the DTI), encompassing the 
minister of labour and the minister of women (RSA Presidency, 2015; DTI, 2003). 
The B-BBEE Advisory Council (which is still in place) is responsible for determining the 
strategic direction for B-BBEE which is then translated into the Codes of Good Practice by the 
minister of trade and industry. The formulated Codes of Good Practice are then reviewed by 
the B-BBEE Advisory Council before it is issued (RSA Presidency, 2015). The Codes offer 
guidelines on how B-BBEE should be practically implemented and measured. Should the Codes 
not achieve their purpose of successfully rectifying the inequalities of the past, government can 
alter the Codes and circulate to businesses for comment. 
2.4.1 The 2004 Codes of Good Practice 
The DTI issued the first draft of the Codes of Good Practice in 2004. The draft consisted of ten 
sub-codes, titled from Code 000 (Black Economic Empowerment Framework), to Codes 100 
to 700, dealing with the components of B-BBEE (as discussed below), and practice notes on B-
BBEE (Code 800) and Code 900 on Public Private Partnerships (DTI, 2004). A significant 
adjustment from phase one BEE (as discussed in Section 2.2.2), was that B-BBEE was now 
truly broad-based. The 2004 Codes aimed to achieve this broad base by using a ‘balanced 
approach’, which was measured by using the balanced (or generic) scorecard (DTI, 2004). The 
2004 Codes stated that there are three main components of B-BBEE, which encompasses all 
seven elements of the balanced scorecard (DTI, 2004). The key components and their 
beneficiaries are depicted in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2:  Key components of B-BBEE and their beneficiaries 
Component Beneficiary 
Direct empowerment 
Equity holders, executives and other owners, as well as managers of 
economic resources 
Human resource development Employees and job seekers 
Indirect empowerment Suppliers, communities and other relevant external stakeholders. 
Source: DTI (2004) 
As part of direct empowerment, the B-BBEE Act (No. 53 of 2003) refers to equity transfers and 
appointing black people in management positions. Human resource development comprises of 
employment equity (also called affirmative action) and skills development. Indirect 
empowerment refers to a company’s interaction with the community. Purchases from 
preferential suppliers (buying from suppliers with a high B-BBEE score), enterprise 
development (by assisting black entrepreneurs), and corporate social investment activities are 
required under this component (DTI, 2004). 
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The 2004 Codes included seven key elements: Ownership, management control, employment 
equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise development and a residual 
factor (DTI, 2004). Ownership refers to the voting rights and economic interests associated with 
equity holding. Specific classes of shares (such as preference shares without voting rights) will 
not attract any points under the ownership element. The combination of voting rights and 
economic interests is essential, as voting rights allow black shareholders to be actively involved 
in strategic business decisions, whereas economic interests aim that black people accumulate 
wealth (DTI, 2004). 
Management control entails that black employees and members of an organisation have the 
power to determine policies and provide direction to economic activities and resources. 
Management control comprises two categories: The percentage of black members on the board 
of directors (or equivalent), and the number of black people involved in executive positions or 
senior management (DTI, 2004). Employment equity focusses on the promotion of “equal 
opportunity and fair treatment in employment” (DTI, 2004:15). Entities should adhere to the 
requirements of the Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 1998) to increase the participation of 
black people in the workforce in the decision-making process of their respective entities (DTI, 
2004). The Codes also required entities to invest in the development of their black workers’ 
skills (DTI, 2004). 
The three remaining elements form part of indirect empowerment (refer to Table 2.2), namely 
preferential procurement, enterprise development and a residual factor. Preferential 
procurement deals with the percentage of purchases made from B-BBEE compliant suppliers. 
The higher the suppliers’ total B-BBEE scores, the higher the score that is ascertained under 
preferential procurement (DTI, 2004). Preferential procurement thus encourages entities to buy 
from compliant suppliers. This element arguably warrants that B-BBEE truly becomes broad-
based. The effect of this element is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1:  The ‘knock-on’ effect of B-BBEE scores through preferential procurement 
Source: DTI (2004) 
As seen in Figure 2.1, the B-BBEE scores of a company’s suppliers indirectly influence the B-
BBEE score of the company. Companies that aim to do business with government need to be 
mindful to procure from B-BBEE compliant companies as, otherwise, they will fall short on 
their preferential procurement score. The sixth element of the balanced scorecard centres on 
enterprise development. This element refers to assisting start-up businesses by specifically 
funding and/or supporting black entrepreneurs. The compliance measures range from finances 
that have been made available to such enterprises, to non-financial assistance to these small to 
medium enterprises (DTI, 2004). 
The final element of the 2004 balanced scorecard was called the residual factor. This factor 
included activities that are relevant to the entity’s specific environment (business environment 
or sector and geographical environment). Examples of activities that could earn B-BBEE 
credentials included investing in the housing, transport and health care needs of previously 
disadvantaged employees, providing infrastructure support to black entities, utilising labour 
intensive methods to create jobs and any other activity that might benefit the environment in 
which the entity operates (DTI, 2004). 
The DTI (2004) suggested that weightings should be applied to the seven elements, as was 
indicated in Table 1.1. Should a total annual score of less than 40 points out of the available 
100 points be achieved, the entity could call itself a “Limited contributor to B-BBEE”, a total 
score of between 40 points and 64.9 points would equate to “Satisfactory contributor” status. A 
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total B-BBEE score between 65 points and 79.9 points would be regarded as a “Good 
contributor”, and to achieve status as an “Excellent contributor”, a score of above 80 points or 
higher was required (DTI, 2004:51).  
Subsequent to the issuing of the 2004 Codes, a substantial increase was seen in B-BBEE deals, 
specifically share transfers to black people (BusinessMap, 2005). A value of R62 billion of B-
BBEE share transfers took place in 2004, compared to only R40 billion in 2003 (ibid). The 
2004 Codes thus provided guidance on the practical measures of B-BBEE and each of the seven 
elements. The 2004 Codes also distinguished between the different levels of contribution 
(limited, satisfactory, good or excellent). The B-BBEE Advisory Council, however, determined 
that the Codes had to be refined and clarified to fulfil the goals they set for B-BBEE (Tangri & 
Southall, 2008). As a result, a clarified set of Codes of Good Practice was released and gazetted 
in 2007.  
2.4.2 The 2007 Codes of Good Practice 
The nature of the 2007 Codes entails a clarification of the 2004 Codes. The 2007 Codes were 
implemented on 9 February 2007 (DTI, 2007). The essence of the 2004 and 2007 Codes 
remained largely the same. A major clarification dealt with how smaller enterprises should be 
evaluated. Section 4.1 of the 2007 Codes stated that, should an enterprise have a turnover of 
less than R5 million, it would be exempt from applying B-BBEE and is awarded a contributor 
status of a level four contributor (DTI, 2007). Should the enterprise have a turnover of between 
R5 million and R35 million, they will be a “Qualifying Small Enterprise” (QSE). These QSEs 
only needed to focus on any four of the seven elements, each awarding the QSE 25 points (a 
total of 100 points is available) (DTI, 2007:9). A QSE could choose which of the seven elements 
it wanted to comply with. 
A further development in terms of the 2007 Codes was the clarification of the individual 
elements, specifically the residual factor. The seventh element (residual element) under the 
2004 Codes essentially focused on corporate social initiatives and was now termed “Socio 
economic development and sector specific contributions element” (DTI, 2007:10). Despite the 
name change, the essence of this element remained the same. The element still measured the 
efforts made by the company to improve its local socio-economic status or to promote sector 
specific initiatives that would provide access for black people to the economy and to the sector 
(DTI, 2007). The weightings for the seven elements remained largely the same, as was shown 
in Table 1.1. Minimal changes to the weightings of certain elements (employment equity, skills 
development, employment equity and socio-economic development) were made. 
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The most significant clarification related to the redefining of the different levels of contributors. 
The 2007 Codes made provision for nine levels (level one to eight contributors plus a level for 
non-compliant contributor status) (DTI, 2007) in comparison with the four compliance levels 
suggested in the 2004 Codes. A summary of the levels and respective scores was provided in 
Table 1.2. It should be noted that companies could achieve a score of more than 100 points 
based on the application of the 2007 Codes. This is possible due to the fact that the 2007 Codes 
and sector charters (see Section 2.6) make provision for bonus points. These bonus points were 
available if, for example, black people that did not previously own shares in a company were 
awarded shares, or if shares are issued as part of an employee share scheme (DTI, 2007). In 
total, there were seven bonus points available (Werksmans, 2014). The measurement targets 
under the 2007 Codes are displayed in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3:  Compliance targets for B-BBEE scores based on the 2007 Codes 
Element Target Measured element 
Ownership 25%+ 1 vote Total ordinary shares 
Management control 40% – 50% Top management and directors 
Employment equity 43% – 68% Junior to senior management 
Skills development 3% Total payroll spend 
Preferential procurement 50% – 70% Total expenditure 
Enterprise development 3% Net profit after tax 
Socio-economic development 1% Net profit after tax 
Source: DTI (2007) 
The 2007 Codes’ targets, presented in Table 2.3, are an indication of the expenditure and other 
requirements to achieve a score of 100. The targets summarise the objectives of the 2003 Act. 
The alterations of sector charters to the generic codes are discussed in Section 2.6. It is 
important to note that three of the elements require additional expenditure, one element 
(preferential procurement) prescribed the nature of the suppliers, and the remaining three 
elements required strategic interventions (to obtain more black shareholders, and to appoint 
more black managers). Companies needed to manage their B-BBEE compliance actively, as 
mere expenditure on traditional corporate social responsibility initiatives would not have 
resulted in obtaining a high B-BBEE score. In the following sections, the 2013 Codes will be 
discussed and the reasons for the changes encompassed in these Codes explored. 
2.4.3 The 2013 Codes of Good Practice 
The percentage of black income in comparison with white income did not change considerably 
since the implementation of B-BBEE in 2003 (IRR, 2009). The B-BBEE Commission therefore 
adjusted the Codes to urge businesses to become more compliant. As a result, companies could 
drop two levels if they did not increase their B-BBEE score in line with the revised Codes that 
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were released in October 2013 (Empowerdex, 2016). The effective implementation date was 
May 2015. Companies hence effectively had a year and a half to revise their B-BBEE strategies 
to remain compliant. As explained in Section 1.2.2, the elements prescribed in the 2007 Codes 
differed from those indicated in the 2013 Codes. These changes will briefly be explained in the 
following sections. 
A comparison of the 2013 Codes relative to the 2007 Codes shows that certain B-BBEE 
elements had been grouped together, and the weightings have changed slightly. In Table 2.4, it 
is shown how the 2007 Codes have been effectively ‘absorbed’ into the 2013 Codes. As 
mentioned in Section 2.4.2, companies were able to achieve bonus points that would allow them 
to achieve a score of more than 105 points (2013 Codes) or 100 points (2007 Codes). Bonus 
points could be acquired for achieving specific targets within the element, as shown below in 
Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Comparison of the 2013 and 2007 Codes 
Element Weighting points (2013) Weighting points (2007) 
Ownership 25 20 plus 3 bonus points 
Management control 15 plus 4 bonus points Management control – 10 plus 1 bonus point 
Employment equity – 15 plus 3 bonus points 
Skills development 20 plus 5 bonus points 15 
Supplier development 40 plus 4 bonus points Preferential procurement – 20 
Enterprise development – 15  
Socio-economic development 5 5 
Total available 118 107 
Source: Werksmans (2014) 
As shown in Table 2.4, a company could theoretically achieve a score of 118 under the 2013 
Codes, as opposed to 107 under the 2007 Codes when accounting for bonus points. There are 
more bonus points available under the 2013 Codes than were available under the 2007 Codes. 
The 2013 Codes also count out of 105, as opposed to 100 under the 2007 Codes. The bonus 
points could reduce the compliance pressure, should a company meet certain criteria. The 
targets for the respective elements can be considered stringent. None of the targets have been 
lowered since 2007. The targets for the 2013 Codes are shown in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5:  Compliance targets for B-BBEE scores under the 2013 Codes 
Element Target Measured element 
Ownership 25%+ 1 vote Total shares 
Management control 50% – 88% Management and staff demographic 
composition 
Skills development 6% Total payroll spend 
Supplier development Preferential procurement: 80% 
Supplier development: 2% 
Enterprise development: 1% 
Total measured procurement spend 
Net profit after tax 
Net profit after tax 
Socio-economic development 5% Net profit after tax 
Source: DTI (2013) 
In terms of ownership, companies were encouraged to aim that at least 25 per cent of voting 
rights belonged to black individuals. Twenty-five per cent of the economic interest should also 
be vested in black individuals (DTI, 2013). Management control requires companies to have a 
targeted 50 per cent black executive directors, 60 per cent senior management, 75 per cent 
middle management and 88 per cent junior management (DTI, 2013). A major challenge, 
however, is that limited black people have post matric qualifications (IRR, 2017). In 2015 only 
5.7 per cent of all black people had tertiary qualifications (ibid). The assumption can be made 
that tertiary education is required for managerial positions. It is hence questionable whether the 
management control target is achievable unless skills development is enhanced. Education as a 
priority has been highlighted by, amongst others, the IRR (2012) in stating that upliftment in 
education should precede economic empowerment. 
Pertaining to skills development, at least six per cent of total payroll spend should be allocated 
to learning programmes for black people. Supplier development is divided into preferential 
procurement, supplier development and enterprise development. At least 80 per cent of the 
entity’s annual procurement spend should be B-BBEE-related. To calculate B-BBEE 
procurement spend, the actual spend is multiplied by the B-BBEE percentage as per the 
supplier’s B-BBEE level. At least two per cent of net profit after tax should be spent on supplier 
development and one per cent of net profit after tax should be contributed to sector specific 
programmes (DTI, 2013). A target of five per cent of net profit after tax should be spent on 
socio-economic development initiatives (DTI, 2013). 
The 2013 Codes specify that there are three priority elements for which sub-minimum 
requirements apply, namely ownership, skills development and enterprise and supplier 
development. At least 40 per cent of the target (see Table 2.5) should be obtained by all large 
companies (with a turnover of more than R50 million) for each of the three priority elements 
(DTI, 2013). Should a company not achieve 40 per cent of the targets for the respective priority 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
30 
 
elements, the company will be awarded a non-compliant status (DTI, 2013). In the following 
section, the allocation and auditing of the B-BBEE scores will be explained. 
 
2.5 THE ALLOCATION AND VERIFICATION OF B-BBEE SCORES  
The 2007 Codes encouraged companies to have their compliance verified by independent 
verification agents (DTI, 2007). The DTI issued further guidelines on the verification process 
in 2008. In October 2015, the DTI (2015a) issued the latest version of the verification manual. 
Only verification agents registered with the South African National Accreditation System 
(SANAS) are allowed to issue valid B-BBEE certificates (DTI, 2015a). Verification is done to 
ensure that the information shown on the certificate is valid and accurate. The verification, 
however, do not mention the completeness assertion, i.e. to ensure that all B-BBEE activities 
are reflected in the B-BBEE certificate.  
The B-BBEE verification manual (DTI, 2015a) determines that to become a verification agent, 
the applicant should have certain traits, including impartiality, competence, responsibility, 
openness and confidentiality. These traits contribute to a verification process that is transparent, 
objective and professional. B-BBEE verification agencies also need to comply with SANAS 
R47 legislation (SANAS, 2013). This legislation stipulates the requirements that should be met 
by a B-BBEE verification agency. As of September 2019, there were 77 officially accredited 
B-BBEE verification agents in the country (SANAS, 2019). The 2003 Act allows for certain 
sectors to tailor the generic codes to their needs. These tailored codes are based on Section 9(1) 
and Section 12 of the 2003 Act, and are referred to as sector charters (DTI, 2013). More details 
will be provided on sector charters in the next section. 
 
2.6 SECTOR CHARTERS  
Following the implementation of the 2007 Codes, several sectors decided to design and 
implement sector charters. Most of these sector charters are based on the generic scorecard, but 
are altered to make them more relevant to their specific sectors. As of September 2019, there 
were nine approved, active sector charters (DTI, 2019), as shown in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6:  Summary of sector charters 
Name 
Implementation 
date 
Summary of charter 
Forestry and paper June 2009 
This charter allocates bonus points for those entities that achieve the target of 
30 per cent black ownership, as set out in the generic 2007 Codes. To ensure 
the workforce is also transformed, the forest and paper sector formulated a 
sector skills plan that will be implemented to teach black individuals the 
necessary skills required in this sector (DTI, 2009a). 
Transport sector August 2009 
This charter consists of eight sub-charters, each responsible for a subdivision 
of the transport industry. Each sub-charter is a tailored version of the generic 
2007 Codes. The DTI specified that the focus and purpose of the transport 
charter was to speed up the implementation of fast and efficient transport and 
logistics. This objective is set in addition to the B-BBEE objectives. The bus 
commuter code further proposes a 35 per cent ownership target, instead of the 
25 per cent ownership target (2007 Codes) to intensify transformation in this 
sector (DTI, 2009b). 
Chartered 
accountancy sector 
May 2011 
The focus of this charter is to promote a shift in the demographics of the 
chartered accountancy profession, specifically regarding skills development 
and employment equity (DTI, 2011). This sector charter, based on the generic 
2007 Codes, increases the weighting of employment equity and skills 
development, whilst preferential procurement had a lower weighting (DTI, 
2011). 
Property sector June 2012 
The following major challenges are applicable to the property sector: 
Ownership of land and representation of the workforce, with specific focus on 
gender equality in the workforce (DTI, 2012a:1). As a result, the property 
sector charter attaches more weight to the ownership and employment equity 
elements of the generic 2007 Codes’ scorecard. An additional element, called 
“economic development” was introduced. Entities complying with this sector 
charter are encouraged to invest at least 10 per cent of their total investment 
spend in under-resourced areas, such as those identified by the Financial 
Sector charter, and to transfer ownership of a targeted 35 per cent of property 
to black-owned companies over a period of five years (ibid). 
Financial sector November 2012 
Under the financial sector charter, two new elements (additional to the seven 
2007 Codes’ elements) specific to the financial sector were introduced (DTI, 
2012b). The two elements are called Empowerment Financing and Access to 
Financial Services. The objectives of these two elements are to promote 
financing facilities to young black entrepreneurs, make housing affordable and 
service black people that did not have access to banking and financing before 
(DTI, 2012b). 
Agricultural sector December 2012 
Land ownership is added as an element to the scorecard (DTI, 2012c). 
Landowners should provide a targeted 30 per cent of their land for reformation 
(DTI, 2012c).  
Tourism sector November 2015 
No sector specific elements are proposed by the tourism charter, more 
weighting has been given to ownership and employment equity (DTI, 2015b). 
Media and 
communication 
sector 
April 2016 
This charter provides for a sixth element, called “Responsible social 
marketing and communications”. This element requires entities to invest one 
per cent of net profit after tax on projects that encourage society to increase 
mutual respect, coherency and embrace differences. This charter also 
increases the weighting of management control to 27 points (15 points under 
the generic 2013 Codes). The ownership target is increased from 25 per cent 
per the generic 2013 Codes, to 40 per cent at implementation date and 45 per 
cent in 2018 (DTI, 2016a). 
Information and 
communication 
technology sector 
November 2016 
The revised five elements of the 2013 Codes’ scorecard were retained. The 
weightings were, however, changed to reflect a larger emphasis on 
management control, preferential procurement and socio-economic 
development initiatives (DTI, 2016b). 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the indicated sources 
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It is disconcerting that only three of the nine sector charters indicated in Table 2.6 are based on 
the 2013 Codes, whilst the rest still refer to the 2007 Codes. Table 2.6 shows that the majority 
of sectors place considerable emphasis on ownership, which could be comforting. An increased 
ownership requirement may, however, not be welcomed by investors. The current minister of 
trade and industry, Ebrahim Patel, also said that focussing on shareholding is perhaps not 
sufficient (Phakathi, 2019). Patel suggests that the companies’ B-BBEE efforts should centre 
on empowering workers (ibid). 
An attempt was made to revise the mining charter to align it with the 2013 Codes, but is still 
not gazetted yet (Donnelly, 2019; DTI, 2017). The revised mining sector charter has already 
caused some controversy in the media (Donnelly, 2019; Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, 2017). The 
latest version was released in December 2018, but its implementation date has been suspended 
due to the debate. The dispute is about the fact that all mining companies are expected to have 
at least 30 per cent black ownership, or risk having their mining rights not renewed upon expiry. 
Non-compliance with the ownership requirements, and having a B-BBEE status of between 
levels six and eight, can result in the cancellation of the mining license of the company 
(Biznews, 2019). Should mining companies’ licenses be revoked, this could be disastrous for 
such a company, and could pose a serious threat to their employees’ job security. 
Attempts have been made in other countries like Malaysia, Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, 
the United States of America (US) to empower economically underprivileged individuals. 
Masito (2007) argued that South Africa already had an empowerment initiative under the 
apartheid regime. In the following section this previous South African empowerment initiative 
and economic empowerment attempts in other countries will be discussed. An overview of prior 
academic research on the successes of these attempts will also be provided. 
 
2.7 OTHER ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT INITIATIVES  
In this section, four other economic empowerment initiatives will be presented.  
2.7.1 Volkskapitalisme (South Africa) 
During the apartheid regime, the reigning National Party implemented a programme called 
volkskapitalisme to uplift the Afrikaner people living in poverty (Masito, 2007). This 
programme was unofficially called Afrikaner Economic Empowerment (AEE). It is important 
to give attention to the lessons that could be learnt from AEE, as it could be argued that AEE 
indirectly lead to B-BBEE. The author’s view is that B-BBEE can be seen as a correction of 
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the inequalities caused by AEE. Masito (2007) believed that the AEE was driven by the 
apartheid laws and regulations, whilst the National Party executed the programme. 
The controlling British originally impoverished the Afrikaners to control mineral resources 
(Masito, 2007). AEE was thus created in an attempt to ensure that the ethnic culture and identity 
of the Afrikaners could be sustained. Even though there was no definitive AEE legislation, 
other acts such as the Land Act (No. 27 of 1913) and the Wage Act (No. 27 of 1925) were 
promulgated to advance the economic interests of white people (ibid). The apartheid regulations 
also ensured that certain jobs were reserved for Afrikaners, similar to the Employment Equity 
Act (No. 55 of 1998) introduced by the ANC. 
The National Party built several Afrikaans medium schools and universities. By 1958, 62 per 
cent of all schools used Afrikaans as a medium of education (Masito, 2007). Another vehicle 
of AEE was the creation of non-profit companies for the purpose of job creation of 
impoverished Afrikaners. Examples of these non-profit semi-state institutions included Sasol, 
Eskom, and Iskor (Masito, 2007). Family-owned businesses were also typically linked to 
empowering Afrikaners (Marazanye, 2016). 
2.7.2 New Economic Plan (Malaysia) 
Malaysia’s economic transformation is often cited as a comparison to B-BBEE (Marazanye, 
2016; Uppal, 2014; Mathura, 2009). The New Economic Plan (NEP) of 1970 from Malaysia 
had the intent of empowering the native Bumiputera people who constituted roughly 50 per 
cent of the population of Malaysia in 1970. The other 50 per cent of the population were mostly 
from India and China (Marazanye, 2016). Bumiputerans were deprived, especially in terms of 
tertiary education. Despite being the majority, only one Bumiputeran for every 20 Chinese 
received a BSc degree over the period 1959 to 1970 (Abdullah, 1997 in Marazanye, 2016). 
Sartorius and Botha (2008) added that 65 per cent of all Bumiputerans were living in poverty 
before the introduction of the NEP in 1970. The Malaysian government thus implemented the 
NEP to uplift this ethnic group. The target was that Bumiputerans should own at least 30 per 
cent of ordinary shares of Malaysian companies by 1990 (Uppal, 2014). 
The NEP entailed very similar requirements to the B-BBEE principles, such as ownership and 
employment equity (Sartorius & Botha, 2008).  Similar to AEE, Marazanye (2016) added that 
the education sector was also identified as a main pillar of the NEP. The Malaysian government 
improved education by investing in schools for children, granting bursaries to deserving 
students, and sponsoring promising students to receive tertiary education abroad. Quotas in 
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local universities were also used to ensure that sufficient numbers of Bumiputerans were 
granted access to the local universities (Marazanye, 2016).  
Ownership by Bumiputeranian people in companies were achieved by means of state 
intervention. The government appointed different agencies that would purchase the shares on 
behalf of Bumiputerans and distribute it amongst qualifying individuals (Marazanye, 2016). By 
1990, the Malaysian government managed to increase corporate equity to 27 per cent 
Bumiputeran representation. 
The Malaysian government also aimed to restructure the Malaysian workforce to include 
Bumiputerans in professional occupations. These individuals were traditionally 'side-lined’ to 
work as unskilled labourers in industries like farming and fishing. Quotas in higher education 
were introduced to ensure that Bumiputeran people were qualified for the positions earmarked 
for them (Marazanye, 2016). Companies were encouraged by the government to participate in 
the NEP initiatives by awarding government contracts and operating licenses, similar to B-
BBEE. Since the NEP had an expiry date of 1990, the NEP was replaced by the National 
Development Programme (NDP) in 1991, with similar policies and objectives (Uppal, 2014).  
Even though it could be claimed that Malaysia’s transformation initiatives were partly 
successful (Marazanye, 2016; Uppal, 2014), Mathura (2009) highlighted that there were some 
significant shortcomings of the NEP and the NDP. The largest failure entails that the 
Bumiputera people felt entitled to access to education and, indirectly, enrichment. Some foreign 
investors were disgruntled and hence divested from Malaysia (Sartorius & Botha, 2008). As a 
result, the quality of education deteriorated, and economic growth was hindered. There were 
also a few elite individuals who benefited from this programme, as opposed to the masses it 
was supposed to uplift (Sartorius & Botha, 2008). A considerable advantage for Malaysia was 
the fact that their empowerment programme was introduced during a time of extreme economic 
growth, which seemed to have diluted the negative impacts of the NEP. The economic growth 
was, however, not as a result of the NEP, but rather the consequence of a high savings 
percentage by domestic households and growth in exports (Sartorius & Botha, 2008).  
2.7.3 African-American reformation (United States of America) 
In the US, African-American individuals have historically been economically marginalised 
(Mtima, 1999). The end of slavery meant that these individuals were economically 
dispositioned. The majority of African-Americans have not yet escaped poverty (Nembhard, 
2004). Several political leaders in the US, including Booker Washington (1856 – 1915) and 
William du Bois (1868 – 1963) attempted to find solutions for the poverty problem (Mtima, 
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1999). Washington believed that poverty would be eradicated by focussing on skills 
development and education, while Du Bois advocated the formation of black companies to 
advance the economic position of African-American people (Nembhard, 2004). Du Bois 
advocated “full legal equality for all Americans in every aspect of life” (Mtima, 1999:3). Du 
Bois, however, did not advocate transfer of ownership in particular, but rather suggested that 
employment opportunities should be created for black people, by black people. This strategy 
correlates with Andrews (2008) who stated that new black-owned companies should be formed, 
with B-BBEE giving those companies a competitive advantage. Creating black industrialists 
are referred to as stage three B-BBEE by DTI Minister Ebrahim Patel (Phakathi, 2019). 
The author ponders whether skills development in terms of B-BBEE should not be of greater 
importance. Over and above the funds required for skills development and education, the 
department of basic education should also invest in the training of teachers to improve the 
quality of education. In line with Andrews (2008), the author furthermore postulates that the 
focus of B-BBEE should perhaps change from transfer of ownership and workforce to the 
creation of new black-owned companies. 
Nembhard (2004:5) pointed out that there have been several formal attempts to generate black 
wealth in the US, including the so-called “Buy Black” campaign and the “Black Panther” 
programmes. These campaigns urged citizens to transact with black-owned businesses. None 
of these programmes seems to have been successful or sustainable, as African-Americans are 
still impoverished, and none of these programs is in place any longer (Nembhard, 2004). A 
formalised economic empowerment plan, such as B-BBEE legislation in South Africa or the 
NEP in Malaysia, was not implemented in the US. 
2.7.4 Zimbabwe Indigenisation Programme  
A country which was marred by controversial land grabs, is South Africa’s neighbouring 
country Zimbabwe. A policy similar to South Africa’s B-BBEE legislation was implemented 
in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Indigenisation Programme (also called ‘ZIP’) was promulgated 
in 2007, titled “Chapter 14:33 Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 14/2007” 
(Zimbabwe Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation & Economic Empowerment, 2007:1). The 
purpose of ZIP is to ensure that all Zimbabwean companies are at least 51 per cent owned by 
indigenous Zimbabweans. Compliance to ZIP is driven by the fact that companies can lose their 
operating licenses should they fail to comply with the 51 per cent ownership target. Equity deals 
are also prohibited if the result is not at least a 51 per cent shareholding by indigenous 
Zimbabweans. Furthermore, at least 51 per cent of all procurement should be from companies 
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which have a majority shareholding by indigenous Zimbabweans (Zimbabwe Ministry of 
Youth, Indigenisation & Economic Empowerment, 2007). 
The requirements for ZIP seem to be stricter than B-BBEE. The ownership target for B-BBEE 
is 25 per cent, as opposed to 51 per cent for ZIP. Whilst compliance with the B-BBEE Act (No. 
53 of 2003) is voluntary, failure to comply with ZIP can result in a company losing its operating 
license (Zimbabwe Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation & Economic Empowerment, 2007). 
Mathura (2009) suggested a similar approach for South Africa, based on the argument that a 
reward-based approach might not yield the same effect than a punishment-based approach. 
Such a suggestion should, however, be treated with caution, given the economic situation in 
Zimbabwe following the implementation of ZIP. 
Uppal (2014) pointed out that an economic reformative policy such as ZIP can only succeed in 
an environment with strong economic growth and requirements that are not as strict as ZIP, as 
it would otherwise hamper economic growth. The effect of the strict, punishment-based policy 
on the Zimbabwean economy could rightfully be questioned. Since Zimbabwe has not 
prospered in the 10 years since promulgating ZIP, there is arguably no compelling evidence 
that ZIP contributed towards economic growth in Zimbabwe. The opposite seems to be true.  
ZIP is a very radical empowerment programme. A reformative policy can, however, never be 
at the forefront of economic activity, but should rather be a by-product of the economic policy, 
with the main focus on growing the economy (Magure, 2012). By growing the economy, 
previously disadvantaged citizens can be uplifted (ibid). Marazanye (2016) added that 
stakeholder buy-in is critical for the success of any reforming act. Without buy-in from the 
stakeholders involved, it becomes a legal and financial burden to conduct business and is likely 
to eventually result in failure. Chidede and Warikandwa (2017) elaborated on Marazanye’s 
(2016) view by stating that foreign direct investment is critical to any economy. As such, a 
reformative act should be implemented in such a way that foreign direct investors are not 
deterred from investing in the country.  
 
2.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the history and application of B-BBEE were explained. This discussion included 
the generic Codes, the specific sector charters and the auditing of B-BBEE scores. There was a 
large disparity in income between black and white individuals in South Africa prior to 1994, 
which ultimately gave rise to B-BBEE legislation. This disparity in income still exists. Several 
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legal and academic definitions for B-BBEE have been constructed. The author considered these 
definitions and defined B-BBEE as a formalised process, led by the South African government, 
to redress the economic imbalances of the past, to ensure that all South Africans are equally 
privileged and could compete on the same level in all spheres of life.  
The application of B-BBEE is driven by the Codes. Since the inception of B-BBEE with the 
2003 Act, three Codes have been released: the 2004, 2007 and 2013 Codes. This study was 
mainly based on the 2007 Codes, with the 2004 Codes being considered to be not dissimilar 
from the 2007 Codes. The elements between the 2007 and 2013 Codes differ, and the 
compliance requirements became stricter. As such, this study excluded the B-BBEE scores of 
companies measured under the 2013 Codes. 
Economic empowerment initiatives that were introduced in other countries were also discussed. 
The author regards the following as important lessons for B-BBEE in South Africa, based on 
the discussed case studies. Education appears to be critical for economic empowerment. 
Economic empowerment in a time of minimal economic growth is unlikely to be sustainable. 
Skills development and job creation should be a priority. 
The focus of this study is not the effectiveness or appropriateness of B-BBEE as a policy, but 
rather the relationship between B-BBEE scores and financial health. In this chapter, the 
calculation of B-BBEE scores based on the respective Codes was clarified. The financial health 
measures will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION OF FINANCIAL HEALTH 
MEASURES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As presented in Chapter One Section 1.4, the primary objective of this study was to investigate 
the nature of the association between the B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and financial 
health of a sample of JSE-listed companies over the period 2004 to 2015. In Chapter Two, the 
requirements and calculations of the total B-BBEE scores were explained. In this chapter, 
several financial health measures will be discussed. Financial health is the encompassing term 
used in this study for accounting-based, market-based, value-based and default risk probability 
measures. The rationale for utilising each of the measures and the pitfalls associated with each 
metric will be explained.  
Doyle (1994) indicated that a company typically has two dominant financial performance 
objectives. The first is to maximise shareholder wealth, whilst the second is to increase 
operating profit. Investors who are investing in companies with high total B-BBEE scores are 
interested in the potential financial benefit from it in addition to the moral gratification of 
supporting transformation in the country. Financial benefits can be measured by using 
accounting-based, market-based, value-based and risk-based performance metrics. Accounting-
based metrics measure the historic profitability of a company, whilst market-based financial 
health measures account for the creation of shareholder wealth and expectations pertaining to 
future profits (Verweire & Van den Berghe, 2004). A third category of measurement 
interrogates a company’s profit relative to the cost of the capital required to generate the profit. 
This category is called value-based measures. Default risk probability was also added to this 
study to determine whether companies with an increased B-BBEE score (in total and per 
element) would be more likely, or less probable, to meet their short-term debt repayments. 
These categories will be discussed in the following sections. Under each category, the nature 
and compilation of the measure(s) pertaining to that category will be discussed.  
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3.2 ACCOUNTING-BASED FINANCIAL HEALTH MEASURES 
In this section, the different accounting-based financial health measures will be reviewed. 
Attention will be given to the associated advantages and disadvantages of each measure and 
which of these measures have been previously used in the diversity literature. Accounting-based 
measures typically incorporate accounting data to calculate ratios and trends. In previous 
studies, researchers have utilised accounting-based measures such as return on equity (ROE), 
return on assets (ROA) and percentage change in sales. A summary of prior accounting-based 
studies in the diversity literature is supplied in Table 3.1. Diversity in this table means 
percentage of ethnic minorities in the workforce, or board, or management team, as indicated. 
Table 3.1: Summary of prior studies that used accounting-based measures 
Author(s) 
Accounting-based 
measure(s) utilised 
Diversity measure(s) Nature of relationship 
Richard (2000) ROE Employee diversity No significant relationship 
Richard et al. (2004) ROE Managerial diversity No significant relationship 
Acemoglu et al. (2007) 
Return on sales 
(ROS) 
Total B-BBEE score No significant relationship 
Marimuthu & 
Kolandaisamy (2009) 
ROA, ROE Managerial diversity No significant relationship 
Kleynhans & Kruger 
(2014) 
Operating profit, 
Turnover 
Total B-BBEE score 
No significant relationship with 
both measures 
Erhardt et al. (2003) 
ROA, Return on 
Investment (ROI) 
Board diversity 
Significant positive relationship 
with ROI 
Marimuthu (2008) ROA Board diversity Significant positive relationship 
Shukeri et al. (2012) ROE Board diversity Significant positive relationship 
Source: Author’s compilation based on cited references 
As indicated in Table 3.1, two B-BBEE studies included accounting-based measures: 
Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Kleynhans and Kruger (2014). Neither found any relationship with 
the mentioned diversity measures and accounting-based financial health metrics. These authors 
utilised small samples. In contrast, this study used a large sample and a range of financial health 
measures. In Sections 3.2.1-3.2.4, a discussion is provided on several of the accounting-based 
ratios used in previous academic studies.  
3.2.1 Annual percentage change in turnover 
The annual percentage change in turnover is arguably the simplest accounting-based measure 
to compute and is widely used in the diversity literature (Dossi & Patelli, 2010). Kleynhans and 
Kruger (2014) computed the annual percentage change in turnover to measure the growth or 
deterioration in turnover on a year-on-year basis. This type of analysis, where one year is 
compared with another (a so-called base year), is called index analysis (Correia, Flynn, Uliana 
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& Wormald, 2013). The preceding year would be the base year, and the current year’s turnover 
would be expressed as a percentage of the base year, indicating the percentage change from the 
previous year. The Bloomberg (2018) equation for annual percentage change in turnover, which 
was adopted in this study is: 
 
∆T=
T1
T0
− 1 
…Equation 3.1 
Where:    
∆𝑇= Annual percentage change in turnover  
T1 =  Turnover for the current financial year  
T0 =  Turnover for the preceding financial year  
 
A high, positive annual percentage change in turnover can be associated with better financial 
health, as management was able to generate a higher turnover than in the preceding year. A 
negative or small positive annual percentage change in turnover can be indicative of the 
company not performing optimally. The percentage change in turnover should arguably 
outperform inflation to provide real growth. A positive correlation between B-BBEE score and 
annual percentage change in turnover can indicate that B-BBEE contributed to more 
government contracts being awarded to higher B-BBEE scoring companies than is the case for 
lower B-BBEE scoring companies. More government contracts could have resulted in more 
revenue for the higher B-BBEE scoring companies. There are, of course, many other factors 
that could contribute towards a positive change in turnover, such as superior marketing 
campaigns. 
The annual percentage change in turnover has the benefit of allowing comparison over time, 
i.e. from one year to another, as opposed to other measures (such as ROA) which only show a 
measure at a certain point in time (Correia et al., 2013). There are, however, a few pitfalls 
associated with using annual percentage change in turnover as a financial health measure. The 
most notable, as indicated by Correia et al. (2013), is that some companies might ‘drive sales’, 
but the associated costs are not taken into account. To account for this pitfall, the annual 
percentage change in turnover should be interpreted along with other accounting-based 
measures such as ROS. 
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3.2.2 Return on sales (ROS) 
Correia et al. (2013) stated that in addition to index analysis, so-called ‘common size analysis’ 
is also frequently used in practice and academia. Common size analysis refers to an approach 
in which all other considered items are expressed as a percentage of a specific item (Correia et 
al., 2013). The ROS and ROA measures are examples of common size analysis. ROS has been 
used by previous researchers in the B-BBEE field, such as Acemoglu et al. (2007). ROS was 
defined by these authors as operating profit divided by turnover. In line with these researchers, 
ROS is defined in this study as:  
 
ROS =
NOPAT
T
 
…Equation 3.2 
Where:    
ROS = Return on sales  
NOPAT =  Net operating profit after tax  
T =  Turnover for the current financial year  
ROS hence measures how much NOPAT is generated for each R1 of sales. A high ROS figure 
is therefore better than a low figure. A positive link between total B-BBEE score and ROS 
could imply that companies with higher total B-BBEE scores are likely to generate more 
NOPAT for each R1 of turnover, than companies with lower total B-BBEE scores.  
The ROS ratio can be computed on a before or after-tax basis. Correia et al. (2013) argued that 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), divided by turnover or earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), divided by turnover, might be a more suitable 
measure, as net profit can be influenced by differences in accounting policy regarding 
depreciation. In this study, NOPAT will be used for consistency, in line with previous B-BBEE 
research. ROS addresses the criticism of using the annual change in turnover, as the latter does 
not take operating expenses into account. Since ROS accounts for the operational costs, the 
NOPAT of a company should be more comparable between industries than the annual change 
in turnover.  
3.2.3 Return on assets (ROA) 
The ROA ratio is widely used as a measure of profitability (Sharma, Shebalkov & Yukhanaev, 
2016; Waddock & Graves, 1997). This ratio has been used by many previous researchers in the 
diversity literature, such as Carter et al. (2010), Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009), 
Marimuthu (2008) and Erhardt et al. (2003). ROA measures how effective an entity is in 
generating operating profit from its available assets, before the effects of financing are taken 
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into account (if ROA is calculated using EBIT or EBITDA) (Damodaran, 2001). As with ROS, 
ROA can also be computed on a before or after-tax basis. Damodaran (2007) defined ROA as 
NOPAT divided by total assets. Brealey and Myers (1991), however, argued that average assets 
should rather be used. In this study, ROA will be defined as follows:  
 
ROA =
NOPAT
A1 +  A0
2
 
…Equation 3.3 
Where:    
ROA = Return on assets  
NOPAT =  Net operating profit after tax  
𝐴1 =  Total assets at the end of the current financial year  
𝐴0 =  Total assets at the end of the previous financial year  
 
Similar to ROS, a high ROA ratio is viewed in a positive light, especially when compared with 
the industry’s ROA figure. When a firm’s ROA is compared to the industry average, the 
information obtained from this ratio becomes very valuable (Brealey & Myers, 1991). In the 
context of this study, a positive association between ROA and total B-BBEE score could be 
interpreted as B-BBEE enabling the company to generate more operating profit from its existing 
assets.  
Correia et al. (2013) stated that ROA can be regarded as a type of return on investment 
calculation. Investment is often referred to as investment from shareholders (equity) and from 
creditors (liabilities) (Correia et al., 2013). In accounting terms, assets should always be equal 
to equity plus liabilities (Koppeschaar, Rossouw, Deysel, Sturdy, Van Wyk, Gaie-Booysen, 
Papageorgiou, Smith, Van Der Merwe & Schmulian, 2015). As such, Correia et al. (2013) 
argued that ROA could account for return on investment. Damodaran (2007) disagrees with 
Correia et al. (2013) by stating that investment cannot be defined as total equity plus total 
liabilities. He argued that entries such as provisions and current liabilities cannot be termed 
investments, as these items refer to short-term operational needs, rather than long-term 
investment needs (Damodaran, 2007). 
ROA as an accounting-based measure of financial health has some shortcomings. This 
profitability ratio does not show how efficient a company is in generating net operating profit 
from each Rand of shareholders’ investment. The methods of valuing assets in financial 
statements could differ, as the international accounting standard for property, plant and 
equipment (IAS 16) allows a company to show assets at historical cost price or fair value, 
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whichever is the most applicable (Koppeschaar et al., 2015). This difference gives rise to the 
problem that, in certain instances, total assets is measured at fair value (market value), whereas 
in other instances total assets is measured at historical cost (price). Comparing two companies 
with different methods of valuating assets could complicate the analysis.  
3.2.4 Return on equity (ROE) 
The ROE ratio was used by international diversity authors Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy 
(2009) who calculated ROE as follows:  
 
ROE =
Net profit
Total equity
  
…Equation 3.4 
Where:    
ROE = Return on equity  
Net profit =  Net profit (after accounting for tax) attributable to ordinary shareholders  
Total equity =  Total shareholders’ equity  
Collier, McGowan and Muhammad (2010) used the DuPont method of analysis to evaluate 
financial performance against corporate social performance. The DuPont method is also 
suggested by Correia et al. (2013) as a technique that is frequently used in structured analyses. 
The Du Pont method states that ROE is the ultimate measure of financial performance. ROE 
can be broken down in a number of components as indicated in Equation 3.5 (Correia et al., 
2013; Collier et al., 2010; Richard, 2000):  
 
DuPont (ROE) =
Net profit
Sales
 ×
Sales
Total assets
 ×
Total assets
Equity
 
…Equation 3.5 
The first two sections of the Du Pont analysis (net profit divided by sales, and sales divided by 
assets) show the net profit margin and sales to assets ratio. The result of the first two sections 
is thus net profit divided by assets, which is ROA per Correria et al.’s (2013) definition. ROE 
can be calculated using the DuPont method, by taking ROA (Equation 3.3) and multiplying it 
with the equity multiplier, also called leverage (The CFA Institute, 2016; Collier et al., 2010). 
The equity multiplier (or leverage) is defined by Collier et al. (2010) as total assets divided by 
total equity. 
Damodaran (2007) defined ROE as net income divided by the book value of equity at the 
beginning of the year. Bloomberg (2018), however, uses the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 
Institute’s (2017) definition: ROE is calculated as net profit divided by average shareholders’ 
equity. This definition was used for the purpose of this study (Equation 3.6).  
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ROE =
Net profit
E1 +  E0
2
 
…Equation 3.6 
Where:    
ROE = Return on equity  
Net profit =  Net profit after tax  
𝐸1 =  Total shareholders’ equity at the end of the current financial year  
𝐸0 =  Total shareholders’ equity at the end of the previous financial year  
The rationale behind using average shareholders’ equity is that return, to which shareholders’ 
equity is compared to, accrued over time (one financial year). To divide a number that was 
derived over time (return) by an indicator that was measured at one point in time (shareholders’ 
equity), is perhaps not ideal. Using the average shareholders’ equity is then arguably the most 
accurate way of calculating ROE, given that an average account for the opening and closing 
balances of shareholders’ equity (Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe, 1996; Brealey & Myers, 1991).  
The ROE ratio provides analysts with valuable information on how effective management has 
been to generate profit with the money invested by the ordinary shareholders. A company with 
a higher ROE would thus be a more attractive investment (Correia et al., 2013). If a company 
has operated at a loss, ROE can be negative. In instances where equity has been reduced by a 
negative retained earnings figure, the reduced equity amount would inflate the ROE.  
Financial risk is furthermore not accounted for by the ROE ratio. Leverage measures the 
relationship between debt and equity. Debt is a less expensive capital source compared to equity 
(The CFA Institute, 2016). Should a company thus employ more debt, ROE could increase. An 
increase in the debt to equity ratio, however, also increases financial risk. The reason being that 
the company has an obligation to pay the interest related to the debt, but do not have an 
obligation to pay dividends to ordinary shareholders (Correia et al., 2013). Since ROE does not 
take financial risk into account, a company with a higher ROE (but higher risk) might seem 
more attractive than a company with a lower ROE (and lower risk). Investors need to account 
for risk and return when making investment decisions.  
To combat the pitfall of ROE and the other accounting-based performance measures not 
accounting for financial risk, attention was also given to market-based (including risk-based) 
and value-based measures. In the following sections, an overview will be provided on the 
application and measurement of selected market-based financial health measures.  
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3.3 MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL HEALTH MEASURES 
Although several previous researchers used accounting-based financial performance measures 
(Table 3.1), only a few researchers have used market-based measures in the diversity literature. 
Market-based measures relate to movements in market data, such as a company’s share price. 
A summary of market-based measures used by prior diversity authors is presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Market-based measures of financial health used by prior researchers 
Author(s) Measures utilised Diversity measure Nature of relationship 
Mathura (2009)  
CAGR, Tobin’s Q 
and P/E ratio 
Total B-BBEE score 
No significant relationship with 
any of the measures 
Carter et al. (2010) Tobin’s Q, ROA Board diversity 
Significant positive association 
with ROA 
De Villiers & Ferreira 
(2011)  
Annual share price 
growth 
Total B-BBEE score 
Significant negative association 
Van der Merwe & Ferreira 
(2014) 
Short-term share 
returns 
Total B-BBEE and 
element scores 
Significant negative relationship 
with total B-BBEE score, 
ownership and preferential 
procurement. Significant 
positive relationship with 
management control 
Morris (2018) Unlevered beta 
Total B-BBEE and 
element scores 
No significant relationships 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on cited references 
As seen in Table 3.2, Mathura (2009) and De Villiers and Ferreira (2011) reported contrasting 
results with regard to the change in share price. Share price was also used by B-BBEE 
researchers in event studies, as is indicated in Table 1.3. Perusal of Table 1.3 revealed 
contrasting results for short-term and long-term share returns. For example, Mehta and Ward 
(2017) reported contradicting results, as they found positive short-term returns and a negative 
long-term association with B-BBEE between 2009 and 2015. As such, a further investigation 
of the change in share price and P/E ratio is warranted. 
3.3.1 Annual share price growth 
The annual share price growth measure could be used to investigate the change in a company’s 
share price from one period to another. De Villiers and Ferreira (2011) and Mathura (2009) 
stated that the share price at the end of each financial year for each company under review 
should be compared to the price of the share at the end of the preceding financial year to 
calculate annual share price growth. The calculation of De Villiers and Ferreira (2011) and 
Mathura (2009) are consistent with Bloomberg’s (2018) equation, as shown in Equation 3.7.  
 
Annual share price growth =
SP1
SP0
− 1 
…Equation 3.7 
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Where:    
SP1 =  Share price at the end of the current financial year  
SP0 =  Share price at the end of the preceding financial year  
Both Mathura (2009) and De Villiers and Ferreira (2011) considered the increase in share price 
over a one-year period following the publication of their sampled companies’ total B-BBEE 
scores. Mathura (2009) termed the annual share price increase CAGR, indicating growth over 
a period longer than a year, but only calculated growth for one year. De Villiers and Ferreira 
(2011) deemed a positive annual share price growth a positive financial performance indicator. 
A positive correlation between annual share price growth and a company’s B-BBEE score could 
possibly be linked to a positive market perception of B-BBEE at the company in question.  
Annual share price growth enables researchers to investigate the market’s perception of future 
financial performance (Verweire & Van den Berghe, 2004). Share prices are publicly available. 
Annual share price growth presents a simple, cost effective manner to measure market 
performance. There are, however, a number of problems associated with the computation of 
this measure. The share price of a company can be influenced by market changes, such as the 
2008 global financial crisis (Mans-Kemp, 2014). Since this study will include this crisis period, 
the results of the annual share price growth measure should be interpreted with caution. Share 
prices can also be influenced by dividend policy (Hussainey, Mgbame & Chijoke-Mgbame, 
2011). Dividends could be included in the calculation of total share return. In line with previous 
B-BBEE researchers, annual share price growth will be used in this study as computed in 
Equation 3.7. Dividends are not included in this measure.  
3.3.2 Market-to-book value (MTBV) 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the market price of an asset is not always equal to its accounting 
value. The same holds true for shares, as the book value (accounting value) of a company’s 
share is often not equal to its market price (Brealey & Myers, 1991). The difference could be 
due to the firm outperforming the market (The CFA Institute, 2016; Correia et al., 2013).  
Mathura (2009) calculated MTBV as market capitalisation divided by the book value of 
shareholders’ equity. The CFA Institute (2016) and Correia et al. (2013) calculated MTBV as 
the share price of a company divided by the book value per share. This calculation is consistent 
with the method utilised by Bloomberg (2018). Book value per share is calculated as total 
shareholders’ equity divided by the total number of ordinary shares issued in a specific year 
(Correia et al., 2013). The calculation for MTBV is presented in Equation 3.8. 
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MTBV =
SP
TSE
OS
 
…Equation 3.8 
Where:    
MTBV = Market-to-book value  
SP =  Share price at the end of the current financial year  
TSE =  Total shareholders’ equity  
OS =  Number of ordinary shares issued at the end of the current financial year  
Mathura (2009) stated that a MTBV of less than one could imply that the company did not 
create sufficient (or any) value for shareholders. The CFA Institute (2016) likewise stated that 
a MTBV of less than one could be regarded as a sign that the market does not expect the 
company to create returns in excess of what the accounting net asset value suggests. These 
explanations (of a MTBV of less than one) imply that the market expects a company to generate 
less value than what the book value of the assets represents. Since accounting theory states that 
the value of an asset should approximate the value of the future economic benefits expected 
from the asset (Koppeschaar et al., 2015), it could be argued that a MTBV of less than one 
might indicate that assets need to be tested for impairment.  
A positive association between MTBV and total B-BBEE score could indicate that the market’s 
perception of the company’s B-BBEE strategy and activities is positive, and is partly reflected 
in a high share price. If the difference between the market value and book value of a share 
results in a MTBV ratio of greater than one, it could be referred to as market value added or 
market goodwill (Damodaran, 2007). A significant positive link between total B-BBEE score 
and MTBV could accordingly be ascribed to B-BBEE giving rise to goodwill that is recognised 
by the market, but which is not reflected on the financial statements.  
Goodwill is only recognised as an asset upon completion of a business combination according 
to IFRS 3, but is not recognised as an asset of the entity possessing the goodwill, as it does not 
fulfil the definition of an asset according to the accounting framework (Koppeschaar et al., 
2015). As goodwill typically gives rise to the entity generating more operating profit from their 
existing assets, it is regarded as a “hidden asset” (Damodaran, 2007:2). Investors tend to define 
assets different to accounting standards (ibid). The statement of financial position from an 
investor’s point of view is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1:  Statement of financial position from an investor’s point of view 
Source: Damodaran (2007) 
Investors take information into account that is not indicated in the financial statements, such as 
value that would be created by future investments, as shown in Figure 3.1. Some investors 
might be willing to pay for assets that are not yet reflected on the financial statements, giving 
rise to a higher MTBV ratio. 
Beaver and Ryan (2000) noted that MTBV is useful in predicting future ROE. Companies that 
have positive net present value projects will probably have higher MTBV, since the market 
expects them to perform better than the book value of the assets reflected on their financial 
statements (Beaver & Ryan, 2000). Correia et al. (2013) also remarked that companies that 
have high growth would have higher MTBV ratios.  
Unexpected changes in market conditions can distort MTBV (Beaver & Ryan, 2000). The 
market tends to integrate changes in the economic environment immediately in the share price, 
while the same results will only be reflected in the financial statements over a period of time 
(Beaver & Ryan, 2000). Correia et al. (2013) stated that the industry in which a company 
operates can also play a role in the MTBV of the company. Attention will consequently be 
given to differences across industries. 
MTBV is different from Tobin’s Q as used by Carter et al. (2010), as the latter measures the 
market value of the company’s assets divided by the replacement value of the assets. Tobin’s 
Q will, however, not be included in this study, due to the fact that MTBV (which can be 
considered as a proxy for Tobin’s Q) is used. A measure that only focusses on the assets of a 
company and disregards the liabilities was not deemed appropriate for this study. 
3.3.3 Price/earnings (P/E) ratio  
The P/E ratio is often used in valuations of companies (The CFA Institute, 2016; Correia et al., 
2013). The metric reflects the ratio between the share price and the EPS (Correia et al., 2013). 
Liabilities 
Investments 
already made 
Debt Borrowed money  
Growth assets 
Expected value that will be 
created by future investments 
Investments 
yet to be made 
Equity Owners’ funds 
Assets 
Assets in place  
Existing investments 
generate cash flows today 
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The CFA Institute (2016) refers to this ratio as the price per share divided by EPS. Since market 
capitalisation is defined as the price per share multiplied by the number of shares in issue, the 
P/E ratio can also be expressed as market capitalisation divided by earnings. In this study, the 
Bloomberg (2018) definition was used as indicated in Equation 3.9. 
 
 
 
P/E =
SP
BEPS
 
…Equation 3.9 
Where:    
P/E = Price/earnings ratio  
SP =  Share price at the end of the current financial year  
BEPS =  Basic earnings per share  
The CFA Institute (2016) defines basic EPS as net profit after tax divided by the weighted 
number of ordinary shares, as indicated in Equation 3.10.  
  
BEPS =
NP
WOS
 
…Equation 3.10 
Where:    
BEPS = Basic earnings per share  
NP =  Net profit after tax  
WOS =  Weighted number of ordinary shares at the end of the current financial 
year 
 
The denominator (WOS) is calculated by taking the duration the share was in issue during the 
year into account. For example, shares that have only been in issue for three months at the end 
of the financial year, is measured as a quarter of a share, as it was only in issue for a quarter of 
the year (The CFA Institute, 2016). Companies with high expected future returns and/or low 
risk are expected to have high P/E ratios (Mathura, 2009; Abdo & Fisher, 2007).  
The P/E ratio is a well-known and trusted method of assessing the market value of a company 
(The CFA Institute, 2016; Correia et al., 2013). According to Correia et al. (2013) and Brigham, 
Gapenski and Ehrhardt (1999), the market will affix a high P/E ratio to a company that is 
perceived to have high growth in future. A positive association between total B-BBEE scores 
and P/E ratios could imply that the market view B-BBEE as a contributor to future growth. P/E 
ratio can also be influenced by the perceived risk of a company. Companies that are more likely 
to close down in future, will attract a lower valuation from investors, and hence a lower P/E 
ratio will be ascertained. A negative relationship between total B-BBEE score and P/E ratio 
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could indicate that companies with a higher total B-BBEE score have a higher perceived risk 
of failure. 
Earnings are, however, susceptible to manipulation (The CFA Institute, 2016). Haberberg and 
Rieple (2008) stated that EPS is often considered when determining managers’ incentives such 
as bonuses and share options. As such, EPS could be manipulated and even overstated in an 
attempt to ensure a higher bonus or other incentive. The CFA Institute (2016) stated that short-
term losses due to non-recurring items can lead to an overstated P/E ratio, as the market might 
not decrease the share price in the same ratio as the decrease in net profit after tax (Correia et 
al., 2013). A negative P/E ratio fails as an indicator of value and is not deemed meaningful. 
3.3.4  Excess return and cost of equity 
A major shortcoming of the financial health measures discussed in Section 3.2 is the fact that 
risk is not explicitly taken into account. To overcome this shortcoming, previous researchers 
such as Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993), Bello (2005) and Mans-Kemp (2014) included an 
excess return measure. Excess return can be measured using Jensen’s (1968) alpha. This value 
represents the difference between ex post total return and required return.  
Instead of using total return (which includes dividends), Hamilton et al. (1993) and Bello (2005) 
used annual share price growth. The same approach was followed in this study as it is aimed at 
directors and managers of companies who should decide on the company’s B-BBEE strategy 
and activities. Agency theory suggests that a director’s remuneration (especially bonus) is 
determined by share price, amongst others, and not directly by dividends paid out. As a result, 
the directors and managers would probably be more concerned about the growth in share price, 
than the dividends received by ordinary shareholders (Shen, 2005).  
The equation for calculating a company’s excess return is presented in Equation 3.11. 
 ∝ = annual share price growth − Re …Equation 3.11 
Where:    
∝= Excess return  
Re =  Required return (cost of equity)  
Required return can be measured according to a number of asset pricing models. Jensen (1968) 
used the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as indicated in Equation 3.12. 
 Re =  Rf +  𝛽(Rm −  Rf) …Equation 3.12 
Where:    
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Re = Realised returns  
β =  Covariance between return of the share and the market return  
Rm =  Return on the market portfolio  
Rf =  Risk-free rate  
The definition indicated above in Equation 3.12 is consistent with the definition used by 
Bloomberg (2018) to calculate cost of equity. The cost of equity as calculated by Bloomberg 
(2018) was used in this study and, as such, cost of equity was calculated as indicated in Equation 
3.12. The required return computed by CAPM suggests that the ex post minimum return that 
any investor requires is the risk-free rate. In addition, an investor wants to be compensated for 
market risk. The difference between the return on a market index and the risk-free rate (Rm-Rf) 
is thus referred to as the market factor. Given substantive criticism against the CAPM (Adrian 
& Franzoni, 2009; Fama & French, 2004; Carhart, 1997; Roll & Ross, 1994), a number of 
multi-factor models have seen the light in recent years.  
In 1992, Fama and French (1992) introduced a three-factor model which included a size factor 
and a value factor. Whether a company is viewed as a growth or value asset, is determined by 
the inverse of its MTBV. As such, a high MTBV would indicate a growth asset, whilst a low 
MTBV would indicate a value asset. The argument to include a size factor was based on the 
findings which showed that the smaller the market capitalisation of a company, the higher its 
required return (Fama & French, 1992). It could be argued that, as larger companies have a 
lower risk of becoming insolvent, ordinary shareholders require a lower return. Companies with 
a high MTBV also have a higher required return, compared to companies with a lower MTBV. 
If a company’s market price is less than its book value, the market arguably perceives the 
company to have a higher risk, resulting in a lower share price and an inflated required return 
(Correia et al., 2013). 
Carhart (1997) argued that momentum should also be included when calculating required 
return. Momentum explains why share prices continue to increase or decrease if there is an 
upward or downward trend in the share price (Gregory, Tharyan & Christidis, 2013). In 2004, 
Fama and French (2004) added two more factors to their three-factor model. The first being 
investment, and the other being profitability (Fama & French, 2004). Investment refers to the 
risk companies take when investing. Companies that are willing to invest aggressively may 
have a higher cost of equity than companies that invest conservatively. Companies that are more 
profitable are expected to have a lower cost of equity than those with lower levels of 
profitability.  
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Despite these criticisms of Fama and French (2004; 1992), Levy and Roll (2012) concluded 
that, whilst there are many objections against CAPM, the empirical evidence shows that it is a 
reliable method to calculate the cost of equity. In the South African context, Ward and Muller 
(2012) have been critical of CAPM. Nel (2011), however, found that CAPM was the most 
widely used indicator of the cost of equity in the local context at the time. PwC (2016) pointed 
out that analysts in Africa prefer to use CAPM over other methods. The usage of CAPM was 
hence deemed applicable for this study. 
A positive excess return is obtained if the annual share price growth is more than the cost of 
equity. This study is the first of its kind (as far as could be established) where B-BBEE (in total 
and per element) was measured against excess return. Excess return measures whether the 
realised return was higher than the required return. Another measure, EVA, also measures the 
excess return a company generated, but by using other assumptions. In the following section, 
value-based financial health measures will be discussed. 
 
3.4 VALUE-BASED FINANCIAL HEALTH MEASURE 
As far as could be established, no previous B-BBEE researchers included value-based financial 
health measures. According to Damodaran (2007), it is important to understand whether a 
company’s assets are generating returns in excess of what it costs to fund them. By accounting 
for the cost of capital, value-based financial health measures such as economic value added 
(EVA), cash flow return on investment and cash value added, emerged. EVA is the most 
commonly used value-based measure (Milichovský, 2015). In South Africa, EVA is also the 
most commonly used (Erasmus, 2008). For the purposes of this study, EVA was included as a 
value-based financial health measure. 
EVA is also termed abnormal earnings by Correia et al. (2013), as it measures the return 
generated in excess of the cost of investment. EVA will thus increase through projects that have 
a positive net present value. The measure was calculated in this study based on Correia et al.’s 
(2013) approach: 
 EVA = NOPAT − WACC × CAPt−1 …Equation 3.13 
Where:    
EVA = Economic value added  
NOPAT =  Net operating profit after tax  
WACC =  Weighted average cost of capital  
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CAPt−1 = Invested capital at the beginning of the financial period  
Correia et al. (2013) and Erasmus (2008) concurred that NOPAT is an acceptable form of return 
to be used in the calculation of EVA. Invested capital is defined by Correia et al. (2013) as the 
book value of a company’s non-current assets, plus its current assets, minus its non-interest-
bearing liabilities. Erasmus (2008) summarised invested capital as total equity plus total 
liabilities minus non-interest-bearing short-term borrowings. In this study, invested capital was 
defined as total assets minus non-interest-bearing current liabilities, in line with Correia et al. 
(2013) and Erasmus (2008).  
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the combination of cost of equity and cost of debt. 
Cost of debt is typically lower than the cost of equity. WACC takes the debt structure of the 
company into account, which is why it is called weighted average (Correia et al., 2013). Should 
a company employ more debt, mathematically their WACC would decrease. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), however, argued that the more debt a company employs, the higher the cost of 
equity becomes. This increase in the cost of equity offsets the saving associated with cheaper 
debt capital. As a result, they believed it is impossible to lower WACC by increasing debt. 
A high EVA could either imply that the firm is creating value, or that the company has a low 
WACC (Young & O’Byrne, 2001). A positive link between EVA and total B-BBEE score could 
point to companies with higher levels of B-BBEE being able to generate higher returns for their 
investors compared to companies with lower total B-BBEE scores. A company should invest 
in projects with net present values that exceed the cost of capital to maximise EVA, which will 
ultimately lead to an increase in shareholder value (Young & O’Byrne, 2001). Holler (2009) 
stated that EVA overcomes the challenge of possible accounting distortions. The CFA Institute 
(2016) and Correia et al. (2013) agreed with Holler (2009) that EVA is a useful measure when 
valuating companies.  
Pitfalls associated with EVA include that certain authors define EVA the same as residual 
income (Stewart, 1991), which can lead to confusion. The accuracy of the EVA measure is 
dependent on the calculation of a company’s WACC, which is not always readily available in 
the case of unlisted companies. In the context of this study, the sample only included companies 
that were listed on the JSE for which WACC was readily available.  
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3.5 DEFAULT RISK PROBABILITY  
It is also important to understand the default risk of a company when evaluating financial health. 
As far as could be established, no prior researcher in the B-BBEE field has referred to the 
possibility that a company would default on its financial commitments. The purpose of the 
default risk probability measure is to calculate the probability that a company would not fulfil 
its financial commitments and hence default on its payments within the next financial year. 
The default risk probability data were downloaded from Bloomberg (2018). The exact equation 
for calculating default risk probability is not provided by Bloomberg (2018), but the 
considerations taken into account in calculating this measure are discussed in this section. 
Bloomberg (2018) is widely regarded as a credible data source. The measure is based on the 
concepts of liquidity and solvency, as defined by Bloomberg (2018). The liquidity of a company 
is determined by the cash flow interest coverage ratio. This ratio is outlined in Equation 3.14. 
 
IC =
CFO
IE
 
…Equation 3.14 
Where:    
IC = Interest coverage ratio  
CFO =  Cash flow from operations for the trailing 12 months  
IE =  Interest expense for the trailing 12 months  
The cash flow from operations used in Equation 3.14 is adjusted by Bloomberg (2018) for taxes 
and interest expense. The solvency of a company is assessed through the relationship of a 
company’s assets to its debt. The value of the company’s assets could be determined by using 
the Black Scholes model (Scholes & Williams, 1977). The solvency ratio of debt to assets, 
which Bloomberg defines as the distance to default, is calculated as shown in Equation 3.15. 
 
𝐷𝐷 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑉0
𝐷 ) + (𝜇 −
𝜎2
2 ) 𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
…Equation 3.15 
Where:    
𝐷𝐷 = Distance to default  
𝑉0 =  Total assets at time 0 according to Black Scholes model  
𝐷 =  Liabilities  
𝜇 = Asset drift  
𝜎 = Asset volatility  
T = Time to maturity of total liabilities  
The distance to default formula is not sufficient to indicate default risk, as it assumes that default 
can only happen when the liabilities mature. It is for this reason that Bloomberg (2018) 
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incorporates the cash flow available to fund interest expenditure. Bloomberg (2018) also makes 
certain accounting adjustments to achieve a more comparable result across industries. Default 
risk probability provides the likelihood of default within a time frame of between three months 
and five years. For purposes of this study, the 12 months probability measure was used, as this 
is in line with the going concern principle of accounting. A higher default risk probability 
indicates weaker financial health. A lower default risk probability shows that the company is 
more likely to continue as a going concern. A positive association between total B-BBEE score 
and default risk probability could thus indicate that companies with higher total B-BBEE scores 
are more likely to default on their debt repayments within the next 12 months.  
The main advantage of using this measure is that it is the only measure showing a company’s 
risk of default (Bloomberg, 2018). This measure incorporates cash flow from operations 
(Equation 3.14). If a positive ROE or ROA ratio was reported, but the returns are not translated 
into cash (due to an increase in debtors balance), the link between total B-BBEE score and 
ROE, ROA and B-BBEE score and default risk probability, respectively, would yield 
contrasting results. An increase in debtors balance can lead to a decrease in cash flow from 
operations and a lower interest coverage ratio. A lower interest coverage ratio will ultimately 
lead to a higher default risk probability.  
 
3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, several financial health measures were discussed, as the relationship with B-
BBEE and these measures might reveal the business case for B-BBEE compliance. Four 
accounting-based measures were explained, namely annual percentage change in turnover, 
ROS, ROA and ROE. In addition, five market-based financial health measures were utilised, 
namely annual share price growth, MTBV, P/E ratio, excess return and cost of equity. This 
study was the first to also include EVA as a value-based financial health measure. A default 
risk probability measure was used to identify the relationship between B-BBEE and default risk 
of a company, a measure which was not previously utilised in B-BBEE research. 
The accounting-based measures give an ex post view of the company’s results. Market-based 
measures, in contrast, provide an ex ante view of the company’s expected performance. EVA 
measures the entity’s performance against its cost of capital. Default risk probability tests the 
likelihood of a company defaulting on debt repayments within the next financial year.  To 
provide a holistic view of the relationships between B-BBEE scores (in total and per element), 
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a wide spectrum of measures was employed. Measures such as default risk probability, cost of 
equity and P/E ratio are all related to an increase or decrease in risk (a higher risk will be 
associated with an increased default risk probability, an inflated cost of equity and a deflated 
P/E ratio). The accounting-based measures of ROE, ROA and ROS are all measuring different 
aspects of a company’s ability to generate profit from the resources it has. Should a company 
be expected to continue to be more profitable than other entities, such expectation will be 
reflected in favourable market-based measures. 
In the following chapter, an in-depth discussion of the research design and methodology 
adopted in this study will be presented. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Research is conducted to gain insight into the facts and environment of a specific research 
question (Wisker, 2001). Zikmund et al. (2010:1) added that business research aims to “find 
the truth” regarding business occurrences. In this study, a uniquely South African business 
occurrence, namely selected listed companies’ compliance with B-BBEE legislation was 
investigated.  
In Chapter Two, a detailed discussion was provided on B-BBEE. As this study addresses the 
question of whether there is a business case for B-BBEE, Chapter Three contained information 
on various financial health measures. In this chapter, the research design and methodology 
adopted to collect and analyse data will be discussed. 
Different types of research will be explained next. Thereafter, the chosen research paradigm 
will be described, followed by the methods used to collect quantitative secondary data. 
Attention will be given to the population, sample and the operationalisation of the variables. 
Details on the statistical tests that were performed will be discussed as part of the data analysis 
section. Lastly, reliability, validity and ethical considerations will be provided. 
 
4.2 TYPES OF RESEARCH 
Research can be exploratory, causal or descriptive in nature, or a combination thereof (Zikmund 
et al., 2010). Babbie (2012) explained that exploratory research usually occurs during the initial 
phase(s) of research and might not provide all the solutions for the research problem. Prior 
research had been conducted on the relationship between B-BBEE and financial performance, 
as discussed in Chapters One to Three. As such, this study was not exploratory. Previous 
researchers did, however, not utilise all the financial health measures used in this study, and 
only two investigated the elements of the B-BBEE scorecard. Causal research can be conducted 
to investigate whether a variable has a predictable effect on another variable (Zikmund et al., 
2010).  
Descriptive research can define certain properties of businesses, objects or humans (ibid). For 
the purpose of this study, descriptive research was conducted to answer questions about the 
nature of the investigated relationships. When there are multiple factors that could influence a 
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relationship, descriptive research is typically performed. Causality can therefore not be proven. 
In this case, financial health could have been influenced by several factors, not only a 
company’s total B-BBEE score. In the next section, attention will be given to research 
paradigms and designs.  
 
4.3 RESEARCH PARADIGMS AND DESIGNS 
4.3.1  Research approach 
A researcher should define his/her approach to the research, by firstly reflecting on the 
appropriate research paradigm. Allison, O’Sullivan, Owen, Rice, Rothwell and Saunders (1996) 
differentiated between positivistic and phenomenological research paradigms. If a positivistic 
paradigm is adopted, methods are used to measure, explain and/or predict relationships between 
variables in a numerical manner (Swanson & Holton, 2005). A phenomenological paradigm 
can be used to investigate perceptions and opinions of human participants (Allison et al., 1996). 
Their experiences are typically subjective and influenced by their individual circumstances. 
When applying a positivistic paradigm, the data are therefore usually easier to measure and 
quantify compared to collecting qualitative data (Dawson, 2013; Wisker, 2001; Allison et al., 
1996). This study analysed the relationships between B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) 
(numerical) and a number of pre-determined financial health measures (also numerical). As 
these variables are all numerical, a positivistic approach could be adopted.  
4.3.2 Panel design 
A study that covers more than one company in the same year is referred to as a cross-sectional 
study. If the same company is investigated for a number of years, a time-series study is 
conducted. If cross-sectional and time-series data are combined i.e. across companies and years, 
the data are referred to as panel data (Gujarati, 2004). A balanced panel is used if all the required 
data are available for all companies for all the years in the study. An unbalanced panel is applied 
if information is not available for selected companies in certain years (Gujarati, 2004). In this 
study, B-BBEE scores for some companies were unavailable for specific years, as those 
companies were not included in the Empowerdex list of most empowered companies for the 
respective years. As such, an unbalanced panel design was used. In the following section, details 
are provided on the collection of the quantitative data. 
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4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
Mouton (2001) stated that data can be secondary or primary in nature. Secondary data are 
already in existence, whilst primary data are collected by the researcher to address a specific 
research problem. Zikmund et al. (2010) further explains that primary data typically arise from 
distributing questionnaires or conducting interviews, whereas secondary data are generally 
obtained from existing data sources, such as databases (Babbie, 2012).  
Exploratory research often relies on primary data, as the researcher would be the first in the 
field to conduct research on a topic (Dawson, 2013). Primary data are advantageous to address 
a novel research problem. The costs involved in gathering primary data may, however, 
outweigh the benefits thereof. Secondary data are easier and often more cost effective to obtain 
than primary data. Secondary data may, however, not be tailor-made for the research question 
at hand and could therefore limit the outcomes of the study (Babbie, 2012). 
Previous B-BBEE researchers such as Mathura (2009), Kleynhans and Kruger (2014) and Van 
der Merwe and Ferreira (2014), utilised secondary data provided by Empowerdex. In line with 
these researchers, the current study also used secondary Empowerdex data. The key differences 
between prior studies and the current study include that a larger sample was used which covered 
a longer timeframe, and a broader spectrum of financial health measures were employed. In the 
following sections, the population, sample frame, sampling technique, sample and the 
operationalisation of variables will be discussed.  
4.4.1 Population  
A population can be defined as the total group of items/individuals that are of interest to the 
researcher (Zikmund et al., 2010; Allison et al., 1996). The population in this study consisted 
of all companies listed on the JSE’s main board and Alternative Exchange (AltX) over the 
research period (2004 to 2015). This time frame was chosen as the first B-BBEE scores were 
released in 2004 by Empowerdex, whilst the 2013 Codes were implemented in 2015. The 2016 
list of most empowered companies are thus based on 2013 Codes and are therefore not 
comparable to the B-BBEE scores obtained under the 2007 Codes.  
The 2007 and 2013 Codes are very different in terms of their weighting, total number of points 
available and the elements. As a result, only the scores measured according to the 2007 Codes 
were considered over the period 2007 to 2015. The years prior to 2007 were measured based 
on the 2004 Codes which were deemed to be comparable to the 2007 Codes. Other B-BBEE 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
60 
 
researchers (such as Kleynhans & Kruger, 2014; Mathura, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2007) all 
used short timeframes (one to three years), whereas the current study spanned over 12 years. 
Details on the population considered are presented in Table 4.1. The majority of the companies 
were listed on the main board of the JSE. Companies that were listed on the AltX were also 
included in the population as Empowerdex scores were provided for some of these smaller 
companies. Fama and French (2004) found that company size could have an influence on 
financial performance. For this reason, this study included larger companies (JSE main board) 
and smaller companies (AltX). 
Table 4.1: Population: Companies listed on the JSE main board and AltX (2004-2015)  
Year 
Number of JSE-listed 
companies 
2004 389 
2005 373 
2006 389 
2007 411 
2008 411 
2009 398 
2010 397 
2011 395 
2012 387 
2013 375 
2014 380 
2015 382 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2016) 
The number of companies listed on the JSE fluctuated between 373 and 411 over the period 
under review. It is notable that the number of companies declined from 2008 to 2009, as this 
period coincided with the global financial crisis. This crisis had a considerable impact on South 
Africa, resulting in job losses and a loss of investments. This downturn in economic activity 
culminated in a technical recession in the first two quarters of 2009 (Mans-Kemp, 2014).  
4.4.2 Sample frame and selection 
Greenfield (2002) argued that it is not always possible to collect data for the entire population, 
due to time and budget constraints. For this reason, only a selection of the population, called 
the sample is investigated (Zikmund et al., 2010). The sample is typically selected from the 
sampling frame, namely a partial or complete list of the individual population elements 
(Zikmund et al., 2010; Allison et al., 1996). In this study, the sample frame comprised a 
complete list of all companies that were listed on the local bourse between 2004 and 2015 (see 
Table 4.1).  
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4.4.3 Sampling technique 
There are two main sampling approaches. According to Zikmund et al. (2010), sampling can 
either be based on probabilities or based on judgment/ convenience. The former is called 
probability sampling, whilst the latter is referred to as non-probability sampling. Probability 
sampling entails the random selection of subjects from the sampling frame. Non-probability 
sampling entails the non-random selection of pre-determined subjects from the sampling frame. 
In this study, all the companies included in the Empowerdex lists (of most empowered 
companies) from 2004 to 2015 and for which financial data could be obtained, were used. The 
companies in these lists voluntarily agreed to make their scores available to Empowerdex for 
publication purposes. As the inclusion of these companies was not random, a non-probability 
sampling technique was applied.  
Non-probability sampling consists of judgement, quota and convenience sampling (Zikmund et 
al., 2010). Judgement sampling refers to selecting certain items in a population based on an 
expert’s opinion. Quota sampling is applied if the data can be categorised and a certain number 
of each category is required (ibid). For example, if a researcher specifically wants to focus on 
a certain number of companies in each JSE industry. 
Convenience sampling was used in this study. This sampling technique entails the selection of 
items based on their availability or ease of access. As explained, companies were chosen based 
on the availability of their Empowerdex B-BBEE scores for the period 2004 to 2015. Kleynhans 
and Kruger (2014) also applied convenience sampling in their B-BBEE study. In contrast, 
Mathura (2009) applied cluster sampling. This non-probability sampling technique splits the 
population into a number of categories or clusters (for example low, medium and high B-BBEE 
scores). A number of these clusters are then randomly selected to represent the total population 
(i.e. if one cluster is selected, either the low, medium or high cluster can be selected to represent 
the population).  
4.4.4 Compilation of the final sample 
Empowerdex annually publicly disclosed the B-BBEE scores of approximately 200 JSE-listed 
companies over the period 2004 to 2009, based on their willing participation and consent. From 
2010 onwards Empowerdex annually only disclosed the scores of approximately 100 
companies. A few companies had to be excluded from the sample as they were not JSE-listed, 
and hence had no publicly available financial data. In total, eight observations were excluded 
from the sample as no financial data were available for these private companies. In Table 4.2, 
the number of companies included in the final sample is displayed. 
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Table 4.2: Number of companies included in the sample 
Period  Year Number of companies in the sample Percentage of population(b) 
Nascent 
2004 198 51% 
2005 184 49% 
2006 200 51% 
2007 199 48% 
2008 188 46% 
2009 200(a) 50% 
Wider adoption 
2010 100(a) 25% 
2011 110 28% 
2012 99 26% 
2013 82 22% 
2014 99 26% 
2015 108 28% 
(a) The lists of most empowered companies reduced from approximately 200 to approximately 100 
(b) Based on the figures contained in Table 4.1 
Given the purpose of the study, a large sample size was required. As such, this study used all 
the data that were available to the author. As there was a limitation on the amount of data 
available, the author did not limit the data further by considering factors such as significance 
level, power and effect size. This study used, as far as could be established, the largest sample 
of companies with publicly available B-BBEE scores to date. In Table 4.2 it is indicated that 
the period under review was divided into two sub-periods: the nascent period, and the wider-
adoption period. The total period was 12 years. Halfway through this study period, 2010, the 
lists of most empowered companies reduced from approximately 200 to approximately 100. To 
separate the data at 2010 also made logical sense, as it came three years after the implementation 
of the 2007 Codes. Companies thus had sufficient time to formalise their B-BBEE strategies. 
Between 2010 and the end of the study period (2015), this period was called the wider adoption, 
as companies then had sufficient opportunities to decide on their B-BBEE endeavours. When 
the data were analysed descriptively, it was also seen that between the end of the nascent period 
and the start of the wider adoption period, the largest increase in B-BBEE scores (in total and 
per element) were noted. This observation was also verified by the mixed-model ANOVAs that 
showed statistical significance regarding the transition between the nascent and wider adoption 
periods, even after the effect of the reduced sample size was accounted for. 
In line with previous researchers such as Mathura (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Chipeta and 
Vokwana (2011) and Kleynhans and Kruger (2014), no industries were intentionally excluded 
from the sample. To address survivorship bias, delisted and suspended companies were also 
included in the sample for the period that they were included on Empowerdex’s annual lists. In 
contrast, Mathura (2009) excluded delisted companies from his B-BBEE study. As companies 
often delist because of poor financial health or bankruptcy, delisted companies were included 
in this study to account for companies with varying degrees of financial health. The data sourced 
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from Empowerdex only indicated company names, and not JSE ticker codes. Ticker codes were 
sourced from the IRESS (2018) database, whilst delisted companies’ ticker codes were obtained 
from the Sharenet (2018) website. In certain instances, stock exchange news service 
announcements were used to identify ticker codes of delisted companies. In total, 379 unique 
ticker codes were used in the final analysis, making this study very comprehensive. 
Only the total B-BBEE score per company was publicly released, but the scores per element 
were obtained through enquiry from Empowerdex’s research department. It is important to note 
that these companies were the most empowered companies that voluntarily participated in 
Empowerdex’s lists. It is therefore not necessarily the most empowered companies listed on the 
JSE, as the data of all the total B-BBEE scores of all the JSE-listed companies were not 
available. Companies were classified in terms of industry using the Industry Classification 
Benchmark. All industries were represented, with the exception of utilities, as there were no 
companies listed in this industry over the duration of the study period. Only one company year 
from the oil and gas industry were included in the sample. The number of companies per year 
per industry is shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Number of companies per industry per year 
Industry 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Basic materials 35 28 35 38 43 44 12 15 11 9 11 8 
Consumer goods 21 18 19 19 14 17 11 10 8 9 9 8 
Consumer services 40 36 37 28 30 29 11 14 12 10 14 17 
Financials 44 42 47 54 42 44 21 23 23 19 18 26 
Health care 4 4 4 4 4 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 
Industrials 34 35 39 37 36 40 26 29 27 21 31 31 
Oil and gas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Technology 16 18 16 16 15 16 9 9 10 6 8 11 
Telecommunications 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 3 4 4 3 
Total per year 198 184 200 199 188 200 100 110 99 82 99 108 
In Table 4.3 it is seen that the sectors were well represented over the study period.  
4.4.5 Operationalisation of variables 
The operationalisation of variables refers to how variables are defined (Babbie, 2012). 
Researchers can use different measurement scales to classify collected data, including nominal, 
ordinal, interval or ratio scales (Zikmund et al., 2010). If a nominal scale is used, data are 
organised into categories where no specific order or sequence is implied. According to Babbie 
(2012), nominal data could be dichotomous, for example when the label ‘1’ is used for yes and 
‘0’ for no. Ordinal data can be ranked from first to last or highest to lowest value based on a 
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value attached to each observation (Zikmund et al., 2010). Interval data can also be ranked, but 
has no maximum value and can also be infinitely negative. Some of the data used in this study 
were interval data (such as ROE, ROA and ROS). As ratio data have an absolute zero point, the 
researcher can compare differences in total B-BBEE scores over time and across industries. 
Variables can also be classified as a dependent, independent or control variables (Babbie, 2012). 
An independent variable is a variable against which the dependent variable is measured 
(Babbie, 2012; Zikmund et al., 2010). One of the main objectives of this study was to determine 
the nature of the relationship between B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and the 
sampled companies’ financial health measures. The B-BBEE scores were regarded as the 
independent variables, whilst the financial health measures were regarded as the dependent 
variables. Prior researchers focused on the relationship between B-BBEE scores as the predictor 
variable and financial health measures as the dependent variable (Morris, 2018; Van der Merwe 
& Ferreira, 2014; Kleynhans & Kruger, 2014; Mathura, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2007). 
A control variable is a variable that can influence the dependent variable indirectly (Zikmund 
et al., 2010). Company size, defined as the log of total assets, log of market capitalisation and 
log of total sales, were included as control variables. For the financials and basic material 
industries, company size was only defined using the log of total sales and log of market 
capitalisation. Total assets (and ROA) were not used for these sectors, as financials (notably 
banks) typically have considerable assets (money from clients), owes the money to the clients, 
and thus have corresponding liabilities. Basic materials industry includes the mining companies 
that own very expensive mining equipment and, in the author’s opinion, can thus not be 
compared to retail stores that rent the majority of shops and have less expensive property, plant 
and equipment. As stated in Section 4.4, all the B-BBEE scores were collected from 
Empowerdex, while the financial health data were sourced from Bloomberg (2018). In Table 
4.4, a description is provided for each of the considered variables. 
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Table 4.4: Description of the variables  
Variable Description  Source 
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Total B-BBEE score 
Total B-BBEE score is the score on which the level of 
compliance (one to eight or non-compliant) is based. This score 
has a maximum value under the 2007 Codes of 100, even though 
there are bonus points that could give a company a score of more 
than 100. 
Empowerdex 
Ownership score Score out of 20 based on the percentage black shareholders. 
Management score 
A maximum score of 10 is available for having a certain 
percentage black directors and managers. 
Employment equity score 
15 points are allocated if a company complies with all the 
requirements of the Employment Equity Act. 
Skills development score 
Skills development can add 15 points to the total B-BBEE score 
should a company adequately train workers. 
Preferential procurement 
score 
20 points could be earned if a company procured from companies 
with high levels of B-BBEE compliance. 
Enterprise development 
score  
A maximum of 15 points are available if a company assisted in 
developing small black-owned enterprises. 
Socio-economic 
development score 
Corporate social initiatives could earn a company 5 points. 
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Annual percentage 
change in turnover 
Change in sales or revenue from continued operations for the 
trailing twelve months. Calculated as shown in Equation 3.1 
Bloomberg 
 
ROS 
Net operating profit after tax, divided by revenue or sales, as 
defined in Equation 3.2. 
ROA 
Return on assets was defined in Equation 3.3 as net operating 
profit after tax divided by the average total assets. 
ROE 
Net profit after tax, as disclosed in the statement of 
comprehensive income, divided by average equity (Equation 
3.6). 
Annual share price 
growth 
Change in share price from the current financial reporting date to 
the previous financial reporting date (Equation 3.7). 
MTBV 
The ratio between market capitalisation at date of current 
financial year-end and total equity in the statement of financial 
position at the same date (Equation 3.8). 
P/E ratio 
Share price at financial year-end, divided by basic EPS as 
reported at the same date (Equation 3.9). 
Cost of equity 
Return required by ordinary shareholders, based on CAPM 
(Equation 3.12). 
Excess return 
Excess return was calculated as annual share price growth minus 
cost of equity (Equation 3.11). 
EVA 
EVA was defined as net operating after tax minus weighted 
average cost of capital timed by total equity and interest-bearing 
liabilities at the start of the financial year (Equation 3.13). 
Default risk probability 
Default risk probability measures the likelihood of a company not 
meeting its financial commitments within the following year. 
C
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Log (10) of total assets 
Decimal logarithm of total assets. Total assets were defined as 
the total of the statement of financial position assets. 
Bloomberg 
Log (10) of market 
capitalisation 
It was defined as total ordinary shares in issue multiplied by share 
price at date of financial year-end of the respective company. The 
decimal logarithm thereof was computed. 
Log (10) of total sales 
Total sales were defined as total revenue as reported in the 
statement of profit or loss of the respective company for the 
trailing 12 months before reporting date. The decimal logarithm 
of total sales was used. 
All the B-BBEE scores were ratio data due to the fact that they could not be negative. The same 
is applicable to the default risk probability as this measure shows how likely a company is to 
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default within the next twelve months. A likelihood or probability can only range between 0 
and 1. The control variables were also ratio data, since these variables cannot be negative.  
All other data were interval data. If return (NOPAT or net profit, depending on the measure) is 
negative, all of ROS, ROE, ROA and P/E ratio will be negative values. Annual share price 
growth can also be negative if one year’s share price is lower than that of the previous year. 
MTBV can be negative if the company has negative equity, even though this is improbable. 
EVA can be negative if the cost of capital employed is more than NOPAT generated by the 
company. A negative excess return can be obtained if the cost of equity is higher than annual 
share price growth. The nature of the respective variables influenced the choice of methods 
used to analyse the data. 
 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
A statistical test can be either descriptive or inferential in nature (Babbie, 2012; Zikmund et al., 
2010). To define the characteristics of a sample, descriptive statistics are generally used 
(Babbie, 2012). Inferential statistics are employed to examine whether significant relationships 
exist between the considered variables. 
4.5.1  Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics define the location, spread and shape of the collected data. To describe 
the location of the data, the mean and median of the B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) 
and financial health indicators were determined. The minimum and maximum values were 
computed to consider the range of the data, whilst the standard deviation was used to describe 
the spread of the data. Trends of the means of the dependent, independent and control variables 
were graphically illustrated and discussed in Chapter Five. 
4.5.2  Inferential statistics 
Inferential measures are generally classified as difference or associational statistics (Zikmund 
et al. 2010). Difference statistics are used to determine differences between groups (Morgan, 
Leech, Gloeckner & Barret, 2011). To determine the difference in B-BBEE scores between 
industries and over time, mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Fisher’s least 
significant differences (LSD) tests were conducted.  
Associational statistics, such as regression analysis, can be used to investigate the relationships 
between variables (Morgan et al., 2011). As the primary objective of this study was to determine 
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the nature of the relationship between B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and the 
financial health measures, regression analyses were conducted. As explained in Section 4.3, 
panel data were collected. The panel regressions will be explained first, and the discussion of 
the mixed-model ANOVA and Fisher’s LSD test will follow thereafter. A panel regression is 
an amended version of the basic regression model (Pedace, 2013). Equation 4.1 can be used to 
perform a basic linear regression analysis. 
𝑦 = β0 + β1𝑥+ ∈ … Equation 4.1 
where: 
𝑦  = dependent variable 
β0 = intercept 
β1 = regression coefficient 
𝑥 = independent variable 
∈ = error term 
This equation is similar to the basic mathematical equation for a straight line, namely y = mx + 
c. This simple model is built around the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique that fits a 
straight line through data points based on the least squares. An allowance for error is added in 
the equation. To keep the error term as low as possible, the following assumptions are made: 
the chosen regression model generates the dependent variable, the independent variable(s) is 
not random, the errors are uncorrelated and have a constant variance. Should any of these 
assumptions not hold true, a specification error will occur (Gujarati, 2004). 
4.5.3 Pooled OLS regression model 
The basic regression model (Equation 4.1) needs to be altered to account for different 
companies over different years (Menard, 2008). A pooled OLS regression model assumes that 
regression coefficients remain constant across years and companies (Gujarati, 2004). The 
equation for the pooled OLS regression model is as follows (Menard, 2008): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡 … Equation 4.2 
where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  = dependent variable 
β0 = intercept 
β1 = regression coefficient 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = independent variable 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = error term 
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The i and t subscripts indicate that there were pooled observations for i units over t time periods 
(years). The units represent companies and time represents financial years. A more refined 
version of the pooled OLS regression model is the fixed effects panel regression, which will be 
discussed next. 
4.5.4  Fixed effects panel regression model 
A number of factors could influence financial health, of which total B-BBEE score could 
possibly be one. Fixed effects panel regression should be applied if the other effects (such as 
the board of directors) remain constant over time, even though it could vary from one company 
to another (Pedace, 2013). Equation 4.3 includes a dummy variable for the fixed effect (ibid). 
yit = β0i + 𝛿𝑡 + β1𝑥𝑖𝑡  + 𝜖it  … Equation 4.3 
where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  = dependent variable for entity i at time t 
β0𝑖 = (i = 1…n) is the intercept for each entity (separate intercepts are indicated for each unit) 
𝛿𝑡 = dummy variable for each time period 
β1 = regression coefficient 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = independent variable for entity i at time t 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = error term 
The i and t subscripts indicate that there were observations for i units (companies) over t time 
periods (years). If the other effects are not constant over time or units, random effects regression 
will be used. This technique is discussed next. 
4.5.5  Random effects panel regression model 
The random effects panel regression model expands on the fixed effects regression model 
(Pedace, 2013). If other effects are not consistent regarding time and unit, the dummy variable 
used in the Equation 4.3 needs to be elaborated to account for the variance in time and unit. The 
random effects regression is indicated in Equation 4.4 (ibid). 
yit = β0 + β1𝑥it + μi + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    … Equation 4.4 
where: 
yit  = dependent variable for entity i at time t 
β0 = intercept 
β1 = regression coefficient 
𝑥it  = independent variable for entity i at time t 
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μi and 𝜔𝑡 = separate error terms for entity i and time t 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = within-entity error 
The intercept β0 in Equation 4.4 differs from β0i in Equation 4.3. There are also separate error 
terms for time (t) and unit (i). With random effects, the intercept β0 is expected to be the mean 
intercept of the sample, with the error terms μi representing the difference between the mean 
intercept and the intercept of the specific company. The difference between the mean intercept 
and the mean intercept of that specific year is represented by 𝜔𝑡 (Gujarati, 2004).  
There could be more terms considered in a random effects regression, compared to that of a 
fixed effects regression, depending on the outcome of the Hausmann test (see Section 4.5.6). 
The problem of multicollinearity (see Section 4.5.8.3) could, however, exist if some of the error 
terms have a covariance with the independent variables (represented by 𝑥it) (Gujarati, 2004). 
Fixed effects regression should be used should there be a covariance, as it could otherwise lead 
to incorrect results (Menard, 2008). 
4.5.6  The Hausmann test 
The Hausmann test is designed to test whether the random effects regression or fixed effects 
regression model is more applicable. This test’s null hypothesis states that the random effects 
regression is the preferred model (Gujarati, 2004). If the test statistic shows that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected (p-value of less than 0.05) it means that the random effects model 
cannot be used and the fixed effects model should be used instead (Gujarati, 2004). The 
equation for the Hausmann test is presented next (ibid). 
H = 
(β̂1 (FE) - β̂1 (RE))
σ
β̂1 (FE)
2 - σ
β̂1 (RE)
2
2
~ χ1
2  … Equation 4.5 
where: 
β̂1  = estimated coefficient for the independent variable 
σβ̂1 
2  = estimated variance of the coefficient 
FE (fixed effects) = denotes values that were obtained by fixed effects estimation 
RE (random effects) = denote values that were obtained by random effects estimation 
The Hausmann test has a distribution of the Chi-Square (χ2) with one degree of freedom 
(Menard, 2008). 
4.5.7  The F-test for fixed effects 
Time and unit dummies are sometimes erroneously included when analysing panel data. Before 
the various panel regressions were performed in this study, an F-test for fixed effects was 
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conducted. The purpose was to determine whether the time and unit dummy variables are 
necessary (Menard, 2008). In Equation 4.6, the calculation for the F-test statistic is presented 
(ibid). 
𝐹 = 
𝑀𝑆𝑅
𝑀𝑆𝐸
 … Equation 4.6 
where: 
𝑀𝑆𝑅  = mean square due to regression = 
𝑆𝑆𝑅
𝑘
 
𝑆𝑆𝑅 = sum of squares due to regression 
𝑘 = corresponding degrees of freedom 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = mean square due to error = 
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝑛−𝑘−1
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = sum of squares due to error 
𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1  = corresponding degrees of freedom 
A significant result from the F-test would imply that time and unit dummies have to be included 
in the study (Menard, 2008). Certain specification errors could, however, undermine the 
outcome of the study. Three specification errors were considered in this study.  
4.5.8  Specification errors considered in this study 
Three possible specification errors were considered, namely heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation 
and multicollinearity. 
4.5.8.1  Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is the opposite of homoscedasticity and determines whether an independent 
variable can predict the dependent variable accurately (Pedace, 2013). Heteroscedasticity in 
this study meant that companies with a high total B-BBEE score could have either a high or 
low level of financial health compared to companies with a low total B-BBEE score. The data 
were tested for heteroscedasticity by using a test developed by Breusch and Pagan (Gujarati, 
2004). This test is called the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier, and is set out in Equation 4.7 
(ibid). 
LM= 
NT
2 (T - 1)
[
∑  𝑖=1
𝑁
( ∑  𝑡= 1
𝑇 𝜖𝑖𝑡)
2
∑  𝑖=1
𝑁 ∑  𝑡= 1
𝑇 𝜖𝑖𝑡
2 -1]
2
~ χ1
2  … Equation 4.7 
where: 
N  = number of cross-sectional units (JSE-listed companies in this case) 
T = number of time periods 
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𝜖𝑖𝑡    = OLS residuals of the model 
The test statistic has a distribution of the Chi Square (𝜒2) with one degree of freedom (Pedace, 
2013). This equation is specifically designed for a one-way random effects model (excludes 
time effects), but can be altered for a two-way random effects model (includes time effects), 
should it be required (Kouassi, Mougoue, Sango, Brou, Amba & Salisu, 2014). 
4.5.8.2  Autocorrelation 
The data collected in this study were panel data as there were different observations of the 
various entities over many time periods. A problem of autocorrelation exists when the values 
of one period correlates with that of a prior period (Menard, 2008). For the purpose of this 
study, particular attention was thus given to the possibility of this specification error occurring. 
This specification error was addressed by the panel regression models applied in this study.  
4.5.8.3  Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity can arise when there are independent variables that are strongly correlated 
(Pedace, 2013). For example, a percentage change in turnover can be strongly correlated to 
ROS. In terms of the independent variables, element scores are highly correlated with the total 
B-BBEE score, as this variable consists of all the individual elements.  Multicollinearity was 
checked by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF). All VIFs were found to be <10. 
4.5.9 Mixed-model ANOVA and Fisher’s LSD 
4.5.9.1 Mixed-model ANOVA 
A mixed-model ANOVA can be utilised to analyse differences between and within groups. A 
combination of a random effects model variance component and the fixed effects ANOVA 
model, in which observations do not correlate, forms the mixed-model ANOVA. The fixed 
effects factor is a between-subjects construct and the random effects factor is a within-subjects 
variable (Rovai, Baker & Ponton, 2014). 
The equation for the linear mixed-model ANOVA (Demidenko, 2013) is: 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖β +  𝑧𝑖𝛾𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖 …Equation 4.8 
 
Where: 
𝑦𝑖   = dependent variable 
β = vector of parameters associated with the fixed factors 
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𝑥𝑖 = gathers all fixed effects 
𝑧𝑖 = matrix gathering all the random effects 
𝛾𝑖 = vector of parameters associated with the random effects 
𝜖𝑖 = error term 
4.5.9.2 Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) test 
The null hypothesis of equal averages can be rejected if an ANOVA is performed and the 
overall F-test indicates a significant difference. The Fisher’s LSD test can then determine where 
the differences occurred by making use of pair-wise comparisons between two sample averages 
(Tavakoli, 2012).  
The Fisher’s LSD test statistic (t) for comparing two sample means (Anderson, Sweeney & 
Williams, 2011) is:                 
t =  
?̅?𝑖− ?̅?𝑗
√𝑀𝑆𝐸 (
1
𝑛𝑖
+ 
1
𝑛𝑗
)
 …Equation 4.9 
where: 
?̅?𝑖 = historic mean of sample i 
?̅?𝑗 = historic mean of sample j 
𝑛𝑖 = sample size of group i 
𝑛𝑗 = sample size of group j 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = mean square error obtained from the ANOVA test 
The null hypothesis should be rejected if the p-value is smaller than or equal to the level of 
significance. 
 
4.6  VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Validity refers to the accuracy of the results and the extent to which a score truthfully represents 
a specific variable, whilst reliability refers to replicability of a study (Winter, 2000). Validity 
in terms of this study would imply that all the financial data were accurate as per the financial 
statements. It would also imply that all the B-BBEE scores are exactly as per the companies’ 
respective B-BBEE scorecards as provided by Empowerdex. 
To ensure the validity of the financial data, two company years per industry were selected for 
comparison between the data that were published by the companies and the data sourced from 
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Bloomberg. The accounting data were validated with the actual financial statements. All the 
accounting-based data on Bloomberg could be traced back to an original source document (in 
most cases the annual financial statements) that were available on Bloomberg (2018) and the 
respective companies’ websites. Additional checks were conducted in instances where the 
parameters changed considerably over time, and parameters that were deemed to be very high 
or low in comparison to the other values. Extreme values were winsorised. For the financials 
and basic materials industries, ROA and total assets were not taken into account (see Section 
4.4.5). Validity also implies that the most applicable measures should be used (Winter, 2000). 
A comprehensive literature review was performed, and the financial health measures were 
based on those used by previous researchers. The discussion in the literature and the fact that 
the measures were clearly defined in this study, further adds to the replicability of this study. 
A B-BBEE certification is typically issued after a company’s financial year-end, as the 
preceding year’s expenditure on preferential procurement suppliers, skills development and 
socio-economic development is used. The potential improvement in financial health would thus 
be seen in the following financial year. As such, the financial results of each of the sample 
companies were considered for the financial year-end corresponding with the year when the 
audited B-BBEE scores were released. 
Pertaining to the validity of the B-BBEE scores, the sum of the elements of the B-BBEE 
scorecard were compared to the total B-BBEE score reported. There were 30 cases where there 
were differences between the total B-BBEE score and the sum of the individual elements. The 
B-BBEE scorecards for these 30 companies were compared to the actual certificates obtained 
from the Beagle (2018) database. The Beagle (2018) database contains the B-BBEE certificates 
for various private and public companies. In the instances where differences were found, the 
data set were updated to reflect the scores per the actual B-BBEE certificate. The certificates 
were found by searching for the company’s name or value added tax number. For companies 
whose total B-BBEE scores were available from Bloomberg (2018), those scores were 
compared to those that were obtained from Empowerdex.  
Winter (2000) explained that if a study can be replicated, the study is reliable. When the data 
were sourced from Bloomberg (2018), the researcher ensured that the reporting currency was 
set to ZAR, and that information from that year’s financial statements were used, using numbers 
for the trailing 12 months. The conversion from foreign currency to ZAR was performed by 
Bloomberg (2018). The exchange rate as at the respective financial year-end dates were applied 
by Bloomberg (2018). In cases where the company in question discontinued operations, the 
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author only used results for the continued operations. The author ensured that the non-
standardised numbers, as reported, were obtained from Bloomberg (2018). Audited B-BBEE 
scores (in total and per element) were used. The study can hence be reproduced in future by 
other researchers using a similar methodology. 
Ethical clearance was obtained from the departmental ethics screening committee of the 
Department of Business Management at Stellenbosch University. Only publicly available data 
were collected and analysed. As no data from human respondents were used, the study was 
classified as having minimal ethical risks.  
 
4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, attention was given to the research paradigm adopted, the operationalisation of 
the variables and the methods used to collect and analyse panel data. The population of this 
positivistic study consisted of all companies listed on the JSE over the period 2004 to 2015. As 
all companies’ B-BBEE scores were computed and published by Empowerdex, a convenience 
sample was used. A total of 1 767 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2015 were investigated. 
The B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) were categorised as the independent variables, 
whilst the financial health measures were classified as the dependent variables. Company size 
was included as a control variable. To ensure that the financial data were reliable and valid, the 
financial information was compared to the annual financial statements. The total B-BBEE 
scores were validated against the Beagle (2018) database. 
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyse the data. Fixed effects, random effects 
and pooled OLS regression models were considered whilst accounting for three specification 
errors namely heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation. Trends in the B-BBEE 
scores (in total and per element) were analysed using mixed-model ANOVAs and Fisher’s LSD 
tests. The descriptive statistics are presented in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
“Life is not just a series of calculations and a sum total of statistics, it is about experience, it is 
about participation, it is something more complex and more interesting than what is obvious” 
(Libeskind in Cash, Jones & Pennock, 2016:1). 
Given the complex nature of B-BBEE, the researcher conducted an in-depth analysis of the 
phenomenon. Each of its elements is explored and possible reasons for observed trends are 
provided before exploring the business case in Chapter Six. The literature review on B-BBEE 
was presented in Chapter Two. Chapter Three dealt with various financial health measures. The 
research design and methodology adopted in this study was explained in Chapter Four. In this 
chapter, the descriptive results will be presented. The descriptive statistics of the B-BBEE 
scores (in total and per element) will be followed by descriptive trends of the financial health 
measures and the control variables. 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE B-BBEE SCORES 
B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) were deemed the independent variable. In this section, 
details on the sampled companies’ total B-BBEE scores will be presented followed by a 
descriptive overview of the elements. 
5.2.1  Total B-BBEE scores over the entire research period (2004 to 2015) 
In Table 5.1, the annual descriptive statistics for the total B-BBEE score are provided.  
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Table 5.1:  Descriptive statistics for the total B-BBEE score  
Year 
Number of 
observations (a) 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
2004 198 19.717 15.670 13.543 4.470 69.580 
2005 184 24.396 19.290 20.311 1.250 80.070 
2006 200 25.433 21.270 20.890 0.890 76.440 
2007 199 26.849 20.090 21.258 1.830 79.280 
2008 188 33.607 31.245 23.042 0.430 81.690 
2009 200 33.584 29.755 26.411 1.000 88.711 
2010 100 64.106 67.878 13.253 30.740 90.800 
2011 110 70.390 72.825 13.147 34.400 92.830 
2012 99 76.497 75.780 8.801 59.990 100.000 
2013 82 78.293 77.785 7.953 65.230 94.870 
2014 99 75.330 76.040 10.379 55.600 95.170 
2015 108 77.334 79.590 11.984 45.100 98.390 
Total  
 
1 767 42.905 44.590 29.056 0.43 100 
(a) Number of observations varied according to the number of companies’ total B-BBEE scores released by 
Empowerdex. 
The total B-BBEE scores were widely distributed for the sample companies. The total B-BBEE 
scores ranged from 0.43 to 100, and have a standard deviation of 29. The mean and median B-
BBEE scores were relatively close to each other. The mean and median for the overall period 
were 42.905 and 44.590. These measures indicate central tendency, i.e. the approximate mid-
point of the data set. In this sample, these measures were below 50. The maximum total B-
BBEE score is 100.  
During 2012, a certain company had a maximum B-BBEE score. This achievement could be 
partly ascribed to the bonus points available in the 2007 Codes. This specific company managed 
to comply with some of the additional criteria for bonus points, which enhanced its total B-
BBEE score. On its website, the business is described as an investment company specifically 
focussed on B-BBEE transactions. This firm was thus unambiguously created for B-BBEE 
transactions. 
The mean total B-BBEE score increased from 19.717 in 2004 to 77.334 in 2015. There was 
hence a considerable improvement in compliance in terms of the total B-BBEE score over time. 
The significance of this trend was statistically tested. The results are provided in Section 6.2. It 
should be noted that the number of observations in 2015 (108) was approximately 55 per cent 
of the number of observations in 2004 (198). The change in the number of observations is due 
to the fact that Empowerdex released the total B-BBEE scores of approximately the 200 most 
empowered companies from 2004 to 2009, and only the total B-BBEE scores of approximately 
the 100 most empowered companies from 2010 to 2015. In 2013, only 82 companies 
participated in the Empowerdex survey. If a bit more than 100 companies participated, 
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Empowerdex exercised their discretion to release all the participating companies’ scores. In 
other years, Empowerdex included the results of companies, such as private companies (owned 
by JSE-listed companies), for which the financial information could not be obtained. Such 
companies were excluded from the sample. 
Based on the mean scores, companies almost doubled their compliance scores from 2009 to 
2010. As explained, the 2010 scores were, however, based on approximately the 100 most 
empowered companies, as opposed to approximately the 200 most empowered companies 
utilised in the 2009 scores. As such, Empowerdex excluded less empowered companies since 
2010. The comparatively higher descriptive statistics since 2010 are hence not unexpected. For 
the purpose of the mixed-model ANOVA analyses reported in Section 6.2, only the top 100 
companies from 2004 to 2009 were taken into account, to be consistent with the period from 
2010 and beyond (the wider adoption period during which Empowerdex focused on 
approximately the 100 most empowered companies). A slight reduction in the mean and median 
total B-BBEE scores were noted from 2013 to 2014. It should be borne in mind that the 2013 
scores were published in 2014. The revised Codes were published in 2013. Companies could 
arguably have spent more time understanding the newly released 2013 Codes, as opposed to 
focussing their efforts on compliance with the 2007 Codes.  
The trend in the mean total B-BBEE scores is illustrated in Figure 5.1 by accounting for the 
total sample and the top 100 companies per year. The solid line represents the mean total B-
BBEE score of the total companies in the sample per annum, whereas the dotted line indicates 
the mean total B-BBEE score of the 100 most empowered companies from 2004 to 2009. 
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Figure 5.1: Mean total B-BBEE score per year 
A notable increase in the total B-BBEE score is seen over the period 2004 to 2015, and in the 
two sub-periods of 2004 to 2009 (nascent), and 2010 to 2015 (wider adoption). The significance 
of the trend over time was empirically tested and the results are reported in Section 6.2. The 
dotted line (top 100 companies) showed a gradual increase in the total B-BBEE scores over the 
period. The relatively large increase in the mean total B-BBEE score of the total sample (solid 
line) from 2009 to 2010 might be partly ascribed to the reduction in number of companies. 
The change in the mean total B-BBEE scores can also be explained by the change in the 
individual elements contributing to the total B-BBEE score. The change in the elements will 
hence be discussed in the following section. 
5.2.2  Individual elements of the total B-BBEE score 
The analysis of the elements will indicate which elements mainly contributed to the total B-
BBEE score. In Table 5.2, the descriptive statistics for the elements of the B-BBEE scorecard 
is presented for the overall period.  
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for the elements of the total B-BBEE score(b) 
Element Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value(a) 
Points 
available 
Ownership  
 
10.112 9.090 7.915 0 25 20 
Management control  
 
4.237 3.670 3.087 0 15 10 
Employment equity 
 
4.203 3.870 4.058 0 15 15 
Skills development 
 
5.710 5.210 5.454 0 20 15 
Preferential procurement  
 
8.276 7.500 7.614 0 25 20 
Enterprise development 
 
6.756 4.400 6.779 0 16 15 
Socio-economic development  
 
3.372 3.895 3.203 0 12 5 
(a) Bonus points are available that could allow a company to score more than the available points 
(b) As provided by Empowerdex, based on the 2007 Codes 
Except for enterprise development, the mean and median for the all the elements of the B-BBEE 
scorecard were close to each other. The standard deviations indicate considerable variation in 
the elements’ scores. The maximum values typically correspond with the maximum points 
available as per the B-BBEE scorecard. In some cases, more points than the maximum were 
achieved due to bonus points available through certain sector charters (Section 2.6), and through 
the 2007 Codes as shown in Table 2.4.  
The mean and median values of the elements observed in Table 5.2 reflect approximately half 
of the points available. The contributions per element per year towards the total B-BBEE score 
were also considered. The expectation was that preferential procurement and ownership would 
be the largest contributors per year, since their available points were the highest (20). The 
contribution of each element (mean score) towards the mean total B-BBEE score per year is 
displayed in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Contribution of each element per year to the mean total B-BBEE score(a) 
(a) As provided by Empowerdex (non-normalised) 
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The mean contribution per element per year varied considerably from 2004 to 2007. Since 2008 
onwards, the contribution of each element seemed to increase or decrease in line with the total 
score. The results could possibly indicate that the considered companies struggled to align their 
B-BBEE practices with the 2004 Codes whilst it was still in draft form. Since the Codes were 
finalised in 2007, the sampled companies seem to have maintained the elements they considered 
as important. As mentioned, the increase from 2009 to 2010 is largely ascribed to the reduction 
in sample size.  
The largest increase was for socio-economic development. The 2015 mean score of this element 
was five times the average of this element’s mean score in 2004 (a 400 per cent increase). 
Ownership, management control and employment equity increased by between 66 and 120 per 
cent, whilst preferential procurement and enterprise development improved by more than 260 
per cent. Each element was analysed per year. The relevant descriptive statistics will be 
discussed next. 
5.2.3  Ownership and preferential procurement elements 
Ownership and preferential procurement each contribute 20 points to the total B-BBEE score, 
indicating their relative importance in promoting transformation in the country (DTI, 2007). 
These two elements are compared in this section. In Figure 5.3, the changes in the ownership 
and preferential procurement scores are shown. The average for the 100 most empowered 
companies from 2004 to 2009 is indicated as dotted (preferential procurement) and dashed 
(ownership) lines for comparability purposes.  
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Figure 5.3: Mean ownership and preferential procurement scores (2004 – 2015) 
The mean ownership and preferential procurement scores (Figure 5.3) seem to follow a similar 
trend as change in mean total B-BBEE score (Figure 5.1). When graphs of the top 100 
companies (indicated by dotted and dashed lines) from 2004 to 2009 are compared with the 
graphs of 2010 onwards, only a slight rise is seen, as opposed to the considerable increase seen 
in the mean element scores of the total sample.  
The preferential procurement score was lower than that of the ownership score in 2004, but 
higher in 2015. It hence seems as if more business owners used preferential procurement to 
improve their total B-BBEE score, as opposed to transferring the ownership to black 
shareholders. Acemoglu et al. (2007) identified that B-BBEE share transfers took place at a 
discounted share price. As a result, directors will be deterred to engage in share transfer 
transactions and would be encouraged to focus on an element that does perhaps not dilute 
shareholder value as much. In this light, the association between B-BBEE scores and cost of 
equity is of particular interest. This relationship was tested and reported on in Section 6.11.  
A preferential procurement score is obtained by purchasing from empowered suppliers (DTI, 
2007). If companies increase their total B-BBEE scores, it would imply that the suppliers of 
these companies also increased their total B-BBEE scores. The more empowered a supplier is, 
the higher the score obtained under preferential procurement by the customer. The preferential 
procurement score thus has a ‘circle effect’: it increases the total B-BBEE score of the supplier 
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and the procurement recognition level of the supplier consequently rises. A higher procurement 
recognition level contributes to a higher preferential procurement score and, ultimately, to 
higher total B-BBEE scores for the companies purchasing from these more empowered 
suppliers, which in turn has a positive effect on the preferential procurement score of the 
customers of the company’s customers, and so the circle continues. It is thus expected that 
preferential procurement will follow an exponential increase until maximum preferential 
procurement scores are attained.  
It might be more challenging to increase a company’s ownership score than its preferential 
procurement score, since it requires a shift in the demography of shareholders. Companies could 
consider share schemes for black employees. Shareholder value might, however, then be 
diluted. As a result, shareholders might prefer that management pursue other elements of the 
B-BBEE scorecard, such as preferential procurement or other elements discussed next. The 
relationship between B-BBEE scores and cost of equity is of particular interest to shareholders. 
This relationship was empirically tested and reported in Section 6.11. 
5.2.4  Employment equity, skills development and enterprise development 
The employment equity, skills development and enterprise development elements each 
accounted for 15 of the 100 available B-BBEE points under the 2007 Codes. Employment 
equity measures the compliance of a company with the Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 
1998) (Department of Labour, 1998). An increase in the percentage black employees in a 
company will improve the employment equity score of a company. The skills development 
score is determined by the percentage of total payroll spend on the development of black 
employees’ skills (DTI, 2007). Enterprise development measures the percentage of net profit 
after tax that has been spent on developing small black enterprises (ibid).  
As was indicated in Table 1.1, the weighting of the scores for these three elements changed in 
the 2007 Codes. Skills development was lowered from 20 points in the 2004 (draft) Codes to 
15 points in the 2007 Codes. Employment equity and enterprise development each increased 
from 10 to 15 points. The annual scores for both elements for 2004 to 2007 were accordingly 
adjusted/normalised to reflect the 2007 weighting. The normalised scores therefore reflect the 
actual scores divided by the 2004 Codes’ maximum score (20 or 10) and multiplied by 15 (the 
2007 Codes’ maximum score).  
The annual mean employment equity, skills development and enterprise development scores 
are displayed in Figure 5.4. The dotted and dashed lines represent the normalised trend of the 
top 100 companies, adjusted for the difference in weighting and the difference in sample size. 
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Figure 5.4:  Average skills development, employment equity and enterprise 
development scores (2004 – 2015) 
If it is assumed that the number of points available is a proxy for relative importance, it was 
anticipated that the elements’ scores would reveal comparable trends, since they all add the 
same number of points (15). These elements make the second largest contribution to the total 
B-BBEE score, following ownership and preferential procurement. It could thus be expected 
that companies would spend considerable time on these three elements to ensure that the 
maximum amount of points are obtained. This seemed to be the case for skills development and 
employment equity until 2012. The 2013-2015 scores for skills development show an increase 
in line with ownership and preferential procurement. Employment equity, however, declined 
by almost two points (13 per cent of the 15 employment equity points available). This was not 
statistically significant (see Appendix A, Table 6).  
The 2013 Codes do not list employment equity as a separate element, but include it as a sub-
element of management control which accounts for 15 points under the 2013 Codes (DTI, 
2013). The 10 points (2007 Codes) for management control and 15 points for employment 
equity (thus 25 points in total) was lowered to only 15 points for management control (ibid). 
Companies could have anticipated this change and might have placed less emphasis on 
employment equity. 
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Under the 2013 Codes, the relative importance of skills development rose from 15 to 20 points 
(ibid). Companies might have anticipated this change, resulting in the increase seen from 2012 
to 2013. The increase in the number of points allocated to skills development is a welcome 
development, seen in the light of the skills shortages nationally (Department of Higher 
Education and Training, 2018). From Section 2.7 it was evident that the success of many 
reformative programmes hinged on the significance they put on education and skills 
development. 
Enterprise development had a lower average score in 2004 compared to employment equity and 
skills development, but surpassed both skills development and employment equity. The 2007 
Codes stipulated that three per cent of net profit after tax should be spent on the development 
of black entrepreneurs. This expenditure on enterprise development could, depending on the 
nature of the business, be less than three per cent of the total payroll spend, as is required for 
skills development (if net profit after tax is less than payroll expenditure). The considered 
companies could possibly have invested in enterprise development as a relatively ‘easy way’ 
of enhancing their total B-BBEE score.  As such, spending does not per se require companies 
to become directly involved in initiatives, as opposed to employment equity which require a 
company to actively change their employee demographical representation. In an online 
newspaper, The South African (2018), the use of enterprise development was promoted as a 
way of obtaining B-BBEE scores with low cost implications for companies. The DTI reduced 
the enterprise development target from three per cent of net profit after tax to one per cent of 
net profit after tax in the 2013 Codes (DTI, 2013). Anticipation of this ‘lower benchmark’ might 
have contributed to the decrease in the scores measured under the 2007 Codes since 2012 
onwards.  
5.2.5  Management control and socio-economic development 
Management control accounted for 10 out of the 100 available B-BBEE points, whilst socio-
economic development only contributes five points (DTI, 2007). The goal of management 
control is to ensure that the managers and directors of a company become more racially diverse 
and that black people are entrusted with the decision making of companies (ibid). Socio-
economic development strives to uplift communities by investing a percentage of net profit 
after tax in socio-economic activities, such as corporate social responsibility investments (ibid). 
Socio-economic development was termed the “residual factor” and contributed a score of 10 
points under the 2004 Codes. For comparability purposes, these pre-2007 scores were 
normalised, similar to what was done for the elements illustrated in Figure 5.4. In Figure 5.5, 
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the average management control and socio-economic activities scores over the research period 
are shown. The dotted lines refer to the mean top 100 management control score, and the dashes 
to the normalised mean top 100 socio-economic development score. 
 
Figure 5.5: Average management control and socio-economic development scores 
(2004 – 2015) 
Since management control was worth twice the number of points of socio-economic 
development, one would expect the average management control score to be twice that of socio-
economic development. The trend observed in Figure 5.5, especially in the latter part of the 
wider adoption period (2012 to 2015), is not in line with this expectation. The management 
control score, which has a similar goal to that of employment equity, displayed a similar pattern 
(see Figure 5.4). The average socio-economic development scores increased considerably from 
2004 to 2006, after which it stabilised with a steady increase year-on-year. A slight decrease is 
seen in the socio-economic development score around 2008, which coincides with the global 
financial crisis.  
An economic crisis could arguably cause companies to refrain from any avoidable expenditure. 
The target for socio-economic development was one per cent of net profit after tax (DTI, 2007). 
It appears as though companies attempted to maximise socio-economic development scores in 
the first few years of the nascent period. It should also be borne in mind that socio-economic 
investment has a moral imperative. If companies can do well (gain B-BBEE points and possible 
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financial benefits) by doing good (uplifting communities), it is understandable that this element 
would receive considerable attention. It should be noted that at least 75 per cent of beneficiaries 
should be black, and expenditure on socio-economic development may not be tax deductible if 
the beneficiary does not provide the donor with a Section 18A tax deductible receipt (DTI, 
2007).  
From 2012 onwards, an average of more than the five allocated points is noted for socio-
economic development. This observation can be partly explained by the fact that the ICT sector 
charter was published in 2012, which awarded a company a maximum of 12 points for socio-
economic development initiatives (DTI, 2012). Companies that fall under the ICT sector charter 
are well represented within the sample. Other sector charters also allowed for a higher socio-
economic development score, as discussed in Section 2.5. An overview of the industries 
represented in the sample was provided in Section 4.4.4. In the following section, the annual 
mean total B-BBEE score per year per industry will be discussed. 
5.2.6  Industry overview 
In Figure 5.6, the annual mean total B-BBEE score per industry per year is displayed. In this 
figure, the actual total B-BBEE scores of the total sample were used. 
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Figure 5.6: Average total B-BBEE score per industry (2004 – 2015)
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In line with the bonus points available in the ICT sector charter for socio-economic 
development, telecommunications (represented by the top line in 2004 and 2015) seem to be 
one of the most empowered sectors. An overall increase in compliance across industries is seen 
from 2004 to 2015. There is a larger disparity between industries in terms of mean total B-
BBEE scores in the nascent period than the wider adoption period (2010-2015). This disparity 
could be due to companies finalising their B-BBEE strategies during the nascent period. It was 
noted in Table 4.3 that the number of telecommunication companies did not decrease when the 
sample size decreased from 2009 to 2010. This is partly due to the small number of 
telecommunications companies listed on the JSE, compared to other industries, and the fact that 
a large state-owned telecommunications company formed part of the list of most empowered 
companies every year.  
The annual average total B-BBEE score of basic materials and consumer services did decrease 
by a larger percentage than the decrease in sample size (from approximately 200 to 
approximately 100) between 2009 and 2010. There are a few high B-BBEE scoring companies 
within these two sectors that is not representative of the industries. This is especially evident 
within the basic materials sector. In 2009, basic materials seemed to be the least empowered 
sector. When the least empowered companies were removed in 2010, basic materials surpassed 
consumer goods in terms of mean total B-BBEE scores. 
The sector charters were released during the wider adoption period (2010 onwards) enabling 
companies to formalise their B-BBEE strategies. It should also be noted that the reduction in 
sample size occurred in 2010. Since only the 100 (approximately) most empowered companies 
of each industry were included from 2010 onwards, it could be expected that their mean total 
B-BBEE scores of the industries were closer to each other. The following section will focus on 
the descriptive statistics of the financial health variables. 
 
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE FINANCIAL HEALTH 
VARIABLES  
The financial health variables were regarded as the dependent variables in this study. The 
descriptive statistics for the various financial health measures are displayed in Table 5.3 for the 
entire period under review. 
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Table 5.3:  Descriptive statistics for the financial health variables  
Variable Mean Median 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Standard 
deviation 
Change in turnover (%) 14.201 11.740 -43.807 69.983 23.733 
ROS (%) 13.637 10.701 -21.059 46.824 14.376 
ROA (%)(a) 9.021 8.819 -11.045 29.190 7.817 
ROE (%) 19.259 18.641 -27.794 66.177 19.305 
Annual share price growth 
(%) 
19.405 15.662 -97.013 145.201 
45.925 
MTBV 2.442 1.985 0.099 6.451 1.617 
P/E ratio 13.224 11.854 0.022 29.963 6.775 
EVA (R’m) 70.998 27.051 -1260.972 1402.070 653.720 
EVA (log10) 9.398 9.406 9.101 9.594 0.122 
Default risk probability 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 
Excess return (%) 8.765 5.354 -117.942 136.649 46.641 
Cost of equity (%) 10.695 10.286 -11.768 25.525 3.139 
(a) ROA was not computed for companies listed in the financials and basic materials industries. 
The relatively large standard deviations, in comparison with the mean and median values of the 
respective measures, were expected due to the diverse industries represented within the sample 
and the unstable economic climate during the period under review. The 2004 to 2007 period 
represented the commodity boom, whilst from 2008 to 2010 the global financial crisis had a 
detrimental impact on the results of the companies within the sample, as is evident from the 
discussion of the financial health indicators in Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5. 
As explained in Table 4.4, the ROS and ROA ratios were calculated using NOPAT. ROS is 
measured as NOPAT divided by total sales, and ROA is calculated as NOPAT divided by 
average assets. There is a four per cent difference in the mean values of the ROS and ROA 
ratios shown in Table 5.3. If ROS is higher than ROA, it implies that the denominator of ROS 
(sales) is smaller than the denominator of ROA (average assets), given that the numerator 
(NOPAT) is the same across the two measures. The sampled companies thus generated less 
than one Rand of sales for every one Rand of average assets. Given the timeframe of this study, 
many companies could have built up assets during the commodity boom from 2004 to 2007, 
but may have failed to translate these assets into profit from 2008 onwards, due to the global 
financial crisis.  
The sampled companies generated approximately 19 per cent ROE on average over the duration 
of the study period, which is in excess of the required return (cost of equity). This difference 
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between these variables has resulted in an average excess return percentage of almost nine per 
cent. The sampled firms’ mean cost of equity was 10.695 per cent. There were two companies 
with negative costs of equity. A negative cost of equity, calculated by CAPM, could indicate a 
negative beta. Morris (2018) also reported negative unlevered betas amongst JSE-listed South 
African companies. Change in turnover was 14.201 per cent on average for the companies under 
review. The average inflation rate for the period 2004 to 2015 was five per cent (author’s 
calculation based on Inflation.eu (2019)). Growth in sales was thus nine per cent in real terms 
for the companies included in the sample. 
The market values of shares were, on average, double the book values, which is an indication 
of a positive market sentiment surrounding these companies (Damodaran, 2007). This positive 
sentiment is also reflected in the positive EVA mean value reported in Table 5.3 in Rand 
million. There was also large variation in the EVAs of the sampled companies. This large 
variation was expected since EVA depends on three variables: NOPAT, total assets and WACC.  
Companies generated on average R71 million more than the cost of invested capital. This 
positive mean EVA is testament to the efforts of directors of JSE-listed companies to generate 
shareholder wealth. The log of EVA values was used for the regression analyses. 
According to South African Market Insights (2019), the average P/E ratios of all JSE-listed 
companies from 2008 to 2019 were between 12.3 (lowest in 2009) and 21.95 (highest in 2016). 
The average of all the mean P/E ratios from 2008 to 2019 was 16.8 (ibid). The mean P/E ratio 
of companies included in this sample is 13.224 (Table 5.3). The most empowered companies 
have a smaller P/E ratio than the average of the JSE, as reported by South African Market 
Insights (2019).  
The default risk probability measure computed by Bloomberg (2018) indicates the likelihood 
of a company not being able to meet its future financial commitments (See Section 3.5). With 
only a 0.1 per cent average default probability, it thus seems unlikely that the sampled 
companies would not meet their required payments within the following year. This finding is 
unsurprising, since the companies in the sample are all large listed companies. These companies 
should (ideally) have the necessary resources to repay their short-term debt. Trends in each of 
the financial health measures will be explored in the following sections. 
5.3.1  Change in turnover and annual share price growth 
Change in turnover measures the increase or decrease in sales on a year-on-year basis. A year-
on-year comparison was also performed on share price and was termed annual share price 
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growth (See Table 4.4). Both these measures compare the current year’s result (turnover or 
share price) to the prior year. As such they were displayed together in Figure 5.7. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Average change in turnover and annual share price growth (2004 – 2015) 
The average change in turnover and annual share price growth exhibited a similar trend from 
2004 to 2007. The positive growth in share prices and sales peaked in 2005. This trend was 
partly due to the growth in gross domestic product during that period (Statistics South Africa, 
2016). The global financial crisis of 2008 visibly impacted the results. The share prices seemed 
to be more volatile than sales, as the share prices plummeted immediately, but the sales figure 
gradually decreased. This finding is in line with Aylward and Glen (2000) who found that share 
prices are the best indicator of future growth or a decline in turnover. The share prices increased 
between 2009 and 2010, while sales only increased after 2010. Sales growth only recovered to 
its pre-global financial crisis level in 2012. From 2013 to 2015, both change in turnover and 
annual share price growth seem to have stabilised.  
5.3.2  Return on sales, return on assets and return on equity 
The ROS, ROA and ROE ratios are similar in nature, due to ROS and ROA both being 
measured using NOPAT, and ROE which is based on net profit. These three accounting-based 
ratios are thus all profit-based measures, with profit used as the numerator. In Figure 5.8, the 
average ROS, ROA and ROE are displayed from 2004 to 2015. 
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Figure 5.8: Average ROS, ROA and ROE values (2004 – 2015) 
The average ROS, ROA and ROE values followed a similar downward trend over the research 
period. These ratios measure how efficiently companies can convert sales, assets or equity into 
profit (Correia et al, 2013). In prosperous economic times, it would be easier for companies to 
convert their sales, assets and equity into profit. The fact that the economy has struggled to 
recover since the economic crisis (Statistics South Africa, 2016) has hindered companies from 
attaining similar profit margins to those achieved during the economic growth period of 2004 
to 2007. 
5.3.3  Price/earnings ratio and market-to-book value 
The P/E ratio and MTBV are two market-based financial health measures that are both 
influenced by share price. MTBV is calculated as share price divided by book value per share 
(see Section 3.3.2). In contrast, the P/E ratio uses earnings as the denominator (see Section 
3.3.3). Both these measures compare a market value (share price) to an accounting-based value. 
As such these two measures are presented together. The MTBV and P/E ratio values were 
winsorised for purposes of the regression analysis. The average winsorised MTBV and P/E 
ratio from 2004 to 2015 are displayed in Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9: Average MTBV and P/E ratio (2004 – 2015) 
The P/E ratio seems to have had larger fluctuations than MTBV. As indicated in Figure 5.9, the 
latter ratio fluctuates between 2 and 2.8 (almost a 40 per cent change). The P/E ratio fluctuated 
from approximately 10 in 2004 to 14 in 2007 (also a 40 per cent increase). The economic upturn 
from 2004 to 2007 (Statistics South Africa, 2016) is also reflected in the P/E ratio and the 
MTBV. The decrease in share prices (as reflected in the negative annual share price growth 
seen in Figure 5.7) also played a role in these two measures’ decrease in the latter stage of this 
study.  
The P/E ratio and MTBV both represent a multiplication factor reflecting what investors are 
willing to pay for a share. The P/E ratio measures the multiplication factor between EPS and 
share price, and MTBV evaluates the multiplication factor between book value per share and 
share price. Should investors expect higher future returns than what is reflected in the current 
EPS or book value per share, the P/E ratio or MTBV would increase. The expectation of 
generating future returns for shareholders are also related to ROS, ROA and ROE. The higher 
these profitability measures, the better the company’s ability to create returns. A similar pattern 
is also reflected for ROS, ROA and ROE in Figure 5.8. 
5.3.4  Excess return and cost of equity 
Excess return was defined in Section 3.3.4 as annual share price growth minus cost of equity. 
In this section, focus will be placed on excess return and the cost of equity, while annual share 
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price growth will be incorporated to explain the trends. Cost of equity can be negative if the 
beta of the company is negative, as was reported by Morris (2018). The average cost of equity, 
excess return and annual share price growth are depicted in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10: Average excess return and cost of equity (2004 – 2015) 
If annual share price growth remains constant, excess return is expected to decrease as cost of 
equity increases. This inverse trend is evident in the years 2004 to 2007 where a decrease is 
seen in excess return, and an increase in cost of equity. The global financial crisis of 2008 had 
an impact on cost of equity and excess return (cost of equity increased between 2008 and 2010) 
and, as a result, excess return decreased. This observation was anticipated, since cost of equity 
reflects the return shareholders require for the level of risk that they take. When a company 
goes bankrupt, shareholders assume the highest risk of all capital providers (Correia et al., 
2013). It is therefore expected that shareholders would require higher return for their higher 
risk. Cost of equity peaked in 2010 – two years after the economic crisis of 2008. From 2012 
to 2015, the mirror image effect of the increase in cost of equity is seen in the decrease of excess 
return. As anticipated, excess return followed the same trend as annual share price growth, but 
decreases more than annual share price growth if cost of equity increases.  
5.3.5  Default risk probability 
The default risk probability is likely to exhibit an inverse curve to annual share price growth 
(market-based financial health indicator). This expectation is ascribed to the fact that the worse 
a company performs financially, the higher the risk of the company defaulting on its debt 
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obligations. Depicted in Figure 5.11 is the average default risk probability and annual share 
price growth. 
 
Figure 5.11: Average default risk probability (2004 – 2015) 
The default risk probability line reflects the inverse of annual share price growth. For the 
purpose of this discussion, the author assumed that a lower default risk probability indicates 
better financial health, since a company is more likely to pay its debt as it becomes due. When 
the global financial crisis occurred in 2008, the sampled companies’ financial health decreased 
notably (depicted by an increase in default risk probability). A recovery is noted from 2010 to 
2014. The descriptive statistics of the control variables are discussed next. 
 
5.4  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
As shown in Table 4.4, three control variables for company size were taken into account, 
namely total assets, total revenue and market capitalisation. The movement in average total 
revenue can be partly explained by the mean change in turnover, and the change in average 
market capitalisation is related to the change in mean annual share price growth. If the number 
of shares remained the same, annual share price growth could also be seen as the change in 
market capitalisation, as the change in market capitalisation could then only be attributed to the 
change in share price. The average total revenue, average total assets and average market 
capitalisation per year are displayed in Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.12: Average size control variables (2004 – 2015) 
A noticeable upward trend is seen in Figure 5.12 for all the size measures. Total assets were 
constantly lower than total sales and market capitalisation. As expected, the change in turnover 
and annual share price growth also followed similar paths (Figure 5.7). The value of a company 
represents the current value of expected future cash flows of the company (Correia et al., 2013). 
If revenue fluctuated, the anticipated cash flows derived from the sales is assumed to fluctuate 
in the same ratio, affecting the market value of a company (ibid). The corroboration between 
market capitalisation and revenue was thus expected. From 2013 to 2015, a decrease in total 
sales is observed. This decrease is indicative of a struggling economy. The downswing in the 
economy culminated in a technical recession (Fin24, 2018). 
 
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There was a notable increase in the mean total B-BBEE score and means of the individual 
elements between 2004 and 2015. This increase was noted even after adjustments were made 
for the reduction in sample size in 2010. Several companies within the sample made a 
considerable effort to enhance their B-BBEE practices. Whether they increased their B-BBEE 
scores to benefit financially will be investigated in the following chapter. The largest increase 
in the scores of the elements, percentage wise, was noted in socio-economic development. 
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Ownership, an element that is traditionally associated with B-BBEE, showed a smaller 
percentage increase than the other elements. The increase in mean B-BBEE scores (in total and 
per element) appeared to be smaller at the start of the nascent period and the end of the wider 
adoption period. These two periods of reduction in growth falls concurrently with the release 
and implementation of the 2007 and 2013 Codes. The industries were well represented in the 
sample, with telecommunications the industry with the highest mean total B-BBEE score. This 
industry includes a large state-owned telecommunications enterprise that was consistently one 
of the most empowered companies. 
The financial health measures were impacted by two major events, namely the commodity 
boom of 2004 to 2007 and the global financial crisis of 2008. The companies evaluated in this 
study were not able to reach the same level of financial health that they had prior to the global 
financial crisis by the end of the research period (December 2015). In the following chapter, 
the statistical significance of the increases in B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) noted 
will be tested. The question on whether the increase in B-BBEE compliance could have been 
driven by any financial health measure will also be addressed.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
INFERENTIAL FINDINGS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The existence of a business case for B-BBEE is a lingering question that has been attempted by 
previous scholars (Van der Merwe & Ferreira, 2014; Kleynhans & Kruger, 2014; Mathura, 
2009; Acemoglu et al., 2007). Their findings were, however, inconclusive and contradicting. 
As such, this study set out to investigate this research question in the most comprehensive way 
that could be established thus far. In the previous chapter, the results of the descriptive statistics 
were presented. To ascertain whether the changes in the mean B-BBEE scores (in total and per 
element) were significant, mixed-model ANOVA and Fisher’s LSD tests were performed. The 
results of these tests will be presented first. The trends in B-BBEE scores (in total and per 
element) were analysed using the 100 most empowered companies from 2004 to 2009, and the 
full sample size from 2010 onwards. Next, the results of the panel regressions performed (on 
the full sample) with B-BBEE total score and each element of the B-BBEE scorecard as the 
independent variable, and all measures of financial health as the dependent variables, will be 
discussed. 
 
6.2 MIXED-MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE AND FISHER’S 
LEAST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES RESULTS 
Based on the descriptive statistics reported in Section 5.2 the mean total B-BBEE scores of the 
sample companies increased over the study period. A mixed-model ANOVA was therefore used 
to determine the significance of the observed trend. The mixed-model ANOVA included both 
fixed effects (between subjects) and random effects (within subjects) factors (Dowdy, Wearden 
& Chilko, 2004). For the purpose of this study, the considered fixed effects factor was year. 
The random effects factor was JSE ticker code. The sample size was larger during the nascent 
period than the wider adoption period (Empowerdex reduced the number of companies from 
approximately 200 to approximately 100 most empowered companies). As such, the sample 
size of the nascent period (2004 to 2009) was reduced to include only 100 companies per year, 
consistent with the sample size of the wider adoption period (2010 to 2015). A restricted 
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maximum likelihood solution with type III decomposition was performed to estimate the 
variance components of the random effects in the model. 
The results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean total B-BBEE scores are 
shown in Table 6.1. The Fisher’s LSD test was used to determine whether the mean total B-
BBEE scores differed significantly on an annual basis. The results are shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.1: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean total B-BBEE 
scores 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 1007 254.666** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level  
 
Table 6.2: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean total B-BBEE score per annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005    0.013* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2006      0.135 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2007        0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2008          0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2009            0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2010              0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2011                0.013* 0.001** 0.017* 0.000** 
2012                  0.305 0.938 0.002** 
2013                    0.265 0.052 
2014                      0.001** 
2015             
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
The mean total B-BBEE scores of the considered companies differed significantly over the 
research period (Table 6.1). Perusal of Table 6.2 shows that all the annual increases in the mean 
total B-BBEE scores were statistically significant, except for the annual increase from 2006 to 
2007. Four changes in mean total B-BBEE score in the wider adoption period were also not 
significant. The insignificant result during the nascent period could be due to the release and 
implementation of the 2007 Codes. Companies may have postponed their B-BBEE efforts until 
the details of the 2007 Codes became clear. The release of the 2013 Codes and the 
implementation thereof in 2015 could have impacted the insignificant results between 2013 and 
2015. 
As the total B-BBEE score comprises of seven elements, mixed-model ANOVA and Fisher’s 
LSD tests were also conducted for each element. The results for the elements are provided in 
Appendix A. Similar trends are observed in the elements with statistically significant increases 
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noted for all years, except for the years surrounding the release and implementation of the 2007 
and the 2013 Codes. The significant increases in compliance scores are encouraging.  
Other results for the insignificant increases noted since 2013 (Table 6.2 and Appendix A) could 
also be attributed to poor economic growth focussing management’s attention on financial 
survival. As a result, spending on social initiatives such as B-BBEE could have decreased. 
Companies could have become ‘comfortable’ with their B-BBEE compliance level and hence 
did not make active attempts to increase their scores. Management might be reluctant to invest 
in initiatives to increase the company’s B-BBEE score if its compliance level is not linked to a 
significant improvement in financial health. As such, this study investigated the relationships 
between B-BBEE scores and financial health. The results of the panel regression analyses will 
be presented next. 
 
6.3 CHANGE IN TURNOVER AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Panel regression analyses, with change in turnover as the dependent variable were performed 
to determine the nature of the relationship between this variable and the sampled companies’ 
total B-BBEE scores, as well as the respective elements of the total score. The multiple 
regression results for the total B-BBEE score are shown in Table 6.3, while the results reflecting 
the respective elements are reported in Table 6.4. The Breusch-Pagan test was conducted to test 
for heteroskedasticity. Where applicable, the results were adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Focus 
will be placed on the results adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 6.3: Regression analysis results for change in turnover and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects 
(F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (6.71**) 2.07** 40.06** 16.81** (4,700) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score 0.032 0.046 0.437 0.662 
Total revenue 0.161 26.064 1.215 0.225 
Market capitalisation 0.916 3.566 5.777** 0.000 
Total assets 0.116 5.433 0.548 0.584 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
429.08** 
0.377 0.707 
Total revenue 0.890 0.374 
Market 
capitalisation 
3.903** 0.000 
Total assets 0.378 0.705 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.09 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
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Table 6.4: Regression analysis results for change in turnover and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (6.11**) 1.94** 39.12** 7.01** (10,694) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Ownership  0.076 0.134 1.245 0.213 
Management control -0.066 0.363 -1.092 0.275 
Employment equity -0.044 0.315 -0.717 0.474 
Skills development 0.006 0.180 0.120 0.904 
Preferential procurement 0.002 0.183 0.022 0.983 
Enterprise development 0.049 0.162 0.823 0.411 
Socio-economic development -0.016 0.294 -0.325 0.745 
Total revenue 0.148 26.556 1.092 0.275 
Market capitalisation 0.908 3.586 5.692** 0.000 
Total assets 0.119 5.482 0.557 0.578 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Ownership  
458.89** 
1.082 0.280 
Management control -0.913 0.362 
Employment equity -0.692 0.489 
Skills development 0.101 0.920 
Preferential procurement 0.021 0.984 
Enterprise development 0.868 0.386 
Socio-economic development -0.277 0.782 
Total revenue 0.809 0.419 
Market capitalisation 3.874** 0.000 
Total assets 0.392 0.695 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.09 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Except for market capitalisation, the regression coefficients adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 were insignificant. The positive association between change in 
turnover and market capitalisation confirms the assumption that larger companies have higher 
sales growth than their smaller counterparts (Ionascu, Ionascu, Sacarin & Minu, 2018; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). This finding could be partly ascribed to large companies having 
more resources available to invest in extensive sales and marketing campaigns that could 
improve their turnover. 
The insignificant positive coefficient for the total B-BBEE score in Table 6.3 suggests that the 
sampled companies with higher total B-BBEE scores did not have significantly lower growth 
in sales than companies with lower B-BBEE scores. Based on these results, B-BBEE does not 
seem to be ‘detrimental’ to the change in turnover of companies. This finding is consistent with 
those reported by Mathura (2009) and Kleynhans and Kruger (2014). The author also 
investigated whether B-BBEE scores had an association with profit margins. ROS was used as 
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the dependent variable in the following analysis, followed by ROA and ROE in Section 6.5 and 
6.6. 
 
6.4 RETURN ON SALES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
In Table 6.5, the regression results with ROS as the dependent variable and total B-BBEE score 
as the independent variable are displayed. The results for ROS and the respective elements of 
the B-BBEE scorecard are tabulated in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.5: Regression analysis results for ROS and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (7.63**) 15.4** 27.28** 32.89** (4,707) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score 0.041 0.013 1.082 0.280 
Total revenue -0.052 7.426 -0.765 0.445 
Market capitalisation 0.833 1.019 10.136** 0.000 
Total assets -0.184 1.548 -1.687 0.092 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
1829.38** 
0.877 0.381 
Total revenue -0.692 0.489 
Market capitalisation 7.586** 0.000 
Total assets -1.504 0.133 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.16 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Table 6.6: Regression analysis results for ROS and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (7.10**) 14.8** 30.41** 13.86** (10,701) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Ownership  0.045 0.038 1.457 0.146 
Management control -0.008 0.103 -0.264 0.792 
Employment equity 0.034 0.089 1.071 0.285 
Skills development 0.000 0.051 0.001 0.999 
Preferential procurement 0.053 0.052 1.312 0.190 
Enterprise development -0.027 0.046 -0.889 0.374 
Socio-economic development -0.035 0.084 -1.397 0.163 
Total revenue -0.071 7.541 -1.030 0.303 
Market capitalisation 0.824 1.021 10.011** 0.000 
Total assets -0.181 1.557 -1.647 0.100 
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Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Ownership  
1824.09** 
1.331 0.184 
Management control -0.218 0.827 
Employment equity 0.754 0.451 
Skills development 0.001 0.999 
Preferential procurement 1.424 0.155 
Enterprise development -0.670 0.503 
Socio-economic development -1.279 0.201 
Total revenue -0.937 0.349 
Market capitalisation 7.848** 0.000 
Total assets -1.480 0.139 
 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.17 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
In line with the regression results for the change in turnover (reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4), 
the only significant relationship observed in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 is for ROS and market 
capitalisation. No significant relationship was observed between ROS and total B-BBEE score 
or any of the individual elements. This finding corresponds with those of Kleynhans and Kruger 
(2014) who also concluded that the total B-BBEE score was unrelated to ROS. Attention was 
furthermore given to whether the companies with higher B-BBEE scores also had higher levels 
of profit per Rand invested in assets.  
6.5  RETURN ON ASSETS AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The results of ROA as the dependent variable and total B-BBEE score as the independent 
variable are shown in Table 6.7, while the results for the B-BBEE elements are displayed in 
Table 6.8. 
Table 6.7: Regression analysis results for ROA and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (5.06**) 3.15** 15.03** 65.77** (4,702) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score 0.004 0.012 0.085 0.932 
Total revenue -0.005 7.111 -0.052 0.959 
Market capitalisation 1.677 0.969 16.054** 0.000 
Total assets -1.320 1.447 -9.713** 0.000 
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Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
458.85** 
0.061 0.951 
Total revenue -0.037 0.971 
Market capitalisation 13.478** 0.000 
Total assets -6.843** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.27 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Table 6.8: Regression analysis results for ROA and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (5.44**) 3.08** 20.23** 26.90** (10,696) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Ownership  -0.018 0.036 -0.443 0.658 
Management control 0.017 0.098 0.420 0.675 
Employment equity 0.013 0.086 0.309 0.758 
Skills development 0.008 0.049 0.232 0.816 
Preferential procurement 0.089 0.050 1.734 0.083 
Enterprise development -0.039 0.044 -0.993 0.321 
Socio-economic development -0.045 0.080 -1.378 0.169 
Total revenue -0.017 7.229 -0.196 0.845 
Market capitalisation 1.671 0.972 15.949** 0.000 
Total assets -1.306 1.457 -9.552** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Ownership  
479.42** 
-0.312 0.755 
Management control 0.428 0.669 
Employment equity 0.310 0.757 
Skills development 0.200 0.841 
Preferential procurement 1.746 0.081 
Enterprise development -1.008 0.314 
Socio-economic development -1.753 0.080 
Total revenue -0.143 0.886 
Market capitalisation 13.804** 0.000 
Total assets -7.097** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.28 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
The significant positive relationship reported between ROA and company size (as measured by 
market capitalisation) was anticipated. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and Ionascu et al. (2018) 
reported similar findings for market capitalisation. The results reported in Table 6.7 confirm 
that companies with higher market capitalisation showed higher profitability over the research 
period. A negative relationship, however, existed between total assets (another measure of 
company size) and ROA. As such, companies with more assets in this sample had lower 
profitability. This result could be partly explained by the insignificant relationship observed 
between total assets and change in turnover (refer to Table 6.4). The implication is that if a 
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company’s assets increased, its revenue did not increase proportionally. If it is presumed that 
constant revenue leads to a constant return, the claim could be made that return remained fairly 
unchanged if total assets increased. If NOPAT remained constant, and total assets increased, 
return (NOPAT) divided by total assets would become smaller, resulting in the observed 
negative relationship between total assets and ROA.  
Given that no significant relationships were detected between ROA and B-BBEE (in total and 
per element directly), it could be argued that the decision to invest in B-BBEE activities is 
arguably not linked to ROA. The B-BBEE regression results related to ROE are reported in the 
next section. 
 
6.6  RETURN ON EQUITY AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The author expected that the ROE results might differ from the ROA results, as ROE removes 
compensation to debt holders and provides an indication of the accounting return to 
shareholders (Correia et al., 2013). As share ownership forms part of the requirements of B-
BBEE, this is an important measure to investigate in the context of this study. The results of the 
panel regression, with total B-BBEE score as the independent variable, are displayed in Table 
6.9, and the results of the panel regression analysis conducted for the B-BBEE elements in 
Table 6.10. 
Table 6.9: Regression analysis results for ROE and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (6.04**) 4.48** 15.94** 33.85** (4,701) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score 0.025 0.034 0.469 0.639 
Total revenue 0.001 19.139 0.011 0.991 
Market capitalisation 1.350 2.608 11.439** 0.000 
Total assets -0.872 3.892 -5.687** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
514.50** 
0.369 0.712 
Total revenue 0.009 0.993 
Market capitalisation 8.575** 0.000 
Total assets -5.426** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.16 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
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Table 6.10: Regression analysis results for ROE and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (5.88**) 4.35** 24.83** 14.12** (10,695) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Ownership  0.023 0.097 0.514 0.607 
Management control 0.083 0.265 1.861 0.063 
Employment equity 0.002 0.231 0.043 0.965 
Skills development -0.034 0.132 -0.893 0.372 
Preferential procurement 0.001 0.134 0.024 0.981 
Enterprise development 0.025 0.118 0.565 0.572 
Socio-economic development -0.027 0.215 -0.730 0.466 
Total revenue -0.027 19.451 -0.271 0.786 
Market capitalisation 1.357 2.615 11.469** 0.000 
Total assets -0.851 3.917 -5.518** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Ownership  
522.17** 
0.413 0.679 
Management control 1.684 0.093 
Employment equity 0.048 0.962 
Skills development -0.781 0.435 
Preferential procurement 0.025 0.980 
Enterprise development 0.589 0.556 
Socio-economic development -0.826 0.409 
Total revenue -0.213 0.831 
Market capitalisation 8.738** 0.000 
Total assets -5.237** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.17 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
The same control variables were shown to have more significant relationships with ROE in 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 than those reported in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 in relation to ROA. The negative 
total assets regression coefficient in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 implies that ROE ratios were inversely 
related with total assets for the sampled firms. If total assets increased, and companies 
maintained their capital structure, liabilities and equity would have increased in line with the 
change in total capital. Constant net profit divided by higher equity would cause a reduction in 
ROE, ceteris paribus, yielding a negative relationship.  
Return on equity can be interpreted as the actual return the company generated for each Rand 
of equity. Cost of equity, on the other hand, measures the return shareholders require for each 
Rand of investment. A positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between 
management control score and ROE was observed. This positive relationship corroborates the 
significant negative relationship that exists between management control and cost of equity 
(Section 6.11) (negative relationship with cost of equity indicates improved financial health). 
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Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014) also reported a positive association between management 
control and short-term share returns. 
No significant relationship was reported between the B-BBEE scores (in total or per element) 
and the employed accounting-based measures in Sections 6.3 to 6.6. In the following section, 
the focus shifts to market-based financial health measures. The first market-based financial 
health measure reflects the change in share price from the previous financial year-end to the 
current share price, and is called annual share price growth. 
6.7  ANNUAL SHARE PRICE GROWTH AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The results for annual share price growth as the dependent variable and total B-BBEE score are 
tabulated in Table 6.11, whereas the results for the elements are shown in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.11: Regression analysis results for annual share price growth and total B-BBEE 
score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (27.5**) 2.26** 12.75** 53.66** (4,693) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score -0.022 0.001 -0.366 0.715 
Total revenue -0.269 0.502 -2.532* 0.012 
Market capitalisation 1.845 0.069 14.569** 0.000 
Total assets -1.219 0.103 -7.330** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
262.15** 
-0.398 0.691 
Total revenue -2.129* 0.034 
Market capitalisation 13.317** 0.000 
Total assets -5.643** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.24 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
109 
 
Table 6.12: Regression analysis results for annual share price growth and B-BBEE 
elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way random effects (26.39**) 2.26** 10.73 19.17** (10,805) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.016 8.148 0.197 0.844 
Ownership  0.012 0.007 0.093 0.926 
Management control 0.066 0.017 0.549 0.583 
Employment equity -0.076 0.015 -0.608 0.543 
Skills development -0.019 0.010 -0.152 0.880 
Preferential procurement -0.073 0.010 -0.415 0.678 
Enterprise development -0.002 0.009 -0.013 0.990 
Socio-economic development 0.030 0.017 0.259 0.796 
Total revenue -0.026 0.833 -0.147 0.883 
Market capitalisation 1.001 0.139 3.917** 0.000 
Total assets -0.883 0.176 -3.108** 0.002 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
285.85** 
0.618 0.537 
Ownership  0.250 0.802 
Management control 1.345 0.179 
Employment equity -1.528 0.127 
Skills development -0.370 0.712 
Preferential procurement -1.087 0.277 
Enterprise development -0.036 0.971 
Socio-economic development 0.633 0.527 
Total revenue -0.453 0.651 
Market capitalisation 9.477** 0.000 
Total assets -7.971** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.19 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
No significant associations are reported in Table 6.11 between annual share price growth and 
total B-BBEE score or the elements (Table 6.12). The signs of the significant size regression 
coefficients (positive for market capitalisation and negative for total assets) are comparable to 
the size regression coefficients reported in Sections 6.3 to 6.6 for the accounting-based 
performance measures. 
  
6.8 MARKET-TO-BOOK VALUE AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
MTBV is utilised to indicate the relationship between the market value of a company’s shares 
and the book value thereof. The value could also be determined by dividing the market 
capitalisation by shareholders’ equity as reported in a company’s statement of financial position 
(Correia et al., 2013). A higher MTBV would thus indicate that investors are willing to pay 
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more for each Rand of net asset value per share. Panel regressions were performed to establish 
the relationship between MTBV and B-BBEE scores (in total and per element). The results of 
these analyses are shown in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 respectively. 
Table 6.13: Regression analysis results for MTBV and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (4.33**) 12.16** 14.28** 95.75** (4,710) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score 0.007 0.002 0.193 0.847 
Total revenue 0.026 1.192 0.404 0.686 
Market capitalisation 1.490 0.163 19.091** 0.000 
Total assets -1.383 0.244 -13.567** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
901.91** 
0.161 0.872 
Total revenue 0.248 0.804 
Market capitalisation 11.445** 0.000 
Total assets -6.212** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.35 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
 
Table 6.14: Regression analysis results for MTBV and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way random effects (3.91**) 11.39** 3.85 93.05** (10,824) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.018 13.473 -1.142 0.254 
Ownership  -0.030 0.008 -0.801 0.423 
Management control 0.029 0.021 0.786 0.432 
Employment equity 0.050 0.018 1.316 0.189 
Skills development -0.017 0.011 -0.533 0.594 
Preferential procurement -0.078 0.010 -1.753 0.080 
Enterprise development 0.033 0.009 0.887 0.375 
Socio-economic development 0.035 0.016 1.209 0.227 
Total revenue 0.085 1.355 1.151 0.250 
Market capitalisation 1.653 0.186 18.526** 0.000 
Total assets -1.383 0.251 -13.188** 0.000 
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Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
931.86** 
-0.686 0.493 
Ownership  -0.473 0.636 
Management control 0.519 0.604 
Employment equity 0.795 0.427 
Skills development -0.419 0.676 
Preferential procurement -1.142 0.254 
Enterprise development 0.604 0.546 
Socio-economic development 0.989 0.323 
Total revenue 0.687 0.492 
Market capitalisation 14.425** 0.000 
Total assets -10.843** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.53 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
Albeit insignificant, a positive association is noted between MTBV and the total B-BBEE score 
(Table 6.13) and the majority of the B-BBEE elements (Table 6.14) of the sampled companies. 
Significant relationships were only reported for the control variables market capitalisation and 
total assets. The latter had a negative relationship with the dependent variable, whereas the 
former had a positive relationship. The results of another market-based financial health 
measure, namely the P/E ratio are reported in the next section. 
 
6.9 PRICE/EARNINGS RATIO AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The panel regression results for total B-BBEE score as the independent variable and the P/E 
ratio as the dependent variable are shown in Table 6.15. In Table 6.16 the results for the B-
BBEE elements are provided. 
Table 6.15: Regression analysis results for the P/E ratio and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (7.72**) 2.91** 20.02** 7.23** (4,658) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score -0.154 0.014 -2.340* 0.020 
Total revenue 0.112 7.833 0.928 0.354 
Market capitalisation 0.699 1.197 4.478** 0.000 
Total assets -0.329 1.687 -1.682 0.093 
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Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
579.26** 
-2.220* 0.027 
Total revenue 0.669 0.504 
Market capitalisation 2.875** 0.004 
Total assets -1.080 0.280 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.04 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
 
Table 6.16: Regression analysis results for the P/E ratio and the B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way random effects (6.65**) 3.00** 17.94 19.08** (10,764) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.022 10.356 -6.373** 0.000 
Ownership  -0.095 0.007 -9.506** 0.000 
Management control 0.021 0.020 2.187* 0.029 
Employment equity 0.079 0.017 7.839** 0.000 
Skills development -0.089 0.011 -9.491** 0.000 
Preferential procurement 0.129 0.010 10.253** 0.000 
Enterprise development 0.040 0.010 3.763** 0.000 
Socio-economic development 0.091 0.017 10.930** 0.000 
Total revenue 0.090 1.054 5.555** 0.000 
Market capitalisation 0.735 0.178 31.729** 0.000 
Total assets -0.469 0.221 -18.330** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
590.17** 
-1.210 0.227 
Ownership  -1.661 0.097 
Management control 0.370 0.712 
Employment equity 1.404 0.161 
Skills development -1.961* 0.050 
Preferential procurement 1.944 0.052 
Enterprise development 0.638 0.524 
Socio-economic development 2.164* 0.031 
Total revenue 1.047 0.295 
Market capitalisation 5.234** 0.000 
Total assets -3.859** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.20 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
In Table 6.15, a significant negative relationship is observed between the sampled companies’ 
P/E ratios and their total B-BBEE scores (before and after adjusting for heteroskedasticity). 
After adjusting for heteroskedasticity, a negative relationship was detected between P/E ratio 
and skills development, but a significant positive relationship was observed with socio-
economic development (Table 6.16). In line with the results reported for the accounting-based 
and other market-based measures (Section 6.8), a significant positive regression coefficient was 
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reported for market capitalisation and a negative significant regression coefficient for total 
assets.  
The negative relationship between total B-BBEE score and P/E ratio could indicate that 
investors were not per se willing to pay more for the shares of companies with high B-BBEE 
scores. No previous researchers have used the P/E ratio to assess the link between market-based 
financial health and B-BBEE. This negative relationship might be partly ascribed to the 
negative sentiment surrounding B-BBEE as indicated by Krüger (2011) and suggested by Van 
der Merwe and Ferreira (2014). A negative relationship between total B-BBEE score and short-
term share returns were found by Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014).  
Given the significant negative relationship between skills development and the P/E ratio for the 
sampled companies, investors could arguably regard skills development as a financial burden. 
This observation is especially true in certain sectors in South Africa, like the information 
technology sector, where the retention of employees is seen as a major challenge (Mohlala, 
Goldman & Goosen, 2012). It is, however, encouraging that a positive relationship existed 
between market-based performance and socio-economic development over the duration of the 
study period. Investors seemed to regard socio-economic development in a positive light.  
Companies that have a risk of going bankrupt in the near future often reflect a lower P/E ratio, 
whilst companies that have longevity, typically have a higher P/E ratio (Correia et al., 2013). 
To further investigate whether the observed negative relationship between the total B-BBEE 
score and the P/E ratio could possibly be partly attributed to risk, the author investigated the 
nature of the relationship between B-BBEE scores and default risk probability. 
 
6.10 DEFAULT RISK PROBABILITY AS THE DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
As explained in Section 3.5, Bloomberg’s (2018) default risk probability measures the 
likelihood of a company not being able to meet its financial commitments in the next year. 
Companies should thus strive to attain a low default risk probability score. The results for 
default risk probability and the total B-BBEE score and the B-BBEE elements are reported in 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 respectively. 
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Table 6.17: Regression analysis results for default risk probability and total B-BBEE 
score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way random effects (10.38**) 5.16** 0.00 167.9** (4,697) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.020 12.513 -0.001 0.999 
Total B-BBEE score 0.069 0.003 0.001 0.999 
Total revenue 0.183 1.267 0.002 0.999 
Market capitalisation -1.465 0.196 -0.011 0.991 
Total assets 0.803 0.263 0.005 0.996 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
370.62** 
-2.144* 0.032 
Total B-BBEE score 1.849 0.065 
Total revenue 2.780** 0.006 
Market capitalisation -13.349** 0.000 
Total assets 6.092** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level       * Significant at the 5% level          
R-squared = 0.49 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
 
Table 6.18: Regression analysis results for default risk probability and B-BBEE 
elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way random effects (9.44**) 5.17** 0.00 67.88** (10,691) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.016 12.697 -0.001 0.999 
Ownership  0.036 0.008 0.001 1.000 
Management control -0.032 0.023 -0.001 1.000 
Employment equity 0.036 0.020 0.001 1.000 
Skills development -0.041 0.012 -0.001 0.999 
Preferential procurement 0.068 0.011 0.001 0.999 
Enterprise development 0.016 0.011 0.000 1.000 
Socio-economic development -0.015 0.019 0.000 1.000 
Total revenue 0.184 1.287 0.002 0.999 
Market capitalisation -1.485 0.195 -0.011 0.991 
Total assets 0.840 0.262 0.005 0.996 
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Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
375.49** 
-2.223* 0.027 
Ownership  0.717 0.474 
Management control -0.656 0.512 
Employment equity 0.739 0.460 
Skills development -0.874 0.383 
Preferential procurement 1.054 0.292 
Enterprise development 0.307 0.759 
Socio-economic development -0.467 0.640 
Total revenue 2.836** 0.005 
Market capitalisation -13.172** 0.000 
Total assets 6.416** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.50 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
In Table 6.17, the two-way random effects panel regression revealed significant relationships 
with all three the control variables, after adjusting for heteroskedasticity. Before adjusting for 
heteroskedasticity, the relationships were all highly insignificant. This change in significance 
highlights the importance of adjusting for heteroskedasticity. This specification error can 
invalidate statistical significance tests, as it implies that the standard error terms do not all have 
the same variance (see Section 4.5.8.1) (Gujarati, 2004).  
After adjusting for heteroskedasticity, a positive relationship was noted between the total B-
BBEE score and default risk probability (Table 6.17). The result was, however, only significant 
at the 10 per cent level (p-value: 0.065). The positive coefficient could imply that higher default 
risk is related to higher B-BBEE scores. This result could partly explain the lower P/E ratio (as 
reported in Table 6.15), as companies with higher risk of default would be likely to have a lower 
valuation (Correia et al., 2013). No significant relationship between the B-BBEE elements and 
default risk probability were noted in Table 6.18. Additional analysis was performed to 
investigate whether this perceived higher risk is also reflected in a higher cost of equity. 
 
6.11 COST OF EQUITY AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The cost of equity of a company indicates the return that ordinary shareholders require on their 
investment. If a company has higher risk, it would most likely result in a higher cost of equity 
(Correia et al., 2013). Different models could be used to calculate the cost of equity. The model 
that is mostly used in South Africa, despite some shortcomings, is the traditional CAPM (PwC, 
2016; Nel, 2011). Table 5.3 indicated that there were two negative cost of equity observations. 
To ensure rigour, the panel regression between B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) were 
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reperformed where the five smallest cost of equity cases were removed from the sample. The 
findings did not differ between the sample including the negative costs of equity, and the sample 
excluding the five smallest costs of equity. As suggested by Basiewicz and Auret (2010), 
company size was controlled for. Total revenue, market capitalisation and total assets were 
included in the panel regressions. The results of the analyses for cost of equity and the total B-
BBEE score and B-BBEE elements are shown in Tables 6.19 and 6.20 respectively. 
Table 6.19: Regression analysis results for cost of equity and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Pooled ordinary least squares 1.13 N/A 35.24** (4,817) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.000 16.916 -0.485 0.628 
Total B-BBEE score 0.231 0.003 6.732** 0.000 
Total revenue 0.027 1.736 0.494 0.621 
Market capitalisation -0.104 0.300 -1.267 0.206 
Total assets 0.310 0.383 3.361** 0.001 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
438.55** 
-0.497 0.620 
Total B-BBEE score 7.569** 0.000 
Total revenue 0.493 0.622 
Market capitalisation -1.372 0.170 
Total assets 3.378** 0.001 
** Significant at the 1% level  
R-squared = 0.15 
The quality of fit of the pooled ordinary least squares regression model was significant. 
 
Table 6.20: Regression analysis results for cost of equity and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Pooled ordinary least squares 1.12 N/A 25.40** (10,811) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.000 16.519 -0.898 0.370 
Ownership  0.138 0.015 3.290** 0.001 
Management control -0.094 0.038 -2.417* 0.016 
Employment equity 0.128 0.034 3.061** 0.002 
Skills development -0.299 0.024 -7.038** 0.000 
Preferential procurement 0.172 0.021 3.137** 0.002 
Enterprise development 0.175 0.020 3.715** 0.000 
Socio-economic development 0.005 0.036 0.143 0.887 
Total revenue 0.046 1.698 0.859 0.391 
Market capitalization -0.014 0.297 -0.175 0.861 
Total assets 0.244 0.380 2.669** 0.008 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
117 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
475.20** 
-0.921 0.357 
Ownership  3.380** 0.001 
Management control -2.246* 0.025 
Employment equity 3.139** 0.002 
Skills development -6.640** 0.000 
Preferential procurement 3.355** 0.001 
Enterprise development 3.382** 0.001 
Socio-economic development 0.194 0.846 
Total revenue 0.862 0.389 
Market capitalisation -0.153 0.878 
Total assets 2.229* 0.026 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.24 
The quality of fit of the pooled ordinary least squares regression model was significant. 
A number of significant relationships are reported in Tables 6.19 and 6.20 after adjusting for 
heteroskedasticity. The significant positive relationship between the cost of equity and total 
assets implies that a larger investment in assets is related to a higher cost of equity. An increase 
in assets in an uncertain economic climate may concern shareholders, as the company’s cash is 
invested in an asset while it is uncertain whether the future cash flows associated with that asset 
would be generated. As such, a company’s risk of failure increases, resulting in a higher 
required return.  
A highly significant positive relationship is noted between the total B-BBEE score and cost of 
equity in Table 6.19. This finding corroborates with the significant negative regression 
coefficient reported for the P/E ratio (Table 6.15) and significant positive regression coefficient 
for default risk probability (Table 6.17 at the 10 per cent level of significance). An increase in 
default risk probability (especially in emerging economies) often results in higher cost of equity 
and a lower P/E ratio (Moretti, 2016). The empirical evidence seems to suggest that ordinary 
shareholders regarded the sampled companies with higher total B-BBEE scores as having more 
risk, resulting in higher cost of equity. Some shareholders could be of the opinion that B-BBEE 
is unsustainable over the long run, as indicated by Ngwenya (2019). Such perceptions could 
result in higher cost of equity in comparison with companies with lower total B-BBEE scores 
(i.e. the return required by investors).  
Significant positive relationships are also reported between the cost of equity and ownership, 
employment equity, preferential procurement and enterprise development, respectively, as 
indicated in Table 6.20. The significant positive relationship between cost of equity and 
ownership could be expected in light of the ownership requirement of B-BBEE, and is 
consistent with the findings of Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014). If shares are issued at a 
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discounted price to meet the requirement of the ownership element, some of the existing 
shareholders might argue that their share value has been diluted. Shareholders whose voting 
power is diluted due to a share issue often deem a share issue in a negative light (Larrain & 
Urzua, 2013). B-BBEE shares are often issued at less than market price (Acemoglu et al., 2007), 
thus diluting market value per share. The recipients of these B-BBEE scheme shares are not the 
existing shareholders (as the purpose of the share issue is to change the racial demographics of 
shareholders). This dilution of value could contribute to negative perceptions of B-BBEE. 
The significant positive relationship between cost of equity and employment equity is reported 
in Table 6.20. Ordinary shareholders might be concerned about the challenges related to finding 
candidates that fit the suitable racial profile, given the limited local talent pool (Department of 
Higher Education and Training, 2018). In 2014, only 15 per cent of black people were 
considered to be skilled, as opposed to 61 per cent of white people (Statistics South Africa, 
2014). Skilled black people thus seem to be in short supply. 
A significant positive relationship with preferential procurement could possibly be ascribed to 
a concern that suppliers are chosen based on their B-BBEE compliance levels and not on the 
price of the goods or service supplied by them, which may not be sustainable over an extended 
period of time. Jeffery (2018) stated that corruption, inflated prices and under-delivery are 
associated with preferential procurement.  
The relationship (significantly positive) between cost of equity and enterprise development was 
noted (Table 6.20). Shareholders might require a higher return on their investment (increased 
cost of equity) if they feel that their company provides resources that benefit other companies, 
but offers no financial benefit to the capital providers (shareholders). 
A racially diverse management team was associated with a lower cost of equity for the sampled 
companies during the period under review (reflected by the negative regression coefficient for 
management control in Table 6.20). A racially diverse board has been associated with higher 
profitability (Marimuthu, 2008). If top leadership is representative of a country’s demographics, 
they can help align the company’s product or service strategy with the needs of diverse citizens 
(ibid). A more racially diverse management team, and presumably a more diverse board, could 
be expected to have a positive influence on future financial health. Van der Merwe and Ferreira 
(2014) reported a significant positive relationship between management control and short-term 
share returns indicating that shareholders might benefit over the short run if a competent, 
diverse management team enhances share returns. Share owners could then require a lower 
return, given this expectation. 
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A highly significant negative relationship is also noted between cost of equity and skills 
development (Table 6.20). This relationship might be partly attributed to ordinary shareholders 
deeming development of skills of a company’s employees in a positive light. A significant 
negative relationship between the P/E ratio and skills development was, however, observed in 
Table 6.16. There are more factors involved in the determination of a company’s P/E ratio and 
cost of equity than skills development and other transformation activities. As such, these 
relationships should be interpreted with caution. In this study, several dependent variables were 
used to measure financial health to allow the author to compare the findings of the dependent 
variables with one another. In the following section, details are provided on the relationship 
between B-BBEE and excess return (annual share price growth minus cost of equity).  
 
6.12  EXCESS RETURN AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
If it is assumed that cost of equity is influenced by risk (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), excess 
return represents the risk-adjusted growth in share price. A higher excess return would thus 
imply that ordinary shareholders receive more return in the form of growth in share price than 
what is required. The results of excess return as the dependent variable and the total B-BBEE 
score and B-BBEE elements are presented in Tables 6.21 and 6.22 respectively. 
Table 6.21: Regression analysis results for excess return and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (30.40**) 2.23** 55.57** 54.07** (4,693) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Total B-BBEE score -0.021 0.089 -0.357 0.721 
Total revenue -0.278 50.243 -2.661** 0.008 
Market capitalisation 1.821 6.876 14.623** 0.000 
Total assets -1.208 10.321 -7.386** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Total B-BBEE score 
242.67** 
-0.383 0.702 
Total revenue -2.257* 0.024 
Market capitalisation 13.390** 0.000 
Total assets -5.688** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.24 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
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Table 6.22: Regression analysis results for excess return and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way fixed effects (28.70**) 2.25** 53.71** 22.22** (10,687) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Ownership  -0.024 0.260 -0.490 0.624 
Management control 0.089 0.716 1.849 0.065 
Employment equity -0.064 0.603 -1.325 0.186 
Skills development 0.010 0.347 0.243 0.808 
Preferential procurement -0.042 0.354 -0.677 0.499 
Enterprise development 0.006 0.313 0.132 0.895 
Socio-economic development 0.022 0.567 0.573 0.567 
Total revenue -0.285 51.121 -2.683** 0.007 
Market capitalisation 1.842 6.897 14.745** 0.000 
Total assets -1.206 10.388 -7.326** 0.000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Ownership  
269.85** 
-0.465 0.642 
Management control 1.744 0.082 
Employment equity -1.109 0.268 
Skills development 0.230 0.818 
Preferential procurement -0.774 0.439 
Enterprise development 0.125 0.900 
Socio-economic development 0.450 0.653 
Total revenue -2.249* 0.025 
Market capitalisation 13.795** 0.000 
Total assets -5.579** 0.000 
 ** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.24 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Perusal of the results reported in Tables 6.21 and 6.22 reveal a significant negative relationship 
between excess return and total revenue and total assets, but a significant positive link with 
market capitalisation. These relationships between excess return and the control variables are 
comparable with those reported for annual share price growth (Section 6.7). No statistically 
significant association is noted between excess return and the total B-BBEE score (Table 6.21) 
or any of the B-BBEE elements (Table 6.22). A hybrid financial health measure was used for 
the final round of analysis, namely EVA.  
 
6.13 ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The EVA measure reflects the return generated from assets, minus the cost involved to finance 
such assets (Erasmus, 2008). EVA could be regarded as a hybrid instrument, as it accounts for 
accounting-based financial health (operating profit) and market-based financial health 
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(WACC). The results of the panel regressions for EVA are tabulated in Table 6.23 (total B-
BBEE score) and Table 6.24 (B-BBEE elements). 
Table 6.23: Regression analysis results for EVA and total B-BBEE score 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way random effects (3.73**) 4.27** 0.09 14.07** (4,817) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.001 10.808 0.907 0.365 
Total B-BBEE score -0.045 0.002 -0.072 0.942 
Total revenue -0.038 1.095 -0.036 0.971 
Market capitalisation 0.739 0.172 0.515 0.607 
Total assets -0.609 0.220 -0.377 0.706 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
1940.47** 
6.818** 0.000 
Total B-BBEE score -1.238 0.216 
Total revenue -0.273 0.785 
Market capitalisation 5.473** 0.000 
Total assets -3.982** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.07 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
 
Table 6.24: Regression analysis results for EVA and B-BBEE elements 
Model summary 
Preferred model (F) 
Test for fixed 
effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Two-way random effects (3.03**) 3.95** 0.12 8.98** (10,811) 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.003 10.669 0.925 0.355 
Ownership  -0.027 0.007 -0.043 0.965 
Management control 0.042 0.020 0.068 0.946 
Employment equity 0.120 0.017 0.187 0.851 
Skills development 0.048 0.011 0.080 0.936 
Preferential procurement -0.112 0.010 -0.137 0.891 
Enterprise development -0.055 0.009 -0.083 0.934 
Socio-economic development -0.022 0.017 -0.041 0.967 
Total revenue -0.046 1.083 -0.044 0.965 
Market capitalisation 0.695 0.171 0.486 0.627 
Total assets -0.570 0.219 -0.355 0.722 
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Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) Adjusted t-value  p-value  
Intercept 
1853.36** 
7.464** 0.000 
Ownership  -0.375 0.708 
Management control 0.691 0.490 
Employment equity 1.444 0.149 
Skills development 0.778 0.437 
Preferential procurement -1.306 0.192 
Enterprise development -0.769 0.442 
Socio-economic development -0.684 0.494 
Total revenue -0.355 0.722 
Market capitalisation 5.188** 0.000 
Total assets -4.269** 0.000 
 ** Significant at the 1% level   
R-squared = 0.10 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
 
No significant relationship was reported between EVA and B-BBEE in terms of the total score 
(Table 6.23) or any of the individual scorecard elements (Table 6.24). It should be noted that a 
negative total B-BBEE score regression coefficient is reported in Table 6.23. Higher cost of 
equity was associated with a significantly higher total B-BBEE score (Table 6.19). Based on 
the EVA equation used in this study (Equation 3.13 in Section 3.6), WACC is multiplied by the 
invested capital and subtracted from NOPAT. WACC includes the cost of both debt and equity. 
As such, the negative relationship between total B-BBEE score and EVA could be partly 
ascribed to the higher cost of equity associated with a higher total B-BBEE score. 
 
6.14 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the results from the inferential analyses were presented. A statistically 
significant increase was seen in the total B-BBEE score and all the elements over the research 
period. Significant relationships were reported between the financial health measures and the 
control variables, especially market capitalisation and total assets. Market capitalisation seemed 
to have a positive relationship with financial health, while total assets frequently had a negative 
relationship with financial health.  
No significant relationship was noted between the total B-BBEE scores, or any of the respective 
B-BBEE elements, and any of the considered accounting-based financial health measures. 
There is hence not a significant accounting-based business case for B-BBEE compliance based 
on the reported findings in this study. In contrast, the market-based financial health measures 
reflected significant associations with B-BBEE (total score and selected elements). 
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A significant negative relationship was observed between P/E ratio and total B-BBEE score, 
while a significant positive relationship was noted for the cost of equity. This negative 
association between total B-BBEE score and financial health (referring specifically to P/E ratio 
and cost of equity) might indicate a negative perception of shareholders towards B-BBEE. 
Companies with high B-BBEE scores may also be perceived to have more risk, as is deducted 
by the positive link with default risk probability. These findings were in line with those of 
previous researchers. In this chapter, the relevant hypotheses formulated in Section 1.6 were 
addressed. In Table 6.25, a summary of these hypotheses and the relevant responses thereto is 
presented.  
Table 6.25: Reconciliation of hypotheses with findings 
Ref Description 
Rejected 
or not 
Where rejected 
H01 There was no relationship between total B-
BBEE score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the 
research period. 
Rejected A significant negative relationship 
between total B-BBEE score and P/E 
ratio was observed in Section 6.9 and a 
significant positive relationship with cost 
of equity was seen in Section 6.11 
H02 There was no relationship between 
ownership score and the financial health of 
selected JSE-listed companies over the 
research period. 
Rejected A significant positive relationship with 
cost of equity was observed in Section 
6.11. 
H03 There was no relationship between 
management control score and the financial 
health of selected JSE-listed companies 
over the research period. 
Rejected A significant negative relationship with 
cost of equity was observed in Section 
6.11. 
H04 There was no relationship between 
employment equity score and the financial 
health of selected JSE-listed companies 
over the research period. 
Rejected A significant positive relationship with 
cost of equity was noted in Section 6.11. 
H05 There was no relationship between 
preferential procurement score and the 
financial health of selected JSE-listed 
companies over the research period. 
Rejected A significant positive relationship with 
cost of equity was noted in Section 6.11. 
H06 There was no relationship between 
enterprise development score and the 
financial health of selected JSE-listed 
companies over the research period. 
Rejected A significant positive relationship with 
cost of equity was noted in Section 6.11. 
H07 There was no relationship between skills 
development score and the financial health 
of selected JSE-listed companies over the 
research period. 
Rejected A significant negative relationship with 
P/E ratio was noted in Section 6.9. A 
significant negative relationship with cost 
of equity was also observed in Section 
6.11. 
H08 There was no relationship between socio-
economic development score and the 
financial health of selected JSE-listed 
companies over the research period. 
Rejected A significant positive relationship with 
P/E ratio was seen in Section 6.9. 
H09 There was no change in the B-BBEE scores 
(in total and per element) of selected JSE-
listed companies over the research period. 
Rejected A significant change in B-BBEE score (in 
total and per element) was noted in 
Section 6.2. 
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All the null hypotheses set in Section 1.6 were rejected in this chapter. In the following chapter 
conclusions will be drawn. Recommendations will be offered to a range of stakeholders and 
future researchers, based on the identified limitations. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
Since the introduction of B-BBEE legislation in 2003, the question is increasingly being raised 
whether there is a financial motivation for companies to achieve a higher level of compliance 
(De Wet, 2016; Kleynhans & Kruger, 2014). In the preceding chapter, the results of panel 
regression analyses conducted on B-BBEE scores (in total and per elements), and a range of 
financial health measures, were reported. In this chapter, an overview of the purpose of the 
study, research objectives and research design and methodology will be presented. Thereafter, 
a summary of the main findings from the literature review and the empirical investigation will 
be provided. Recommendations will be offered per stakeholder group, based on the identified 
limitations. Lastly, concluding remarks will be presented.  
 
7.2  OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
The term B-BBEE was formally introduced in the legislative framework of South Africa in 
2003 with the implementation of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (No. 53 
of 2003). Prior to 2003, reference was predominantly made to BEE. This Act was followed by 
the release of the Codes of Good Practice in 2004 and 2007 and, later, a revised B-BBEE Act 
in 2013 accompanied by revised Codes of Good Practice. The purpose of the 2003 Act and its 
revisions was the redistribution of wealth to those disadvantaged by the apartheid regime. 
Whilst some researchers are critical about the true beneficiaries of B-BBEE (Patel & Graham, 
2012; Hoffman, 2008), the moral imperative of uplifting the poor cannot be debated. Some 
commentators are of the opinion that B-BBEE is not ideal in its design and that it should be 
replaced by another intervention that would better reach the goal of uplifting previously 
disadvantaged South Africans (Ngwenya, 2019; IRR, 2017; Hoffman, 2008; Andrews, 2008). 
This sentiment is also echoed by the current minister of trade and industry in South Africa 
(Phakathi, 2019). B-BBEE in its current form seems to be regarded by some stakeholders as a 
barrier for foreign investment, as the relaxation thereof has been requested by the European 
Union (Gules, 2018). The purpose of this study was, however, not to debate the validity of B-
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BBEE, but rather to investigate the possible relationships thereof with financial health measures 
among a sample of listed companies.  
7.2.1  Purpose of the research 
This study centred around two main constructs, namely B-BBEE and financial health. From a 
legal point of view, companies that do not comply with the 2003 Act are not liable for penalties. 
Government tenders do, however, require B-BBEE compliance. All companies, be it local or 
foreign, wanting to enter into business transactions with the South African government should 
be B-BBEE compliant. The trickle-down effect of preferential procurement means that the 
suppliers of these companies should also be B-BBEE compliant. By doing so, government has 
incentivised companies to adhere to the stated B-BBEE requirements. The logical expectation 
was that companies that have higher compliance levels of B-BBEE should have access to more 
government contracts. Such empowered companies should have a competitive advantage, as 
other companies doing business with them would increase their total B-BBEE score 
(preferential procurement is an element of the B-BBEE scorecard). Previous researchers 
(Morris, 2018; Van der Merwe & Ferreira, 2014; Kleynhans & Kruger, 2014; Mathura, 2009; 
Acemoglu et al., 2007) only gave attention to limited accounting-based and market-based 
financial health measures, whilst only one researcher (Morris, 2018) attended to a risk measure. 
Only two researchers (Morris, 2018; Van der Merwe & Ferreira, 2014) investigated all the 
elements of the B-BBEE scorecard, but used a small sample. All research conducted on B-
BBEE have also been performed over a relatively short time period. 
In light of the research gap, the author investigated the relationship between the B-BBEE scores 
(in total and per element) and a range of financial health measures of a sample of JSE-listed 
companies over the period 2004 to 2015. The sample consisted of all the JSE-listed companies 
for which Empowerdex have made compliance scores available for the period under review. 
This study thus represented a larger sample, and a longer time frame than has been investigated 
before. By using each element of the B-BBEE scorecard, elements that are linked to improved 
financial health could be identified. 
The primary objective was to investigate the nature and significance of the relationship between 
B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and a number of financial health measures. The 
secondary objective was to investigate trends in the respective variables over time. To address 
these research objectives, the research questions and hypotheses were developed and answered. 
A summary thereof and the results of the studies were presented in Table 6.25. An overview of 
how these research questions and hypotheses were addressed, is presented next. 
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7.2.2  Research design and methodology 
A descriptive research design was elected, which called for the collection and analysis of 
quantitative data. A panel design was adopted, as the sample covered different companies over 
consecutive time periods. As the same companies were not studied for all the years, an 
unbalanced panel was used.  
The population consisted of all companies that were listed on the main and AltX boards of the 
JSE from 2004 to 2015. This time frame was selected as the Codes of Good Practice were 
largely unchanged during that period (the 2004 draft Codes and the 2007 Codes were very 
similar). The 2013 Codes were implemented in 2015, and all scores reflected in 2016 were 
measured according to the 2013 Codes. The 2013 Codes was considered incomparable to the 
2007 Codes. Delisted companies were included in the sample to address survivorship bias. In 
total, 1 767 company years from 379 unique companies were analysed. 
Total B-BBEE scores were obtained from Empowerdex’s annual lists of most empowered 
companies. The individual elements were obtained from Empowerdex’s research department 
upon enquiry. The financial health data (accounting-based, market-based, default risk and 
value-based measures) and company size data were downloaded from the Bloomberg (2018) 
database. Outliers were winsorised, whilst B-BBEE scores were confirmed against the B-BBEE 
certificates, and financial health data against financial statements. 
Descriptive analyses were utilised to describe the data set. A mixed-model ANOVA and 
Fisher’s LSD test were used to analyse the significance of the observed changes in the mean B-
BBEE scores (in total and per element) over the research period per annum. Regression models 
(fixed effects, random effects and pooled OLS) were then utilised to investigate the nature and 
significance of the relationship between B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and a range 
of financial health measures. For purposes of the mixed-model ANOVA and Fisher’s LSD test, 
the sample size was reduced to only the 100 most empowered companies per year during the 
nascent period, to be comparable to the wider adoption period. The panel regressions were 
performed on the full sample. The accounting-based measures of change in turnover, ROA, 
ROE and ROS were used to evaluate historical performance. Market-based financial health 
measures (annual share price growth, MTBV, P/E ratio, cost of equity and excess return) were 
employed to investigate the future financial health expectations of the sampled companies. Each 
company’s EVA and default risk probability were also investigated in relation to B-BBEE.  
The panel regression results were adjusted for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity. The cost of equity included two negative observations, and hence these 
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negative costs of equity were removed, and cost of equity reanalysed. No difference in results 
was noted. In the following section, the main findings from the literature review will be 
presented, followed by the findings from the empirical investigations. 
 
7.3  MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main findings from the B-BBEE literature will be highlighted in the following two sections. 
7.3.1  The rationale for and measurement of B-BBEE 
B-BBEE legislation was implemented in 2003 in an attempt to redress the inequalities remnant 
of the apartheid government. The goal was to eradicate poverty, specifically among black 
people. The B-BBEE Act (No. 53 of 2003) was revised and the B-BBEE Act (No. 46 of 2013) 
allows for the amendments to the Codes of Good Practice accompanying the 2013 Codes. 
The 2003 Act did not provide guidelines on the measurement of B-BBEE, but rather specified 
that the Codes of Good Practice should stipulate how B-BBEE would be measured. A draft of 
these Codes was circulated in 2004, detailing seven elements of B-BBEE, namely ownership, 
management control, employment equity, preferential procurement, enterprise development, 
skills development and a residual element. The residual element was clarified under the 2007 
Codes as socio-economic development. The weighting of each element was indicated in Section 
2.4.2, and tabulated in Tables 1.1 and 5.2. Ownership and preferential procurement carried the 
largest portion of the total B-BBEE score, as each element accounted for 20 of the 100 points. 
Employment equity, skills development and enterprise development each added 15 points 
toward the total score, whilst management control and socio-economic development 
contributed ten and five points respectively (DTI, 2007). 
All the elements making up the total B-BBEE score need to be verified by a registered B-BBEE 
auditor which then provides the company with an official B-BBEE certificate. This certificate 
could be used for government tenders and to obtain new clients. The B-BBEE certification is 
typically issued after the company’s financial year-end, as the preceding year’s expenditure on 
preferential procurement suppliers, skills development and socio-economic development are 
considered. The possible benefit of the increased B-BBEE compliance should thus be noted in 
the year following the B-BBEE efforts. Given that the effect of increased B-BBEE compliance 
is expected to be noticeable in the year when the audited scores are released, the financial results 
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of each of the sample companies were considered for the financial year-end corresponding with 
the year when the audited B-BBEE scores were released. 
7.3.2  Lessons learnt from other reformative policies 
Similar reformative policies to B-BBEE were implemented in other countries. The most studied 
policy is the New Economic Plan or the National Development Plan of Malaysia (the latter plan 
replaced the former). The economic reformation plan of Malaysia was widely regarded as 
successful (Marazanye, 2016; Uppal, 2014). The success of this plan could be ascribed to the 
focus on education in addition to ownership and employment equity (ibid). Criticism was also 
raised as some indigenous people expressed a feeling of entitlement to tertiary education, 
despite not meeting the entry criteria of universities (Mathura, 2009).  
The Malaysian programme was followed during a time of a commodity boom, which benefitted 
Malaysia. This boom was similar to the commodity boom seen in 2004 to 2007, which 
positively affected South African firms. The Malaysian reformative plan changed with the 
economic conditions to prevent transformation from hindering economic growth. South Africa 
can thus learn from the Malaysian government to focus on education as a primary source of 
economic upliftment. Transformation programmes can also be followed in a time when there is 
sufficient economic growth, as was seen from 2004 to 2007. The BEE Commission could 
consider realigning the requirements of B-BBEE with the current economic conditions.  
In South Africa, the apartheid regime also followed an economic upliftment program called 
volkskapitalisme. This program was aimed specifically at educating poor white people and job 
creation. The volkskapitalisme program ensured high quality education (all levels of education) 
in Afrikaans. State-owned enterprises, such as Eskom and Transnet, provided employment to 
poor Afrikaans people as a means of economic empowerment. This study was regarded as 
successful by Masito (2007). The post-apartheid government can thus also learn some lessons 
from the volkskapitalisme programme. Firstly, education should be prioritised and if possible, 
education in children’s home language. Secondly, state-owned enterprises can be a suitable job 
creator for the unemployed and could provide designated groups with income and dignity. 
The Zimbabwe Indigenisation Programme (ZIP) was implemented in 2007. ZIP has a more 
strenuous ownership requirement than B-BBEE, namely that 51 per cent of shareholders should 
be black citizens (Zimbabwe Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation & Economic Empowerment, 
2007). Since the implementation of ZIP, the economy of Zimbabwe has not prospered and, as 
such, the author is of the opinion that ZIP has not led to economic growth, but may rather have 
impeded investment and economic growth. Gules (2018) also noted that foreign companies 
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want a relaxation of, specifically, the ownership requirement before investing in South Africa. 
As such, the South African government should be wary to set a stringent ownership 
requirement, as this may hinder companies’ financial health and, by doing so, hinder economic 
growth. 
In the US, several informal programmes were launched to empower the previously enslaved 
African-American individuals (Mtima, 1999). Upliftment was achieved through education, 
skills development and creating new companies by black people for the employment of black 
people (ibid). This approach followed in the US is different to South Africa as the US 
interventions were made by the state itself, instead of the state requiring companies to fulfil 
their transformation strategies. The South African government can broaden their upliftment 
strategies to enhance education and skills development, and to create favourable conditions for 
black entrepreneurs to start their own companies.  
The possible positive effects of B-BBEE on poverty upliftment have not been translated into 
greater income equality in South Africa (IRR, 2016). The opposite is true, in that the inequality 
(measured by the Gini-coefficient) increased during the period covered by this study (The 
World Bank, 2019). Prior researchers have not reported conclusive results on the wealth that 
companies can create through B-BBEE. There was thus no clear business case for compliance 
with B-BBEE legislation thus far. The author, therefore, investigated the relationship between 
B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and a range of financial health measures. The main 
findings from the empirical investigation will be discussed next. 
 
7.4  MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
A summary of the hypotheses and the empirical responses thereto, were provided in Table 6.25. 
All hypotheses were rejected, as a significant relationship with total B-BBEE score and each of 
the B-BBEE elements were observed with at least one measure of financial health. Significant 
increases in B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) were also noted during the research 
period. These findings will be discussed in greater detail in the following two sections. 
7.4.1  Compliance trends amongst the most empowered companies 
The average total B-BBEE score increased from 19.717 in 2004 to 77.334 in 2015 (as seen in 
Table 5.1). This suggests that the average most empowered company in 2004 was seen as non-
compliant, whereas the average most empowered company in 2015 achieved a level three B-
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BBEE score. The overall average score of all the considered companies over the entire research 
period was 42.905, which equates to level seven B-BBEE compliance. The sampled companies 
gradually became more compliant during the wider adoption period. In 2012, one company, 
which describes itself as a B-BBEE investment company, has achieved a score of 100 points 
(the maximum score).  
The averages of the B-BBEE element scores are between 28 per cent and 67 per cent of the 
points available. Employment equity had the lowest average score (4.203 out of a potential 15 
points). Socio-economic development had the best average score (3.372 out of 5).  
Following the observable increases in the total B-BBEE score and each element over the study 
period, mixed-model ANOVAs and Fisher LSD tests were performed to investigate the 
significance of the observed trend over the research period. A significant increase was noted 
for the total B-BBEE score and each element over the study period. The most empowered 
companies have become significantly more empowered. This observation is encouraging, as it 
shows that the sampled companies embraced the moral imperative of compliance with B-
BBEE. The Fisher LSD analyses showed that the majority of the annual changes were 
significant, except for the years surrounding the release of revised Codes.  
The telecommunications, technology and health care sectors were the most empowered sectors. 
The telecommunications sector’s average total B-BBEE score was partly attributable to a large 
state-owned telecommunications company. To ascertain whether there were significant 
relationships between B-BBEE scores and financial health measures, panel regressions were 
performed. The results thereof are presented next. 
7.4.2  Relationships between B-BBEE scores and financial health measures 
Panel regressions were performed with the B-BBEE scores (in total and per element) and the 
financial health measures as the dependent variable. The author controlled for market 
capitalisation, total revenue and total assets. No significant associations between B-BBEE 
scores (in total or per element) and the accounting-based measures of financial health were 
identified. Other researchers, such as Mathura (2009) and Kleynhans and Kruger (2014), found 
no significant relationships with ROS or change in turnover, which is in line with the findings 
of this study. 
Significant positive relationships were observed between total B-BBEE score (in total and 
certain elements) and cost of equity. A positive relationship (significant at the 10 per cent level) 
between total B-BBEE score and default risk probability were observed. A significant negative 
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association was reported between total B-BBEE score and P/E ratio, as summarised in Table 
6.25. These findings are comparable since both a higher cost of equity and default risk 
probability, and a lower P/E ratio is seen as a negative financial health indicator. These findings 
are in line with those reported by Mehta and Ward (2017), Van der Merwe and Ferreira (2014) 
and De Villiers and Ferreira (2011) who all found a significant negative relationship between 
total B-BBEE score and market-based measures. Market capitalisation had a positive 
relationship with financial health, and total assets a negative association in the majority of the 
analyses.  
These relationships between B-BBEE scores (in total and certain elements) and the market-
based measures can be related to the higher risk associated with a higher B-BBEE score. A 
higher risk of default can be associated with a higher cost of equity and a lower valuation (P/E 
ratio) (Moretti, 2016). The relationship between the financial health measures and the 
individual elements of the B-BBEE scorecard were also investigated. A significant negative 
relationship was identified between skills development and the P/E ratio, whereas a significant 
positive relationship was detected between socio-economic development and P/E ratio. The 
positive relationship implies that a higher valuation is associated with a higher B-BBEE element 
score. More socio-economic development spend is thus related with a higher valuation (P/E 
ratio), whilst a lower valuation was observed for increased skills development. These 
observations could imply that shareholders are sceptical of the long-term benefits of skills 
development. Expenditure on skills development might offer financial benefits in the short-
term as limited job opportunities exist for the beneficiaries of skills development. A negative 
sentiment towards skills development could partly explain the negative relationship between 
skills development score and P/E ratio for the considered companies during the study period.  
In contrast, a significant negative association existed between skills development and cost of 
equity. This finding implies that a lower cost of equity was associated with an increase in skills 
development score, which could be seen in a positive light. This contradiction may indicate that 
skills development and the relationships thereof with different financial health measures, is a 
complex phenomenon. There could be positive and negative implications for a company to 
comply with skills development.  
Management control was also negatively related with cost of equity. Shareholders might hence 
view more diverse management in a positive light. Ownership, employment equity, preferential 
procurement and enterprise development were positively associated with cost of equity. An 
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increase in these element scores were thus related with an increase in cost of equity, and is thus 
a negative indication of financial health.  
The different associations with the B-BBEE elements could provide an indication to 
management of which elements they should concentrate on when developing their B-BBEE 
strategy. Management control and socio-economic development seem to be the two elements 
which shareholders view positively. The findings on the most likely perception of stakeholders 
on the elements are summarised in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Summary of the most likely perception of stakeholders on the B-BBEE 
elements 
Element Positive or negative 
Ownership Negative 
Management control Positive 
Employment equity Negative 
Skills development Positive and negative 
Preferential procurement Negative 
Enterprise development Negative 
Socio-economic development Positive 
In the light of the significant relationships found, recommendations will be provided next. 
 
7.5  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the reported findings, recommendations are offered to a range of stakeholders, 
including directors, policy makers, shareholders, the media, educators and accountants. 
7.5.1  Recommendations for directors 
Directors who are responsible for developing and implementing empowerment strategies, play 
an integral role in the sustainable future of B-BBEE. B-BBEE compliance in this study is linked 
to higher cost of equity and lower P/E ratio. No significant relationships with any of the other 
financial health indicators could be found. Directors should thus not view B-BBEE as a policy 
with a proven business case. The results of this study seem to indicate that B-BBEE is not the 
holy grail for financial health. The moral imperative of correcting the injustices of the past 
should, however, be taken into account. B-BBEE is aimed specifically at empowering black 
people. Directors and managers should explore alternative methods of empowering black 
people and addressing poverty in general. As education is an effective way to reduce poverty, 
directors could contemplate redirecting the expenditure on B-BBEE compliance towards 
bursaries for students from disadvantaged communities. 
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Directors could focus on the elements of the B-BBEE scorecard that are viewed as positive by 
shareholders, namely management control, socio-economic development and, to a lesser extent, 
skills development. Based on the findings of this study, a more diverse management team 
should be pursued, and a greater emphasis should be placed on socio-economic development 
and skills development. Directors should caution against overemphasising the importance of 
ownership, given that shareholders seem to view this element in a negative light, based on the 
link with cost of equity. In order to obtain organisational legitimacy, companies can develop 
skills of workers and of the community in the provision of clean energy. 
7.5.2  Recommendations for policy makers 
Policy makers should critically reflect on whether or not B-BBEE has achieved its goal of 
redressing the imbalances of the past, as the South African minister of trade and industry has 
suggested (Phakathi, 2019). From the literature review, it was evident that the common trait 
among successful empowerment state interventions was investment in basic and higher 
education. The current structure of economic empowerment should thus be reconsidered by 
policy makers and a greater emphasis should be placed on education. Policy makers should 
investigate other options than preferential procurement to incentivise companies to comply with 
B-BBEE. For example, tax rebates can be introduced where companies with higher total B-
BBEE scores pay less tax. An alternative to the current format of B-BBEE should ideally be 
investigated by policy makers. More emphasis could be placed on education and the elements 
that are perceived positively by shareholders, namely management control, socio-economic 
development and skills development. The departments of basic and higher education can 
provide additional funding to address skills shortages.  
7.5.3  Recommendations for shareholders 
Capital provided by shareholders is key to the sustainable future of any company. Shareholders 
should request an explanation from companies on the moral and other imperatives of B-BBEE 
initiatives. Meaningful engagement between shareholders and management of companies could 
lead to enhanced B-BBEE practices. The importance of B-BBEE compliance could also be 
stressed at the company’s annual general meeting, during which shareholders should be 
encouraged to engage with management and discuss the concerns they have with regard to B-
BBEE. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
135 
 
7.5.4  Recommendations for the media 
The media can considerably influence the views of the public on specific topics, including B-
BBEE. Whilst the media can play an active role in educating the public on B-BBEE, negative 
publicity about B-BBEE could cause a negative sentiment. The media should provide a 
balanced perspective on B-BBEE and remind the public of the continued need to uplift 
previously disadvantaged individuals.  
7.5.5  Recommendations for educators 
Educators, who have a significant influence on the future generations of directors and 
shareholders, should create awareness of the need for economic transformation. Entrepreneurial 
skills and social justice should be explained to students by involving them in community 
upliftment projects. Investment management modules should include the non-financial moral 
imperatives of investing to ensure that future decision makers account for financial and social 
considerations when making investment decisions. 
7.5.6  Recommendations for accountants 
Accountants should understand that a business case is not always necessary for something that 
is considered a moral imperative. The changes in cost of equity and P/E ratio should be 
monitored by accountants on a continuous basis if management decides to increase their 
company’s B-BBEE compliance level. Accountants should advise management on which 
elements (suggestions based on this study’s findings include management control and socio-
economic development) they should focus. The limitations and recommendations for future 
research will be discussed next. 
 
7.6  LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This study made use of secondary data obtained from Empowerdex’s lists of most empowered 
companies. The compliance trends identified are applicable to the most empowered companies 
and are not applicable to all JSE-listed companies. A random sample of companies on the JSE 
could be used to repeat this study in future. Attention could then be paid to their reporting on 
B-BBEE. A future author can compile a B-BBEE index based on corporate reporting. 
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Only JSE-listed companies were used in this study. The findings for these companies may not 
be applicable to small companies that are not listed on the JSE. The reliability and availability 
of data for unlisted companies remains challenging, and hence only JSE-listed companies were 
used. A study involving unlisted companies may provide a better understanding of the business 
case for B-BBEE in small entities.  
The B-BBEE scores of all companies included in this study were measured using the 2007 
Codes. The elements included in the 2007 Codes changed in the 2013 Codes. The trends of B-
BBEE scores measured under the 2013 Codes is an area of future research. The business case 
for B-BBEE can further be explored based on the 2013 Codes. 
Future researchers can investigate B-BBEE from a qualitative perspective by conducting 
interviews with investors. The aim of such a study can be to obtain a better understanding of 
the link between B-BBEE scores, cost of equity and the P/E ratio. More research is also required 
to reflect on factors contributing to the negative link between skills development and P/E ratio, 
and cost of equity, respectively. In Section 2.5 it was also mentioned that further study on the 
auditing of B-BBEE scores is necessary. The focus of such study should, specifically, be on the 
absence of the completeness assertion in the B-BBEE verification manual. 
 
7.7  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The moral imperative of complying with B-BBEE cannot be disputed. It is not always necessary 
to gain financially from doing the right thing. The results of this study revealed several instances 
where B-BBEE efforts were not significantly related to an increase in a company’s financial 
health. This observation does not, however, imply that companies should or could disregard B-
BBEE, specifically in the light of regulation in this regard. Companies have the freedom to 
select mechanisms that they perceive as being the most appropriate to contribute to the 
upliftment of the previously disadvantaged.  
The King IV Report on corporate governance (IoDSA, 2016) states that companies are regarded 
as corporate citizens and form an integral part of society. Companies thus have a moral 
imperative to uplift the community in which they operate, as they depend on the community, 
and the community depends on them. Compliance with B-BBEE can be seen as one of the ways 
in which companies can be good corporate citizens. It is, however, not the only way in which 
companies can contribute to sustainable development. As not all companies necessarily agree 
with all the elements of B-BBEE, they might explore alternative ways in which they can 
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contribute to society. B-BBEE does not appear to be the holy grail for financial health. As such, 
corporate leaders are encouraged to reflect on how they can truly contribute to a more 
empowered South African society. 
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APPENDIX A 
RESULTS OF THE MIXED-MODEL ANOVAS AND FISHER’S LSD 
TESTS CONDUCTED ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE B-BBEE 
SCORECARD 
Table 1: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean ownership 
score 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 989 52.180** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
Table 2: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean ownership score per annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004   0.112 0.150 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005     0.896 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2006       0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2007         0.014* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2008           0.002** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2009             0.176 0.001** 0.003** 0.000** 0.004** 0.000** 
2010               0.034* 0.086 0.006** 0.115 0.000** 
2011                 0.724 0.437 0.620 0.083 
2012                   0.272 0.887 0.038* 
2013                     0.210 0.374 
2014                       0.025* 
2015                         
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
 
Table 3: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean management 
control score 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 966 35.712** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level  
Table 4: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean management control score per annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004   0.000** 0.253 0.002** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005     0.000** 0.000** 0.238 0.544 0.333 0.010* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2006       0.036* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2007         0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2008           0.554 0.026* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2009             0.097 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2010               0.089 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2011                 0.008** 0.024* 0.021* 0.002** 
2012                   0.776 0.746 0.682 
2013                     0.979 0.497 
2014                       0.456 
2015                         
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
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Table 5: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean employment 
equity score 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 1017 25.912** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
 
Table 6: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean employment equity score per annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004   0.000** 0.006** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005     0.013* 0.182 0.387 0.007** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2006       0.000** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2007         0.635 0.164 0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.005** 0.000** 
2008           0.059 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.001** 0.000** 
2009             0.110 0.000** 0.000** 0.002** 0.142 0.004** 
2010               0.052 0.000** 0.111 0.924 0.170 
2011                 0.031* 0.824 0.046* 0.604 
2012                   0.024* 0.000** 0.008** 
2013                     0.091 0.783 
2014                       0.138 
2015                         
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
 
Table 7: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean skills 
development score 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 1035 17.241** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level  
Table 8: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean skills development score per annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004   0.006** 0.000** 0.000** 0.286 0.063 0.679 0.062 0.021* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005     0.161 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.002** 0.391 0.702 0.084 0.327 0.005** 
2006       0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.024* 0.077 0.672 0.694 0.139 
2007         0.001** 0.018* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2008           0.408 0.508 0.003** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2009             0.135 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2010               0.017* 0.005** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2011                 0.630 0.009** 0.060 0.000** 
2012                   0.032* 0.164 0.001** 
2013                     0.412 0.317 
2014                       0.056 
2015                         
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
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Table 9: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean preferential 
procurement score 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 1037 152.595** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
 
Table 10: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean preferential procurement score per annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004   0.429 0.049* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005     0.230 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2006       0.013* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2007         0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2008           0.004** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2009             0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2010               0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2011                 0.271 0.054 0.611 0.046* 
2012                   0.385 0.559 0.366 
2013                     0.150 0.995 
2014                       0.133 
2015                         
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
 
Table 11: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean enterprise 
development score 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 1056 97.011** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
 
Table 12: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean enterprise development score per annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004   0.247 0.029* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005     0.296 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2006       0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2007         0.358 0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2008           0.042* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2009             0.013* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.001** 
2010               0.016* 0.000** 0.001** 0.046* 0.404 
2011                 0.170 0.261 0.708 0.126 
2012                   0.854 0.083 0.004** 
2013                     0.138 0.010** 
2014                       0.244 
2015                         
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 13: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean socio-economic 
development score 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 11 1038 38.637** 0.000 
** Significant at the 1% level   
 
Table 14: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean socio-economic development score per 
annum 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2004   0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2005     0.000** 0.043* 0.339 0.013* 0.016* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2006       0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2007         0.282 0.618 0.670 0.019* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2008           0.113 0.133 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
2009             0.944 0.062 0.001** 0.002** 0.000** 0.000** 
2010               0.050* 0.001** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 
2011                 0.162 0.149 0.001** 0.010* 
2012                   0.912 0.057 0.238 
2013                     0.084 0.308 
2014                       0.464 
2015                         
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level 
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